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BEYOND 1984: UNDERCOVER IN AMERICA-
SERPICO TO ABSCAM
ROBERT I. BLECKER*
But what is government itself but the greatest of all reflec-
tions on human nature? If men were angels, no government
would be necessary. If angels were to govern men, neither ex-
ternal nor internal controls on government would be neces-
sary. In framing a government which is to be administered by
men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must first
enable the government to control the governed; and in the
next place oblige it to control itself.
James Madison, The 51st Federalist
PROLOGUE
The Lord made it tempting: commanding Adam not to eat from
the tree in the very center of the garden, and then creating Eve. The
Serpent, "more subtle than any other wild Creature that the Lord God
had made," approached Eve, an unsuspecting innocent, and questioned
her willingness to disobey their Sovereign's command. Deterred by the
prospect of punishment, Eve showed no predisposition to crime.
Thereupon the Sovereign's snake promised enormous gains from crimi-
nal violation: "Gdd knows that when you eat of it your eyes will be
opened, and you will be like God, knowing good and evil."
* Associate Professor, New York Law School; B.A. 1969, Tufts University; J.D.
1974, Harvard Law School; Special Assistant Attorney General, Office of the Special
Prosecutor, New York State 1974-1975.
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I believe that "s/he"--a neuter pronoun-is better than "he" in all appropriate con-
texts, but have been persuaded that its use would distract the reader. Under protest,
therefore, public officials and citizens are referred to as "he." Someday soon, perhaps, an
expanded consciousness of sexual equality will offer us a smooth, neutral grammar,
which will render this essay a stylistic anachronism. Also, I hope that someday a chang-
ing ethic in government will render this essay and the undercover techniques it discusses
similarly out of date.
1. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 322 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
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Eve yielded to the inducement, "took of the fruit and ate; and she
also gave some to her husband and he ate."
But of course the garden was wired. The all-monitoring Sovereign
soon confronted the transgressors: "Have you eaten of the tree of
which I commanded you not to eat?" Unheroic, Adam instantly coop-
erated-implicating his supplier, sacrificing his wife, and raising a de-
fense of sorts: "The woman who Thou gavest to be with me, she gave
me fruit of the tree, and I ate."
God asked Eve, "What is this that you have done?" and Eve, too,
took the route of confession and avoidance. Her response became a
classic legal defense of entrapment: "The Serpent beguiled me, and I
did eat."
The entrapment defense failed here. Eve was condemned to pain
in childbirth, Adam to toil the fields, and both to die. By also punish-
ing the Serpent, God perhaps disavowed responsibility for the induce-
ment. Or perhaps the entrapment defense failed because Adam and
Eve had freely chosen to disobey. Whatever the reason, there remains
an ambiguous moral residue in our mortality.
The Garden story also leaves us queasy because the crime that oc-
casioned our expulsion and certain death was non-violent, consensual,
unlike robbery or murder, where the victim (or family or friends) will
ordinarily protest their loss, so that the Sovereign may apprehend and
punish those responsible. But whom did Adam and Eve hurt? Did it
warrant such punishment? Their crime was victinless: they merely
possessed forbidden fruit. The purchase, sale, and consumption of con-
traband, forbidden consensual pleasures, leave no complainants. No
one involved wants an investigation; detection is difficult. It may be
necessary to monitor the garden and send in the snake.
We were expelled from our garden into a jungle, where the greedy
grasp for more ways to satisfy their desires, which multiply without
limit. On occasion, we are moved to act for a stranger's benefit, and
sometimes in nobler moments we care to do what is abstractly right,
but by and large, as individuals, we the people are selfishly driven to
gratify our desires.
Perhaps the greatest of all desires is the desire for power. In 1787
and 1788, when the people of the United States believed themselves
the first in history to deliberate freely on their constitutional plan, fear
of a lust for total power permeated their debates:
The pleasure of controul is palatable to all mankind without a
single exception from the cradle to the throne. Let our peculiar
situations be what- they may, our proportion of happiness
great, our domestic circles pleasing, our love of money un-
bounded .... still we are ready to risque the sacrifice of them
19841
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all for a share in the exercise of power over our fellow
creatures . 2
"History exhibits this melancholy truth" said Centinel during the
founding of our republic, "that lust of dominion that is inherent in
every mind, in a greater or less degree."3 Widely understood by Ameri-
cans of all persuasions who designed, discussed, and ratified the Con-
stitution, was that "when possessed of power [any governor] will be
constantly struggling for more, disturbing the government, and en-
croaching on the rights of others."
'4
The American founders were not the first to realize that human
nature impelled the powerful to increase their power. Aristotle, a fer-
vent advocate of limited constitutional government, portrayed the hor-
ror of all-pervasive totalitarianism, describing tyranny's "administra-
tive principle," for eliminating
independence and self confidence, two things which a tyrant
must guard against ... . Generally ensure that people do not
get to know each other well, for that establishes mutual confi-
dence. Another piece of traditional advice to a tyrant tells him
to keep the city dweller always within his view. . . . Their ac-
tivities then will not be kept secret and by constantly perform-
ing servile obligation they will become used to having no minds
of their own. . . . Similarly a tyrant should endeavor to keep
himself aware of everything that is said or done among his sub-
jects; he should have spies [at] any place where there [is] a
meeting or gathering of people.5
2. Ti*E CompLE-m ANT-FEDERALIST 30 (John De Witt) (H. Storing ed. 1981) [herein-
after cited as THE ANTI-FEDERALIST]. The Complete Anti-Federalist is an exhaustive col-
lection and analysis of letters and essays written in 1787-88 by those who opposed the
ratification of the Constitution. According to Herbert Storing, the editor, although
the Federalists and Anti-Federalists were divided among themselves, they were,
at a deeper level, united with one another. Their disagreements were not based
on different premises about the nature of man or the ends of political life. They
were not the deep cleavages of contending regimes. They were much less sharp
and clear-cut differences ... of men agreed that the purpose of government is
the regulation and thereby the protection of individual rights and that the best
instrument for this purpose is some form of limited, republican govern-
ment .... The nation was born in consensus but it lives in controversy, and the
main lines of that controversy are well-worn paths leading back to the founding
debate.
1 THE ANn-FEDERAIST, supra, at 5-6 (footnote omitted).
3. 2 id. at 172 (Centinel) (pseudonym of Judge George Bryan and his son Samuel,
both of Pennsylvania, id. at 130).
4. Id. at 310 (Federal Farmer) (pseudonym of Richard Henry Lee of Virginia, al-
though this is subject to dispute, id. at 215-16).
5. ARISTOTLE, THE PoLrTIcs, bk. V, ch. xi, at 225-26 (T.A. Sinclair, trans. 1962).
[VCol. 28
BEYOND 1984: UNDERCOVER IN AMERICA
Twenty-three centuries later, with the benefit of more modem
technology like two-way telescreens and implanted microphones, and
with the brutality of Nazi Germany and Stalinist Russia as recent ex-
amples, George Orwell's 1984 updated Aristotle's vision. If in Eden
God monitors everything, in Oceania, Big Brother is everywhere, and a
person
lives from birth to death under the eye of the Thought Police.
Even when he is alone he can never be sure that he is alone.
Wherever he may be, asleep or awake, working or resting, in
his bath or in bed, he can be inspected without warning and
without knowing that he is being inspected. Nothing that he
does is indifferent. His friendships, his relations, his behaviour
toward his wife and children, the expression of his face when
he is alone, the words he mutters in sleep, even the characteris-
tic movements of his body, are all jealously scrutinized. Not
only any actual misdemeanor, but any eccentricity, however
small, any change of habits, any nervous mannerism that could
possibly be the symptom of an inner struggle, is certain to be
detected. He has no freedom of choice in any direction
whatever.'
We retreated from brutal anarchy into consensual society and gave
our governors amplified but limited public power to command us in
common defense against violent threats, only to discover after checking
our enemies' designs and desires, that often the enemy are us. Our own
peaceful selfishness can be self-destructive: Our commons are tragic as
we all starve because each strives in isolation to better his or her di-
minishing lot.7 Without government, prudent and peaceful individuals
6. G. ORWELL, NINETEEN EIGHTY-FouR 173-74 (Signet ed. 1949).
7. See Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968). In an article
discussing possible solutions to the world's population growth problem, Hardin described
a scenario which he called "the tragedy of the commons":
Picture a pasture open to all. It is to be expected that each herdsman will try to
keep as many cattle as possible on the commons....
As a rational being, each herdsman seeks to maximize his gain. Explicitly or
implicitly, more or less consciously, he asks, "What is the utility to me of adding
one more animal to my herd?" This utility has one negative and one positive
component.
1) The positive component is a function of the increment of one animal. Since
the herdsman receives all the proceeds from the sale of the additional
animal, the positive utility is nearly +1.
2) The negative component is a function of the additional overgrazing created
by one more animal.
Since, however, the effects of overgrazing are shared by all the herdsmen, the
negative utility for any particular decision-making herdsman is only a fraction of
-1.
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deplete and pollute the commonwealth, destroying it for all.
Offsetting the ever-pressing threat that governors will not only co-
ordinate but dominate our lives, seize control and destroy liberty, is
the tendency of an uncoordinated selfish society to self-destructive
anarchy.
Our goal is liberty: freedom to develop our talents, to reach the
personality our constitutional inheritance allows us, to become our-
selves most fully. This has always been the promise of America.' Stan-
dard school text in the United States: Desiring freedom to live our
lives according to our own plan, we restrict the choices of each to en-
sure the remainder for all. To survive and improve our inheritance, we
impose restraints upon ourselves, however reluctantly. Restricting
power and liberty for the sake of liberty, limited government is deli-
cately suspended forever between twin threats-absolutism and anar-
chy-extremes to which encroaching power and ungoverned liberty re-
spectively incline it.
So, expelled from the Garden, and fearing both an anarchistic jun-
gle and a totalitarian state, We the People of the United States have
consciously set a standard for the world. We would establish for our-
selves and "millions yet unborn" our own Garden-like Constitutional
Republic where the People's elected representatives use the public
power for the good of the community. Government polices the
game-enforcing contracts, punishing crimes-so we can all cooperate
and compete within limits, striving for scarce rewards according to
posted rules.
We foresaw from our infancy that governors would violate their
compact with the governed, not only from a hunger for power but also
from material greed. Rulers would not only seize power, they would sell
it. Arguing against the ratification of the Constitution, Melancton
Adding together the component partial utilities, the rational herdsman con-
cludes that the only sensible course for him to pursue is to add another animal
to his herd. And another; and another.... But this is the conclusion reached
by each and every rational herdsman sharing a commons. Therein is the tragedy.
Each man is locked into a system that compels him to increase his herd without
limit-in a world that is limited. Ruin is the destination toward which all men
rush, each pursuing his own best interest in a society that believes in the free-
dom of the commons. Freedom in a commons brings ruin to all.
Id. at 1244.
8. During the constitutional debates, Philadelphiensis proclaimed that "the energy
and national strength of America are concommitant with her freedom .... If America is
to be great she must be free; freedom is her heart, her very lifeblood." 3 TnE ANTz-
FEDERALIsT, supra note 2, at 120 (Philadelphiensis) (pseudonym of Benjamin Workman,
a mathematics instructor at the University of Pennsylvania, id. at 99). The Federal
Farmer declared that "liberty, in its genuine sense, is security to enjoy the effects of our
honest industry and labours, in a free and mild government, and personal security from
all illegal restraints." 2 Id. at 261.
[Vol. 28
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Smith declared: "I will not say all men are dishonest; but I think that,
forming a constitution, if we presume this, we shall be on the safest
side."9 Strong promoters of the Constitution like James Wilson also
saw it "in the nature of man to pursue his own interest in preference to
the public good." 10
Totalitarian tyrants would openly destroy our constitutional rule
of law by substituting abstract ideology, naked power, and individual
whim for laws enacted by the people's representatives. So, too, power-
ful public cheaters corrode the constitutional core. "A free republic
. . . must rest for its support upon the confidence and respect which
the people have for their government and laws,""' declared Brutus in
1787. Most citizens must believe that legal commands mostly translate
into facts of life, that by and large public officials honestly enforce laws
and carry out orders. The People lose this faith when we come to be-
lieve that really two systems of rules operate-one set on the books for
ordinary citizens at the mercy of bureaucrats, and another more
favorable code for the powerful. Sooner or later the people catch on
that cheating pays because cheats pay off public officials with impu-
nity. Corruption, a cancer on the body politic, aggressively spreads, as
the public good becomes routinely sacrificed to private greed; our com-
mon allegiance quickly dissolves into cynical calculating selfishness.
As private individuals, in principle we support government as long
as it protects us against foreign and domestic violence and secures us
from common temptations whose widespread fulfillment injures us. We
force all our public officials to swear an oath of allegiance to the United
States Constitution. We publicly proclaim law and order, while pri-
vately we approach the world with double standards. "[D]eclamations
on the advantages and necessity of public and private virtue fall from
the lips of every one, while their lives are stained with the most sordid
and selfish practices.'
2
Clawing in a world of hypocrites and cheats, doing whatever pays,
we too do what we know we can with impunity. Sometimes we risk
punishment: we cheat at taxes, buy cheap stolen goods, drive under the
influence, use cocaine, commit adultery, and run red lights. To the
outer world, we properly defer to government's commands, but con-
vinced that money and connections substitute for a rule of law among
the elite, we privately fulfill our forbidden desires.
9. 6 THE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 2, at 154 (Melancton Smith).
10. James Wilson's Statehouse Speech, in 1 PENNSYLVANIA AND THE FEDERAL CONSTI-
TUTON 148 (J.D. McMaster & F. Stone, eds. 1970).
11. 2 THE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 2, at 370 (Brutus) (pseudonym of Robert
Yates, a justice of the New York Supreme Court, id. at 358).
12. A Proposal for Reviving Christian Conviction, 31 Oct. 1787, reprinted in 5 THE
ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 2, at 126 (anonymous).
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Still we decry public corruption and governmental overreach for
their serious threat to our constitutional liberties. Ever since Odysseus
had his subordinates bind him to the mast and turn a deaf ear to his
entreaties, 3 we have understood that public safety requires the gov-
erned to restrain their governors from sacrificing the general good to
their private passions, and that safety also requires the governors to
restrain themselves. We need government officials who take their oaths
seriously. They are like us, so we know they lust for power.
We distrust placing power in their hands; yet we know we must
place it somewhere. Liberty requires the power of government, but
again, as the founders knew, history proves that government tends to
encroach upon liberty, expanding toward totalitarian control. "It must
be admitted," the Federal Farmer observed,
that men, from the monarch down to the porter are constantly
aiming at power and importance; and this propensity must be
as constantly guarded against in the forms of government. Ade-
quate powers must be delegated to those who govern, and our
security must be in limiting, defining and guarding the exercise
of them, so that those given shall not be abused.2
4
Everyone saw the problem. How to harness the desire for power and
constructively channel it by constitutional arrangements? How to
make a limited constitutional republic real? Madison proposed the
pragmatic solution in the 51st Federalist: "Ambition must be made to
counteract ambition.'1
5
The 1970's shook and restored this nation's faith in its rule of law.
This past decade's characteristic theme, the issue more than any other
for which it seems to stand, is public reaction to corruption in govern-
ment. A Vice President resigned, pleading "no contest" to bribery
charges.'0 The President of the United States, about to be impeached,
13. HoMER, THE ODYSSEY 138-39, 141-42 (W.H.D. Rouse trans. 1937). One of the ob-
stacles along the path home was the island of the Sirens. Any man who heard the Sirens'
melodious song became bewitched to the point of forgetting all else in life save the
beauty of their song. The enchanted listener, lured to the meadow of the Sirens, was
rendered immobile by their song. There he would sit forever, his body decaying until
death.
Odysseus yearned to hear the song of the Sirens', but understandably wished to
forego the consequences of its charm. Ingeniously, Odysseus plugged the ears of each
man in his crew with wax, but not before ordering them to bind him hand and foot and
to fasten his body to the mast. He also commanded that should he signal his crew to
untie him, they were to tie him even tighter. Thus secured, Odysseus safely led his crew
past the enticements of the Sirens. Id.
14. 2 THE ANTI-FEDERALIST supra note 2, at 310 (Federal Farmer).
15. THE FEDERALIST, supra note 1, No. 51, at 322 (J. Madison).
16. "Agnew Resigns the Vice Presidency," N.Y. Times, Oct. 11, 1973, at 1, col. 1;
"Agnew Plea Ends 65 Days of Insisting on Innocence," id. at 1, col. 3. As the result of a
[Vol. 28
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resigned and was pardoned from all criminal liability by his own cho-
sen successor.17 The United States Attorney General, the Counsel to
the President, and many other ranking public officials were indicted,
convicted, and sent to prison."" In the United States, the '70's were
Watergate: corruption in government.
The experience was frightening when Nixon fired Special Prosecu-
tor Cox for pushing too hard, and Attorney General Elliot Richardson
resigned in protest.19 Could it be happening here, in this republic
where no person, even the President, is above the law? We shuddered.
Public officials, sworn to uphold the laws, could not themselves become
successful lawbreakers. Our most cherished freedoms, protected by our
plea bargain agreement, Agnew was not tried and faced no jail term for the criminal
charge.
17. On August 9, 1974, Richard Nixon resigned his post as President of the United
States. R. Nixon, PuB. PAPERS 626 (1974). On September 8, President Gerald R. Ford,
pursuant to article I, section 2 of the United States Constitution, pardoned Richard
Nixon for any offenses committed from January 20, 1969 through August 9, 1974. G.
Ford, PUB. PAPERS 103 (1974) (text of Presidential Proclamation 4311). Following the
pardon, Ford's press secretary, J.F. terHorst resigned, saying that "it is impossible to
conclude that the former President is more deserving of mercy than persons of lesser
station in life whose offenses have had less impact on our national well-being." G. FORD,
A TiME TO HEAL 176 (1979).
18. See generally 1-26 Hearings Before the Select Committee on Presidential Cam-
paign Activities of the United States Senate, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974); Debate on
Articles of Impeachment: Hearings of the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of
Representatives, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974); I-iH Impeachment Inquiry: Hearings
Before the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives, 93d Cong., 2d
Sess. (1974); EXAMINATION OF PRESIDENT NIXON'S TAX RETURNS FOR 1969 THROUGH 1972
PREPARED FOR THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON INTERNAL REVENUE AND ITS STAFF 93d Cong., 2d
Sess. (1974); SELECT CoMmITTEE ON PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN ACTIvITIES, U.S. SENATE, Fi-
NAL REPORT 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974); S. DASH, CHIEF COUNSEL (1976); J. DEAN, BLIND
AmITION (1976); J. DOYLE, NOT ABOVE THE LAW (1977); J. EHRLICHMAN, WITNESS TO
POWER: THE NIXON YEARS (1982); H.R. HALDEMAN, THE ENDS OF POWER (1978); S.
HERSH, THE PRICE OF POWER (1983); E.H. HUNT, UNDERCOVER (1974); L. JAWORSKi, THE
RIGHT AND THE POWER (1976); G.G. LIDDY, WIL (1980); J.A. LUKAS, NIGHTMARE: THE
UNDERSIDE OF THE NIXON YEARS (1976); D. RATHER AND G.P. GATES, THE PALACE GUARD
(1974); J.J. SIRIcA, SrTING THE RECORD STRAIGHT (1979); B. WOODWARD AND C. BERN-
STEIN, ALL THE PRESIDENT'S MEN (1974).
19. On April 30, 1973, in response to public pressure, President Nixon appointed Ar-
chibald Cox, former Solicitor General and Professor of Law at Harvard University, as
Special Prosecutor to investigate the Watergate break-in and related matters. After the
existence of the White House tapes became known, Cox subpoenaed tapes of nine critical
White House conversations. Having resisted the subpoenas in the courts and lost, United
States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974), President Nixon ordered Attorney General Elliott
Richardson to fire Cox on October 20, 1973. Both Richardson and his deputy, William D.
Ruckelshaus, refused to do so, and resigned. Solicitor General Robert Bork, next in the
Justice Department's line of authority, then fired Cox. See THE STAFF OF Tim NEW YORK
TIMES, THE END OF A PRESIDENCY, 33-34 (1974).
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abstract rule of constitutional law, suddenly hung by a thread, subject
to the caprice of the powerful.
In the end, however, Watergate was more comforting than fright-
ening. It confirmed our trust in ourselves and the enormous strength of
a faceless constitutional republic. With fascination we witnessed a tri-
umph of massive inexorable legal process. Journalists wrote their ex-
pos6s, legal gears slowly turned and powerful men tumbled, tangled in
an institutional lattice of countless lesser public officials doing their
jobs.
Prison sentences were served and commuted, pardons were issued.
Memos became memoirs with different casts of heroes and villains.
Monuments were erected to this fight against corruption: Across the
country mandatory ethics courses were instituted in law schools. Con-
gress enacted legislation establishing regular procedures for appointing
special prosecutors when necessary.20 Watergate was all neatly behind
us, we thought. The good.guys were basically separable from the bad,
and two decent law-abiding citizens-Gerald Ford and Jimmy
Carter-successively occupied the White House. Attention began to
shift from corruption to the economy.
But it wasn't so simple. The '80's began and because of ill-timed
leaks, corruption in government once again burst to front-page atten-
tion: Abscam, the code name for a massive federal undercover investi-
gation of corruption, in which Federal agents posed as representatives
of rich Arab sheiks trying to buy favors from federal, state, and local
officials. Early reaction to Abscam raised concern. The American Civil
Liberties Union and other groups cried "foul."21 They characterized
the investigative technique employed as "unfair," "entrapment," a vio-
lation of due process of law. It was one thing to use Nixon's own secret
recordings of corrupt schemes against himself and his scheming subor-
dinates; it was quite another to countenance the FBI and Justice De-
partment setting in motion their own phony schemes, baiting unsus-
pecting public officials and secretly monitoring their reactions.
Did the end-exposing corruption-justify these
means-manufacturing phony crimes and offering very attractive in-
ducements to corruption? Clearly a basic question of the '70's re-
mained: What techniques of investigation, what government-sponsored
insinuations in intimate settings, what poisons were we willing to inject
into the legal process in order to root out the festering rot of public
corruption?
Those who greeted Abscam with an "oh no, not again" were mak-
ing a big mistake. This controversy about official corruption involved
20. Ethics in Government Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-521, 92 Stat. 1824 (codified as
amended in titles 2, 5, 18, 28, 39 U.S.C. (1982)).
21. See, e.g., American Civil Liberties Union, The Lessons of Abscam, Public Policy
Report, October 10, 1982.
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an added dimension-the examination of necessary and proper tech-
niques of investigation-and was therefore not merely a repetition of
Watergate. To another group of secret agents, special prosecutors, and
well-informed citizens who lived through the '70's not in Washington,
D.C., but in New York City, it was not all happening again. It had
never stopped.
New York had had its own great bout with official corruption,
months of front-page headlines, televised hearings, and a Special Pros-
ecutor appointed by the state's Chief Executive, who was later fired by
a successor while investigating that successor's close political associ-
ates. 22 New York had secret tapes which revealed a criminal justice
system rotten to the core. Exposing official corruption in the 1970's
was, then, a tale of at least two cities.
Unlike Watergate, both the New York experience and Abscam
have failed to neatly separate in the public mind forces of good from
forces of evil. Why? The technique of investigation became an inde-
pendent issue. At times how to make a corruption case dwarfed the
problem of who was corrupt. Essentially the identical technique was
utilized in both investigations: In New York honest federal prosecutors
simulated crimes and sent undercover agents fully monitored and care-
fully controlled into the criminal justice system to pose as criminals
and "fix" their own cases in order to determine who within the system
was corrupt.
Government undercover agents posed as criminals, fixed phony
cases and penetrated the system-a strong and unpleasant remedy for
a very serious illness. United States v. Archer,23 a prominent case pio-
22. Maurice H. Nadjari was appointed special prosecutor by New York Governor
Nelson Rockefeller on September 19, 1972. N.Y. Times, Sept. 20, 1972, at 1, col. 6. Gov-
ernor Hugh Carey attempted to dismiss Nadjari on December 23, 1975, noting "clashes
in personalities [and] a recent series of adverse court decisions" which had allegedly
caused "a perceptible decline in public confidence in Nadjari." Id., Dec. 24, 1975, at 1,
col 6. A Times article by Marcia Chambers noted:
It was also learned from three sources that in the last three months Mr.
Nadjari's office had been investigating a number of high officials connected to
the Carey administration, some of whom were based in the city. The inquiry,
which is said to include politicians and judges, centers in part on the alleged
fixing of cases.
Id. Because of strong public outcry, Nadjari was reinstated-only to be dismissed perma-
nently by Governer Carey and Attorney General Lefkowitz on June 25, 1976. Id. June 26,
1976, at 1, col. 6.
23. United States v. Archer, 355 F. Supp. 981 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), rev'd, 486 F.2d 670
(2d Cir. 1973) (reversing convictions with instructions to dismiss indictment). People v.
Archer, 68 A.D.2d 441, 417 N.Y.S.2d 507 (2d Dep't 1979), af'd 49 N.Y.2d 978, 406
N.E.2d 804, 428 N.Y.S.2d 949, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 839 (1980); Klein v. Murtagh, 44
A.D.2d 465, 355 N.Y.S.2d 622 (2d Dep't), aff'd 34 N.Y.2d 988, 318 N.E.2d 606, 360
N.Y.S.2d 416 (1974). See also In re Archer, 61 A.D.2d 802, 402 N.Y.S.2d 184 (2d Dep't
1978) (disbarment proceeding). For the Archer habeas corpus case, see Archer v. Coin-
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neering this technique against public officials, involved deception, not
only of corrupt elements, but of other honest governmental officials.
The technique's success required lies under oath. Under orders and in
the name of rooting out corruption, undercover government agents
committed acts which if done by citizens in their private capacity
would have constituted serious crimes.
Parts of this story are well-known. Serpico and Prince of the City
are two of many books and movies whose main characters and events
figure here.24 But this history is not primarily about the characters and
passions of the corrupt and corruption fighters. Left unasked by
Watergate, at the center of public and court controversy in New York
in the '70's and the real Abscam problem of the '80's, is the question of
the investigative technique and who has authority to use it. The cen-
tral question concerning corruption remains for New York and the na-
tion: Is carefully monitored criminal simulation necessary and proper,
in fact indispensable, for a real commitment to a rule of law, or is it an
unfair intrusion into the liberties of the citizenry and a serious threat
to our rule of law, as well as a violation of Constitutional due process?
If sometimes the technique is necessary and proper and other times an
unfair intrusion and serious threat, how can we distinguish the occa-
sions and how can we use it properly?
There are many ways to put the question. Who guards the guardi-
ans? Whom should we fear more, zealous honest public officials who
are willing to use trickery and deceit to cheat the cheats, or public offi-
cials, among them federal and state legislators, defense attorneys, pros-
ecutors, and judges, who allow criminals to buy their way out of the
rules? Are we threatened with 1984 in 1984 by "special prosecutors"
who use special techniques to detect and prosecute this most resistant
strain of "victimless" crime, public corruption? Specifically, what is en-
trapment? What are its moral and legal limits? What constitutes out-
rageous governmental conduct? Generally, what does it mean to be
committed to a rule of "law" and not of "men"? When do the ends
justify the means?
This essay addresses these questions in the context of a federal
constitutional republic. The United States Constitution, the nation's
higher law, establishes basic structures of government, dividing power
among executive, legislative, and judicial branches. It also guarantees
individual rights and fundamental liberties which override passions
and policies even of the majority. Public opinion as to good public pol-
missioner of Correction, 646 F.2d 44 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 851 (1981).
24. ROBERT DALEY, PRINCE OF THE CITY (1978); PETER MAAS, SERPICO (1973). For
other background material on the issue of police corruption in the New York City Police
Department, see D. DURK AND I. SILVERMAN, THE PLEASANT AVENUE CONNECTION (1976);
B. GELB, VARNISHED BRASS (1983); PATRICK V. MURPHY, COMMISSIONER (1977).
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icy, however strongly held at a given moment, yields to contrary consti-
tutional rights guaranteed in our secular Bible. Freedom from unrea-
sonable searches and seizures, coupled with other basic rights, amount
to a fundamental promise that government will essentially leave us
alone to go about our business and strive for success according to
posted rules. Free, within limits.
By adopting our federal republic, we partitioned power between a
single central government and several state governments. The basic
purpose of our federal plan has been to promote the general welfare
while we secure freedom, by delegating to the federal government ade-
quate power to superintend all and only national concerns, while re-
serving to the state governments the power to superintend local con-
cerns. It was unanimously agreed during our founding that not all
boundaries between national and state power could be established in
advance.
The federal government would provide for the common defense,
make treaties, regulate interstate commerce, coin money, etc., and by
its own explicit declaration the Constitution and all federal law made
pursuant to it was the "supreme Law of the Land. '2 5 Each state's pri-
mary sovereign function was its internal police power, which essentially
included a power to define, detect, prosecute, and punish crime. The
federal government would also define, investigate, and punish, but only
those crimes which involved the nation as a whole: e.g., counterfeiting
and treason. All public power not delegated to the federal government
was reserved to the local government, or the people, in whom ultimate
sovereignty 'rests."8 But the United States also explicitly guaranteed
each state "a republican form of government. '27 Each state constitu-
25. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
26. The absence of such explicit declarations of state and individual rights was the
Anti-Federalists' most telling criticism of the proposed Constitution. The Constitution
was ratified without a Bill of Rights, but with an understanding at the time that the new
Congress would immediately take up proposed guarantees of individual and states'
rights. Accordingly, James Madison, leader in the House, introduced the first ten amend-
ments which the states ratified as of November 3, 1791. I. BRANT, 3 JAMES MADISON
(1941); M. FARRAND, THE FRAMING OF THE CONSTITUTION 252 n.3 (1913). Beyond specifi-
cally enumerated individual rights guaranteed by the first eight amendments, the Bill of
Rights included the "saving" provision of the ninth amendment for individual rights and
the reserving provisions of the tenth amendment for state and popular powers not dele-
gated to the federal government. "The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights,
shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people." U.S. CONST.
amend. IX. "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor
prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively or to the people."
U.S. CONST. amend. X. The principal sources for the events that led to the adoption of
the Bill of Rights are collected in J. ELLIOT, DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS
ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONsTrrunON (1901) and M. FARmD, THE RECORDS
OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 (1937).
27. Article IV, section four states in relevant part: "The United States shall guaran-
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tion might differ radically from the next, but every citizen of the
United States was assured that the people of every state would be rep-
resented by freely chosen delegates who would reflect their will and
legislate for the common good.
If, as Hamilton asserted in the 71st Federalist, "the republican
principle demands that the deliberate sense of the community should
govern the conduct of those to whom they intrust their affairs,' '2 and
if the guarantee clause of the United States Constitution truly guaran-
tees a republican state government to every citizen in every state, then
federal jurisdiction may extend to defining, detecting and prosecuting
official corruption in state government. This was not discussed in 1787.
Immediately thereafter, sharp disputes arose between the federal
government and the states over the boundaries between federal and
state power, resolved only by the Civil War.29 An aftermath of the
tee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government.. . ." U.S. CONST.
art. IV, § 4. There is only a small amount of commentary on the guarantee clause. See,
e.g., W. WIECEK, THE GUARANTEE CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION (1972); Bonfield, Baker v.
Carr: New Light on the Constitutional Guarantee of Republican Government, 50 CALIF.
L. REV. 245 (1963); Bonfield, The Guarantee Clause of Article IV, Section 4: A Study in
Constitutional Desuetude, 46 MINN. L. REV. 513 (1962); Franklin, The Ninth Amend-
ment as Civil Law Method and Its Implications for Republican Form of Government,
40 TUL. L. REV. 487 (1966). See infra text accompanying notes 779-96.
28. THE FEDERALIST, supra note 1, No. 71, at 432 (A. Hamilton).
29. In Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793), the United States Supreme
Court exercised its jurisdiction to hear a suit brought by two citizens of South Carolina
against the State of Georgia to collect a debt owed to an estate. The Georgia House of
Representatives, considering the Court's exercise of jurisdiction in Chisholm an affront
to state sovereignty, passed a bill that would make enforcement of the Court's judgment
a felony punishable by death. See STATE DOCUMENTS ON FEDERAL RELATIONS 7-11 (H.
Ames ed. 1970). The eleventh amendment, adopted in response to Chisholm, explicitly
withdrew cases like Chisholm from the jurisdiction of the federal courts: "The Judicial
power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity,
commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State,
or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." U.S. CONsT. amend. XI (ratified 1798).
Not long after Chisholm, the United States Supreme Court asserted federal
supremacy in Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199 (1796), in which the Court invalidated
a Virginia statute that purported to confiscate the property of British subjects in viola-
tion of the provisions of the Treaty of Peace with Great Britain of 1783. Many of the
Supreme Court's early decisions, especially under Chief Justice Marshall's leadership,
adjudicated disputes over the extent of state and federal power. Among these boundary-
setting decisions are some of the most familiar landmarks of constitutional jurispru-
dence. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824) (state grant of a steamship
monopoly affecting interstate navigation held void as in conflict with federal law licens-
ing such commerce); Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821) (state criminal
conviction reversed as violative of the supremacy clause); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17
U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819) (Maryland law imposing tax on federally-chartered bank held
void as violative of the supremacy clause); Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.)
304 (1816) (Supreme Court asserts appellate jurisdiction to reverse a judgment of Vir-
ginia's highest court held to be in conflict with a United States treaty).
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Union victory, the fourteenth amendment, explicitly guaranteed every
citizen "due process of law," 0 now not only from the federal but also
from their own state governments. The United States Supreme Court,
to whom it had fallen to finally ascertain the constitutional boundaries
between federal and state power,31 has held that this single clause im-
Probably the most important early instance of federal/state power rivalry was occa-
sioned by the enactment of the odious Alien and Sedition Acts, Act of July 14, 1798, ch.
73, 1 Stat. 596; Act of June 25, 1798, ch. 58, 1 Stat. 570. These laws drew strong negative
responses in the Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions of 1798, in which these states as-
serted, not only that the Alien and Sedition Acts were bad policy, but also that they were
unconstitutional. Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions of 1798, reprinted in 4 DEBATES IN
THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 540,
528 (J. Elliot, ed. 1901). The Virginia Resolution asserted that when the federal govern-
ment acted beyond the powers allowed to it by the Constitution "the states, who are
parties thereto, have the right, and are in duty bound, to interpose, for arresting the
progress of the evil, and for maintaining, within their respective limits, the authorities,
rights, and liberties, appertaining to them." Id. at 528.
The state challenge to federal supremacy reached a new intensity during the Nullifi-
cation Crisis of the early 1830's, when federal tariff legislation, Act of July 14, 1832, ch.
227, 4 Stat. 583, was met with the South Carolina Ordinance of Nullification, 1 S.C. Stat.
329 (1832), which declared the federal enactment to be "null, void and no law, [not]
binding upon this State, its officers, or citizens .... ." Id. President Andrew Jackson's
reaction to South Carolina's defiance of federal authority is discussed infra note 749.
The final Constitutional crisis was the Civil War. While the outcome settled the
question of a state's right to secede from the Union, and by implication, its right of
nullification, the federal government's denial of "State Rights," in the sense of the power
to nullify, was not the precipitating cause of the war. After 1832, it was Northern states,
particularly Wisconsin and Massachusetts, which practiced nullification with a ven-
geance, refusing to enforce the Fugitive Slave Act and in some instances explicitly deny-
ing the federal government's right to enforce that Act. See, e.g., In re Booth, 3 Wisc. 157
(1854), rev'd sub nom Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 506 (1858) (state court freed
federal prisoner by writ of habeus corpus); see generally P. PALUDAN, A COVENANT wrrH
DEATH (1975). The Northern abolitionist William Lloyd Garrison called the Constitution
the "parent of all other atrocities .... An agreement with Hell ... a covenant with
death." Id. at 3. Northern newspapers rejoiced at the use of the doctrines of the Virginia
and Kentucky Resolution by Northern states to prevent the return of fugitive slaves, W.
ROBINSON, JusTnCE IN GREY, 442 (1941), while the President pro tem of South Carolina's
secession convention denounced Northern nullification as the cause of the war: "Has not
[the Constitution] been trodden under their very feet by every Northern State, by plac-
ing on their books statutes nullifying the laws for the recovery of fugitive slaves?,"
quoted in E.M. THOMAS, THE CONFEDERATE NATION, 35 (1979). State Rights was a doc-
trine common to both North and South, and nullification was even attempted in the
North during the war, see P. PALUDAN, supra, at 33-34 and cases cited therein. The Con-
stitution adopted by the Confederacy, far from being a state rights document, was al-
most identical with that of the United States. See E.M. THoMAs, supra, at 42. Despite
the traditional view, it is incorrect to distinguish between the Southern and Northern
states on the eve of the Civil War on the basis of State Rights. See P. PALUDAN, supra, at
225-26.
30. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
31. As discussed, supra note 29, the Supreme Court asserted very early that it was
the final arbiter of the division of authority between the federal government and the
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plicitly incorporates other fundamental guarantees of the Bill of Rights
states under the Constitution. Chief Justice Marshall addressed the Supreme Court's
constitutional role in the opening paragraph of McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4
Wheat.) 316 (1819):
In the case now to be determined, the defendant, a sovereign state, denies
the obligation of a law enacted by the legislature of the Union, and the plaintiff,
on his part, contests the validity of an act which has been passed by the legisla-
ture of that state. The constitution of our country, in its most interesting and
vital parts, is to be considered; the conflicting powers of the government of the
Union and of its members, as marked in that constitution, are to be discussed;
and an opinion given, which may essentially influence the great operations of the
government. No tribunal can approach such a question without a deep sense of
its importance, and of the awful responsibility involved in its decision. But it
must be decided peacefully, or remain a source of hostile legislation, perhaps, of
hostility of a still more serious nature; and if it is to be so decided, by this tribu-
nal alone can the decision be made. On the Supreme Court of the United States
has the constitution of our country devolved this important duty.
Id. at 400-01.
Chief Justice Marshall's view has prevailed and shaped the succeeding history of the
nation. The federal system established by the Constitution requires policing the bounda-
ries between state and federal power. James Madison recommended "a negative, in all
cases whatsoever, on the Legislative acts of the States, as the King of Great Britain
heretofore had." Letter from James Madison to Edmund Randolph (April 8, 1787), re-
printed in 2 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 336 (G. Hunt ed. 1904). Under Chief
Justice Marshall's leadership, the Supreme Court performed at least part of this negativ-
ing function that Madison orginally would have entrusted to the national legislature.
Leading proponents of states' rights, such as Judge Spencer Roane of the Virginia
Court of Appeals, denied that the Constitution authorized federal judicial review of state
court decisions as had been provided by § 25 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 73.
Thus, the Virginia Court of Appeals, refusing to follow the mandate of the United States
Supreme Court in Fairfax's Devisee v. Hunter's Lessee, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 603 (1813),
declared:
The Court is unanimously of the opinion, that the appellate power of the Su-
preme Court of the United States does not extend to this court, under a sound
construction of the Constitution of the United States; that so much of the 25th
section of the act of Congress to establish the judicial courts of the United
States, as extends the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to this court,
is not in pursuance of the Constitution of the United States; that the writ of
error in this case was improvidently allowed under the authority of that act that
the proceedings thereon in the Supreme Court were coram non judice in relation
to this court; and that obedience to its mandate be delined by this court.
Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 320-21 (1816) (quoting the opinion
below of the Virginia Court of Appeals, Hunter v. Martin, 18 Va. (4 Munf.) 1, 59 (1815)).
Justice Story, writing for the unanimous Court in Martin, explained that the Supreme
Court was the ultimate judge of the constitutionality of state actions, whether executive,
legislative or judicial:
The courts of the United States can, without question, revise the proceedings of
the executive and legislative authorities of the states, and if they are found to be
contrary to the Constitution, may declare them to be of no legal validity. Surely
the exercise of the same right over judicial tribunals is not a higher or more
dangerous act of sovereign power.
14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) at 314. Thus, the Supreme Court's role in defining the extent of
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which had previously restrained only the central government.3 2 But
however much the Civil War altered federal-state relations, each state's
sovereignty continued to consist essentially in defining, detecting, and
punishing local crime, according to its own standards.
Just as limited government must withstand dual pressure to abso-
lutism and anarchy, so too a working constitutional federalist republic
must withstand tendencies toward consolidation and nullification. The
constitutional plan breaks down when either the central government
ignores constitutionally guaranteed state sovereignty and usurps pre-
rogatives guaranteed the states, or when state governments go their
own way, defying or evading legitimate central mandate. The federal
plan also breaks down when government at either level ignores the
people's guaranteed constitutional rights and interferes with their pri-
vacy and liberty.
Just two weeks short of 1984, the Justice Department surfaced its
three-and-a-half-year undercover Operation Greylord with bribery in-
dictments of Chicago judges and prosecutors. To expose local corrup-
tion, the Federal Bureau of Investigation had bugged a judge's cham-
bers, sent agents posing as corrupt prosecutors and defense attorneys,
and injected phony "crimes" into the local justice system.3 3 The day
after the New York Times front-page headline announced Greylord,
the newspaper headlined: "Questions about Methods Used in Chicago
Court Investigation. ' - 4 The attack and defense had begun. None of the
techniques used in Chicago were new. "All of them were used in Ab-
scam," Professor G. Robert Blakey observed. "If it's appropriate to use
these techniques against Congressmen and Senators, why isn't it ap-
propriate to use them against judges?
'3 5
federal power over the states required the rejection of the states' rights concept of a state
judiciary wholly independent of the central government.
32. The Supreme Court has said that in deciding which guarantees of the Bill of
Rights are incorporated by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment the
proper search is for principles so fundamental as to be "implicit in the concept of or-
dered liberty." Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937). Many of the guarantees of
the first eight amendments have been held applicable to the states. See Duncan v. Loui-
siana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) (right to jury trial); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964) (free-
dom from compelled self-incrimination); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963)
(right to counsel); Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949) (freedom from unreasonable
search and seizure); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (free exercise of reli-
gion); DeJong v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937) (freedom of assembly); Near v. Minnesota,
283 U.S. 697 (1931) (freedom of the press); Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380 (1927) (free-
dom of speech).
33. N.Y. Times, Dec. 15, 1983, at 1, col. 1. See also Reaves, Greylord's Uneasy Fall-
out, A.B.A. J., Mar. 1984, at 35; Tamarkin, The Judge Who Wore a Wire, A.B.A. J., Feb.
1984, at 76.
34. Shipp, Questions About Methods Used in Chicago Court Investigation, N.Y.
Times, Dec. 16, 1983, at A20, col. 1.
35. Id. at A20, col. 5.
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The debate continues beyond 1984 while undercover operations
spread, occasionally to surface and splash corruption into view. Are we
steadily but unwarily embracing totalitarianism to rid ourselves of an-
archy? This essay argues that: 1) successfully maintaining limited gov-
ernment sometimes requires the use without abuse of simulated
crimes-carefully monitored "stings" even in the very temples of jus-
tice; 2) the federal government has jurisdiction under the guarantee
clause of the United States Constitution to initiate stings to uncover
local corruption; and 3) a set of double standards is necessary and
proper to allow for vigorous detection of the abuse of public power
while ensuring the privacy of private citizens.
SERPICO TO ARCHER
After New York City police officer Frank Serpico successively
failed to involve his own department, municipal investigative agencies,
and the Mayor in combating police corruption, he went to The New
York Times, whose front page expos6 forced Mayor John V. Lindsay to
appoint the Knapp Commission. Detective Robert Leuci, assigned to
an elite narcotics unit whose members were known as "Princes of the
City," had come to resemble the criminals he was pursuing. He decided
to turn his life around and described in detail to Knapp Commission
attorney Nicholas Scoppetta a widely fixed local criminal justice
system.
Many cases were sold out during the investigative stage prior to
arrest; defendants were warned about wiretaps on their phones or their
status as targets of an investigation. Assistant district attorneys as well
as police officers would tip off defendants before executing judge-issued
warrants, so they could get rid of evidence.
Other cases were fixed at the time of arrest; defendants would pay
to be released at the scene. Sometimes evidence would be altered, espe-
cially in narcotics cases where non-narcotic substances were substi-
tuted for the drugs actually found. The confiscated contraband would
then be resold by the police officers either through the defendant or
through the informant who had led them to the dealer. Also at the
time of arrest, an open-ended complaint would be drawn allowing an
36. See id., Apr. 25, 1970 at 1, col. 1. Popularly known as the Knapp Commission, the
Commission to Investigate Allegations of Police Corruption was reluctantly appointed by
Mayor John V. Lindsay on May 21, 1970; the Commission was eventually forced to so-
licit funds from private foundations and the federal Law Enforcement Assistance Ad-
ministration in order to sustain itself. At its peak, the Commission consisted only of 26
investigators and attorneys excluding clerical staff. See id., Aug. 7, 1972 at 1, col. 5-6, for
an account of the Commission's history. See supra note 24 and sources cited therein.
The discussion that follows draws in part upon unpublished materials and the author's
discussions with various participants in the events discussed.
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arresting officer later to testify consistently with former facts alleged,
yet making the arrest appear to have violated Constitutional guaran-
tees. The case would be thrown out.
After arrest, awaiting trial, a defendant, often through his lawyer,
would pay an Assistant District Attorney ("A.D.A.") to reduce bail, or
to register the defendant as an informant and credit him with making
cases he never made. His reported "cooperation" would result in
charges reduced or dismissed. Sometimes a cop fixed it on his own, not
informing the A.D.A.; other times the A.D.A. shared in it.
After indictment a case would be fixed through a court clerk by
moving it before the right judge. During more than one of Leuci's re-
corded conversations it was alleged that judges would take payments to
decide a motion improperly, or accept reduced pleas, or dispense light
sentences.
Leuci agreed to spearhead an undercover probe into local corrup-
tion on two conditions: 1) It must be a federal investigation: Leuci
feared local agencies would sabotage it and have him killed; and 2) the
investigation must not be targeted only at police, but must extend to
lawyers, prosecutors and, most importantly, to judges who "set the
pace" in the criminal justice system.
As a demonstration on the spur of the moment, Leuci posed as a
mob go-between, and made a deal with detectives in the Confidential
Investigations Bureau to sell out all organized crime wiretaps. Hearing
Leuci's secret recording, the Justice Department in Washington imme-
diately authorized the United States Attorney's Office for the Southern
District of New York to launch a federal investigation of corruption in
New York City.
Newly-appointed police commissioner Patrick V. Murphy enthusi-
astically promised the department's full cooperation on one condi-
tion-like Leuci, he too demanded, and United States Attorney
Whitney North Seymour, Jr. agreed, that the probe would target not
only police but all other corrupt officials.
Risking his life to regain his sense of self (and also perhaps to
avoid future prosecution for past crimes), Leuci became an undercover
agent, wearing a concealed body recorder, documenting corruption
under the daily supervision of Assistant United States Attorneys Nico-
las ScoppettaW 7 and Edward "Mike" Shaw. Leuci's most significant suc-
cess was the exposure of prominent defense attorney Edmund Rosner,
who specialized in winning large narcotics cases which had appeared
airtight until alibi witnesses appeared or prosecution witnesses disap-
peared. Through Nicholas DeStefano, a corrupt intermediary, Rosner
paid Leuci for secret grand jury testimony.
37. Nicholas Scoppetta had been sworn in secretly as an Assistant United States
Attorney.
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Leuci thought of himself, and demanded that others treat him, as
a government agent and not merely an informant trading information
for leniency; but Andrew Tartaglino, who three years earlier had engi-
neered a successful federal probe of corrupt federal narcotics agents in
New York City and superintended worldwide narcotics enforcement
for the United States, neither forgot nor forgave Leuci's corrupt past.
Assigned to supervise the street and backup agents from Washington,
Tartaglino considered Leuci merely an informant and sought to replace
him at the first good opportunity. When Leuci's undercover status be-
gan leaking and his psyche shredding after he indirectly caused the
suicides of friends, Tartaglino substituted his own agent, Sante Bario,
to continue Leuci's efforts, as Leuci had continued Serpico's, to make
cases against prosecutors and judges, none of whom were yet proven
corrupt.
Several independent sources had indicated that in Queens, the
"rottenest" borough in New York City, assistant district attorneys and
judges routinely fixed cases. After some abortive attempts, at the urg-
ing of Tartaglino, the United States attorneys decided to force a fix
beyond the police, inward toward the rotten core, by simulating a
crime with a cooperating local arresting officer and processing through
the system an arrested undercover agent posing as a defendant trying
to buy his way out.
Concerned with the implications of a sting which he knew would
inevitably involve local police filing false affidavits and federal agents
lying to honest, unsuspecting state judges, United States Attorney Sey-
mour consulted ranking state authorities. He met in chambers with the
Chief Judge of the New York Court of Appeals, Stanley Fuld, and ap-
prised him of both the unproven allegations, and the criminal simula-
tions planned to prove them. Fuld could not, nor was he requested to,
authorize the federal use of this intrusive technique; but the Chief
Judge showed concern at possible judicial corruption, expressed his ap-
preciation at being informed, and offered his best wishes for success.3 8
Seymour also consulted Police Commissioner Murphy, who was appre-
hensive that an arresting officer might later be prosecuted by a vindic-
tive District Attorney's office which he had helped sting, but the Com-
missioner agreed to cooperate and supplied the arresting officer,
Vincent Murano.
Agent Bario, posing as Salvatore "Sam" Barone, out-of-town mob
killer in New York for the Gallo-Columbo gang wars, was arrested by
Vincent Murano at the Omaha Diner in Queens. Barone was charged
with the unlawful possession of two unlicensed handguns. Nicholas De-
Stefano, the corrupt middleman who had inadvertently discovered
38. Minutes of Investigative Technique Hearing in Respondent's Appendix at 141,
People v. Archer, 68 A.D.2d 441 (2d Dep't), 417 N.Y.S.2d 507 (1979).
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Leuci's secret identity, and was trading his own temporary freedom for
limited cooperation, introduced agent Bario-Sam Barone-to Leon
Wasserberger, a bail bondsman. Wasserberger took Bario to Frank
Klein, a prominent Queens defense attorney and past president of the
Queens Criminal Bar Association, who instantly understood Barone's
"I can not afford to appear at trial" as its corrupt equivalent--"I can
afford not to appear at trial."
Hearing the details of Barone's arrest, and unhappy that the case
was now before a grand jury, attorney Klein assured Barone that the
only way to fix his case would be through the person who controlled
the grand jury, the Assistant District Attorney in charge of the grand
jury bureau. Bario made a downpayment and they scheduled a future
meeting date.
Because the targeted Queens District Attorney's office was the
only office with jurisdiction to prosecute local bribery, the United
States Attorneys decided to create federal jurisdiction by having Bario
call attorney Klein from New Jersey, thus committing the federal
crime of using the telephone across state lines to promote the state
crime of bribery. 39 When they met again, Klein informed Barone that
he had spoken to his friend, and that Barone should tell a sympathetic
story to the grand jury which would then decide not to indict. The
attorney and bail bondsman each assured Sam Barone that this was
the only way, and that because he would be bribed, the district attor-
ney could be relied upon not to ask any damaging questions.
Together the three of them created a phony story to tell the grand
jury, making Barone a junket coordinator for a Las Vegas gambling
casino with a Las Vegas gun permit he didn't realize wasn't valid in
New York. Klein set the price for the fix at $15,000 and demanded full
payment up front.
Again the United States Attorneys were concerned. If possible,
they wished to avoid having a federal agent lie under oath to an unsus-
pecting state grand jury. But short of aborting the investigation, there
seemed no other way. There were substantial allegations of corruption
in Queens. The defense attorney who had taken a bribe might be
falsely implicating an innocent prosecutor, looking to rip off his client,
hoping the grand jury on its own would choose not to indict. Washing-
ton had refused to authorize a wiretap on Klein's phone, seeking to
avoid the instrusion into the attorney-client relationship. Either a
cloud of suspicion would forever hang over the presenting District At-
torney, who was entitled to have his innocence shown, or else a grand
jury was in the hands of a corrupt prosecutor. In that case, it seemed
most appropriate to fight fire with fire.
39. United States v. Archer, 486 F.2d 670, 674 (2d Cir. 1973).
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So, the United States Attorney authorized Bario to testify falsely
under oath to the New York grand jury, but urged him to lie as little as
possible, and ordered him and arresting officer Murano not to record
the grand jury proceedings, trusting instead an accurate stenographic
record.
On May 9, 1972, Norman Archer, the Grand Jury Bureau Chief of
the Queens County District Attorney's office, presented the "case" of
People v. Salvatore Barone. Murano, the arresting officer, told his
story straightforwardly, and then Barone himself waived immunity and
told the phony story. When he mentioned the Las Vegas gun permit,
although the stenographer failed to record it, a grand juror asked
Archer if he had checked that Barone had such a valid Las Vegas per-
mit. Archer was forced to lie on Barone's behalf. He had checked it
out, he assured the grand jury: Barone did have a valid Las Vegas per-
mit. Of course, Archer had never checked it out. If he had, he might
have discovered that not only didn't a valid permit exist, but neither
did Salvatore Barone.
Summing up, the District Attorney informed the grand jury that
in similar circumstances a neighboring grand jury had recently given
two Puerto Ricans a break who had valid Puerto Rican gun permits
they didn't know were not valid in New York, and furthermore that
there were potential constitutional problems with the search. The
grand jury chose not to indict Barone.
Later that day, at a coffee shop, agents saw the defense attorney
hand the prosecutor an envelope.
With a solid bribery case against ball bondsman Leon Wasser-
berger, attorney Frank Klein, and Grand Jury Bureau Chief Norman
Archer, and with Barone's credibility established, the investigation was
rapidly approaching its ultimate targets-judges. United States attor-
neys were processing other phony arrests through the courts in Brook-
lyn, Manhattan and Queens; fertile avenues into the heart of the sys-
tem lay open-when suddenly, the whole highly confidential
investigation became front-page news. The New York Times had be-
gun it with headlines proclaiming: "Graft Paid to Police Here Said to
Run into Millions. ' 40 Two years and two months later, on June 15,
1972, a three-column New York Times story headlined: "U.S. Looking
Into Heroin Bribery Here; Some Officials are Said to Be Implicated:
Judges, Prosecutors and Police Held Involved" aborted the
investigation.
41
Early the next morning, federal agents executed a search warrant
on Norman Archer's house and found an envelope in a pile of blankets
in his basement storage closet which contained five one hundred dollar
40. N.Y. Times, Apr. 25, 1970, at 1, col 1.
41. Id. June 15, 1972, at 1, col. 1.
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bills whose serial numbers matched the bribe money Barone had paid
Klein.
Archer, Klein, and Wasserberger were indicted for conspiracy to
violate the Travel Act in that they "use[d] ... facilit[ies] in interstate
and foreign commerce, that is, the telephone, with intent to carry on
the unlawful activity of bribery.
' '4 2
The evidence was overwhelming that Archer, Klein, and Wasser-
berger had accepted $15,000 to fix what they thought was a real case of
illegal gun possession by a mobster. Tape recordings corroborated Spe-
cial Agent Bario's testimony that he only appeared with money and an
inclination to spend it to bribe his way out of the system, that defen-
dants set the price and terms and produced the grand jury appearance
with a sympathetic District Attorney who lied. Furthermore, marked
money had been found distributed among the three defendants. The
defense could hardly argue that the fix never occurred, or that their
clients were basically innocent.
Milton Gould, Klein's experienced and skillful attorney, knew that
the less the jury focused upon his client's activities, the better. The
defense sought to divert the jury's attention from the defendants' con-
duct to the Government's. In their opening, they accused the Govern-
ment of having used "every ingredient of a theatrical production." The
Government had created the case "the same way a Hollywood producer
would make a film"; they selected the actors, costumes, script, and
soundmen. "Before we are finished," Gould assured the jury, "you will
be ashamed of the United States government in this case." 3 Surely the
federal prosecutors had used an appropriate simulation on an appro-
priate occasion. But Gould's prophecy that the United States Attor-
neys would be condemned proved not altogether false.
The trial defenses were two: 1) No federal jurisdiction-the for-
eign and interstate telephone calls were a pretext, and 2) Entrapment.
Judge Tenney brushed aside the first defense. In a pretrial decision, he
found that the Travel Act literally applied to this situation.4'
God had rejected Adam and Eve's entrapment defense, although
the case reporter does not make clear precisely why. Subsequent defen-
dants had fared no better before the United States Supreme Court,
which refused to read into the United States Bible-its Constitu-
tion-an entrapment defense. But in 1932 the Supreme Court in Sor-
rells v. United States excused Sorrells for unlawfully possessing fruits
of the vine, by "firmly recognizing" a federal entrapment defense."5 A
42. United States v. Archer, 355 F. Supp. 981, 984 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), rev'd, 486 F.2d
670 (2d Cir. 1973).
43. N.Y. Times, Jan. 16, 1973, at 44, col. 1.
44. United States v. Archer, 355 F. Supp. at 984-87.
45. Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 442-52 (1932).
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federal prohibition agent posing as a tourist had visited an unsuspect-
ing veteran, and reminisced about common war experiences. After
gaining the target's confidence, the agent asked for some liquor and
was twice refused. At the third request, the defendant Sorrells pro-
duced some booze and was prosecuted. A unanimous United States Su-
preme Court found this to be entrapment, but divided as to why.48
At the time of the Archer trial the most recent Supreme Court
entrapment case was Sherman v. United States.47 In Sherman an in-
formant first met the defendant in a doctor's office where both were
being treated for narcotics addiction. After several conversations about
problems with kicking the habit, the informant asked Sherman for a
good source of junk, claiming the treatment was not working for him.
Determined to rid himself of the addiction, Sherman avoided the issue
at first. But the informant persisted and finally, out of pity, Sherman
acquiesced, purchasing narcotics for both.
The jury convicted; Sherman was sentenced to ten years. The Sec-
ond Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, but the United States Supreme
Court unanimously found entrapment, again splitting as to why.
48
Chief Justice Warren declared common ground: "The function of
law enforcement is the prevention of crime and the apprehension of
criminals. Manifestly, that function does not include the manufactur-
ing of crime.' ' 49 And still, almost certainly expressing unanimous senti-
ments of all realistic citizenry, he continued: "Criminal activity is such
46. Id. at 451-52, 458-59. The Sorrells majority stated that entrapment is available to
an accused person as a "defense" and is an issue properly presented before a jury. Id. at
452. For the Court the "controlling question" was "whether the defendant [was] a person
otherwise innocent whom the Government [was] seeking to punish for an alleged offense
which [was] the product of the creative activity of its own officials." Id. at 451. Accord-
ingly, for the majority, "predisposition and criminal design of the defendant [were] rele-
vant." Id.
Justice Roberts, in a separate opinion, differed with the Court's characterization of
the entrapment issue as a "defense." Id. at 455-56. For Justice Roberts, the doctrine of
entrapment "rest[ed], rather, on a fundamental rule of public policy" which mandated
that "courts must be closed to the trial of a crime instigated by the government's own
agents." Id. at 457, 459. The predisposition of the defendant was, therefore, not relevant
to Justice Robert's understanding of entrapment. He considered it to be appropriate for
resolution by the court, rather than the jury. Id. at 457-58.
47. Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369 (1958).
48. Id. For the majority, "the issue of whether a defendant has been entrapped is for
the jury as part of its function of determining the guilt or innocence of the accused." Id.
at 377; see infra notes 51-55 and accompanying text. In contrast, the concurrence stated
that the "crucial question . . . to which the court [as opposed to the jury] must direct
itself is whether the police conduct revealed in the particular case falls below the stan-
dards to which common feelings respond for the proper use of governmental powers."
356 U.S. at 382 (Frankfurter, J., concurring); see infra notes 57-58 and accompanying
text.
49. 356 U.S. at 372.
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that stealth and strategy are necessary weapons in the arsenal of the
police officer."50
The Chief Justice spoke only for a bare majority by using the
"subjectivist" basis of entrapment:
"[W]hen the criminal design originates" with government in-
vestigators, and "they implant in the mind of an innocent per-
son the disposition to commit the alleged offense and induce
its commission in order that they may prosecute,". .. [t]hen
stealth and strategy become as objectionable police methods as
the coerced confession and the unlawful search. Congress could
not have intended that its statutes were to be enforced by
tempting innocent persons into violations.5'
The fact that government agents "merely afford opportunities or facili-
ties for the commission of the offense" did not constitute entrapment,
which occurred only when the criminal conduct was "the product of
the creative activity" of law enforcement officials.52 The Chief Justice
gave his oft-quoted test which focused on the subjective mental state
of the particular defendant: "To determine whether entrapment has
been established, a line must be drawn between the trap for the un-
wary innocent and the trap for the unwary criminal.""3
Almost repudiating the Sovereign of Eden, Warren declared: "The
case at bar illustrates an evil which the defense of entrapment is
designed to overcome .... Thus the Government plays on the weak-
nesses of an innocent party and beguiles him into committing crimes
which he otherwise would not have attempted. Law enforcement does
not require methods such as this.""
Because five justices of the Supreme Court were convinced there
was at least a reasonable possibility that defendant Sherman was a
non-predisposed unwary innocent who had been beguiled by govern-
ment into crime, they found entrapment as a matter of law, the jury
having already rejected it as a matter of fact.5 5
Defense attorney Gould knew that under this majority subjectivist
view, Klein, Archer and Wasserberger had no entrapment defense. Of
course Klein was predisposed to commit bribery. He had bragged on
tape that nearly every case was a fix, and Wasserberger had talked of
many businesslike years of bribery with Klein. Archer had not even
50. Id.
51. Id. at 372 (quoting Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 442 (1932)).
52. Id. (quoting Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. at 441, 451 (1932)) (emphasis
added by the Sherman Court).
53. 356 U.S. at 372.
54. Id. at 376 (emphasis added).
55. Id. at 373.
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been induced by a government agent at all, and the inescapable fact
was that no defendant displayed any reluctance to fix the case.
Gould wanted the jury to ignore the defendants' predisposition
and instead to focus on the Government's conduct, finding it outra-
geous, and worthy of condemnation. This was the view of four concur-
ring Supreme Court justices in Sherman. In contrast to subjectivists
who focus upon the particular defendant's mental state, objectivists see
the entrapment defense as a way to keep government techniques of
investigation within proper limits.58 From this objectivist perspective,
the entrapment defense primarily protects the purity of the criminal
justice process. The objectivist focuses not upon whether the particular
defendant was predisposed, but rather, with a view toward preventing
Government excess, upon whether the average law-abiding citizen
would succumb to the type of pressure exerted.
Speaking for four justices, Frankfurter observed that entrapment
had always been a means
to express the feeling of outrage at conduct of law
enforcers .... 57
The courts refuse to convict an entrapped defendant, not
because his conduct falls outside the proscription of the stat-
ute, but because, even if his guilt be admitted, the methods
employed on behalf of the Government to bring about convic-
tion cannot be countenanced.
s
For the objectivists in 1958, as for defendants Archer, Klein, and
Wasserberger in 1973,
[t]he crucial question, not easy of answer, to which the court
must direct itself is whether the police conduct revealed in the
particular case falls below standards, to which common feelings
respond, for the proper use of governmental power. For answer
it is wholly irrelevant to ask if the "intention" to commit the
crime originated with the defendant or government officers
59
The Archer defense attorneys wanted the jury to feel revolted at
Bario's portrayal of Barone, the phony arrest, lying to a grand jury
under oath, etc., and therefore to acquit the defendants. The majority
56. United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 440-41 (1973) (Stewart, J., dissenting). See
supra note 51 and accompanying text for an analysis of the objective and subjective
tests.
57. 356 U.S. at 378 (Frankfurter, J., concurring in result).
58. Id. at 380.
59. Id. at 382.
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rule, however, which bound United States District Judge Tenney at
trial, was subjective entrapment, and under it, whether lying to a grand
jury was independently reprehensible, the point remained that these
defendants without doubt had been predisposed to commit crimes of
conspiracy and bribery. Therefore they were not entrapped. Whether
they were similarly predisposed to telephone interstate to further their
corrupt scheme is a more difficult question. They were probably not
predisposed in either direction. Wasserberger often warned that crimi-
nal activity not be discussed over the phone, but the defendants were
quite willing to use the telephone to set up meetings, and they were
not particularly averse nor predisposed to call out-of-state. The cate-
gory just did not seem to apply to the interstate federal jurisdiction
element which was also part of the definition of the crime. Still, once
Judge Tenney ruled as a matter of law that the objections to federal
jurisdiction were unfounded, the issue of a government jurisdiction
trap almost disappeared from the trial.
Instead, the focus on entrapment at this federal trial was where it
would have been at a New York State trial: predisposition to commit
bribery ° Furthermore, under the subjective view of entrapment, once
the defendant admitted committing the acts but raised the defense, it
was open season for the government to show the defendant's predispo-
sition by introducing evidence not otherwise relevant: Klein's other
corrupt acts and the defendants' attitudes toward corruption in
general.
To counter this, the defense could only hope the jury would either
ignore or misunderstand Judge Tenney's instructions on subjective en-
trapment-that notwithstanding overwhelming proof of the defen-
dants' predisposition to fix Barone's case, the jury would say "no" to
the government's investigative technique.
The defendants had no case and called no witnesses. The docu-
mented bribe and subjectivist entrapment, which made the defendants'
predisposition dispositive and the government's investigative tech-
niques irrelevant, combined to produce a jury verdict: guilty on all
60. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 40.05 (McKinney 1975). The statute provides in pertinent
part:
[I]t is an affirmative defense that the defendant engaged in the proscribed con-
duct because he was induced or encouraged to do so by a public servant ....
and when the methods used to obtain such evidence were such as to create a
substantial risk that the offense would be committed by a person not otherwise
disposed to commit it. . . . Conduct merely affording a person an opportunity to
commit an offense does not constitute entrapment.
Id.
See, e.g., United States v. Rubio, 709 F.2d 139 (2d Cir. 1983); United States v. Stein-
berg, 551 F.2d 510 (2d Cir. 1977); United States v. Toomey, 404 F. Supp. 1377 (S.D.N.Y.
1975).
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counts. Pronouncing sentence in March, 1973, Judge Tenney said that
the defendants had been found guilty of a crime that "strikes at the
heart of the criminal justice system."61 Five days later, Edmund Ros-
ner, who had raised his own unsuccessful entrapment defense, was also
sentenced. 2
While the United States Attorneys were trying and defending the
Archer case on appeal to the Second Circuit, its Chief Judge, Henry
Friendly, was delivering the Columbia Carpentier Lectures and prepar-
ing them for publication. 3 Judge Friendly pointed out in his opening
lecture that federal encroachment on state operations was probably un-
constitutional, and certainly unwise. Overburdened federal courts
should not act where they need not. "[W]hen the primary basis for
federal criminal jurisdiction is the use of facilities crossing state
lines," including the mail or telephone, or when the federal element
was "interstate commerce," federal crimes cascaded endlessly. Essen-
tially local fraud, burglary, and prostitution suddenly, like bank rob-
beries, became federalized. The logical extreme was a complete federal-
ization of all crime, a big mistake. "One might have thought the limit
was reached in the so-called Travel Act of 1961, '"65 (the statute under
which Archer et al. had just been successfully prosecuted). But no,
complained Judge Friendly, Congress had exceeded that limit.
[It] has since enacted statutes which make certain activities
criminal [if] they affect interstate commerce, even though the
acts in the particular case were entirely local, and the Supreme
Court has sustained this. . . . It is thus fair to say that today
"there is practically no offense within the purview of local law
that does not become a federal crime if some distinctive federal
involvement happens to be present"-and the involvement
may be exceedingly thin.6
Whether federal criminal prosecutions have not greatly outreached
any true federal interest thus deserved the most serious examination.
For example, in interstate prostitution, "why is the United States in-
terested because the girls have traveled over the George Washington
61. "Archer, Ex-Queens Prosecutor, Gets 3 Years for Taking Bribe," N.Y. Times,
March 15, 1973, at 34, col. 1.
62. United States v. Rosner, 485 F.2d 1213, 1215 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S.
950 (1974).
63. H. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A GE xM. VIEW (1973).
64. Id. at 56.
65. Id. at 57. The Travel Act of 1961 made it a crime to use any facility in interstate
or foreign commerce with the intent to engage in unlawful activity. Travel Act of 1961,
Pub. L. No. 87-228, § 1952, 75 Stat. 498, 498-99 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1952
(1982)).
66. H. FRENDLY, supra note 63, at 57.
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Bridge and thence through New Jersey, although it would not be if
they crossed the Hudson over the New York Thruway?" 7
For Judge Friendly, the "larger problem" was "creating standards
that will keep federal criminal jurisdiction within bounds and assure
some uniformity." 68 He strongly endorsed section 207 of the Final Re-
port of the National Commission on Reform of the Federal Criminal
Laws 9 as a means to handle the "utter disarray" of federal jurisdic-
tion.70 Section 207 proposed a key "discretionary restraint" on federal
investigating and prosecuting authority:
[F]ederal law enforcement agencies are authorized to decline or
discontinue federal enforcement efforts whenever the offense
can effectively be prosecuted by nonfederal agencies and it ap-
pears that there is no substantial Federal interest in further
prosecution or that the offense primarily affects state [or] local
interests. A substantial federal interest exists [when] state or
local law enforcement has been so corrupted as to undermine
its effectiveness substantially."
Judge Friendly would have converted the authorization permitting
federal officials to restrain themselves into a command "directing"
them to restrain themselves, thereby matching the Commission's im-
mediately following proposed command which he also embraced:
"Where federal law enforcement efforts are discontinued in deference
to state [or] local. . . prosecution, federal agencies are directed to co-
operate with [those] agencies, by providing them with evidence already
gathered .... ,,72
Finally, said Judge Friendly:
I still have the uneasy feeling that, even with the salutary re-
straints proposed . federal criminal jurisdiction will be too
frequently invoked. The Founding Fathers, I think, would have
been surprised to find the federal courts trying cases of corrup-
tion in the New York City administration simply because one
67. Id. at 58. Of course in Archer it was the federal agents, not the defendants, who
had crossed the George Washington Bridge to create federal jurisdiction.
68. Id. at 59-60.
69. NATONAL COMMISSION ON REFORM OF FEDERAL CRMINAL LAWS, FINAL REPORT OF
THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS: A PROPOSED NEW
FEDERAL CRIMINAL CODE, 207 (1971) (hereinafter cited as FINAL REPORT). Pursuant to § 8
of the Act of Nov. 8, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-801, 80 Stat. 1516, 1518, as amended by the
Act of July 8, 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-39, 83 Stat. 44, the National Commission submitted
this proposed revision of Title 18 of the United States Code on January 7, 1971, in order
to facilitate Congress in its endeavor to reform substantive federal criminal laws.
70. H. FRIENDLY, supra note 63, at 58-60.
71. FINAL REPORT, supra note 69, at 207.
72. Id.
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of the participants had rowed across the Hudson in the course
of the criminal venture.73
At this time, while Archer's appeal was pending, the United States
Supreme Court decided United States v. Russell, its third major en-
trapment case.7" In a 5-4 decision announced on April 24, 1973, Justice
Rehnquist, writing for the majority, once again rejected objective en-
trapment: Government supplying a predisposed defendant a legal but
difficult to obtain ingredient necessary for committing the offense was
not entrapment. 5 Entrapment would only succeed if the prosecution
failed to prove the defendant's predisposition; entrapment would not
prevent prosecution because a court found law enforcement conduct
objectionable. Justice Rehnquist also rejected the defendant's claimed
violation of Constitutional due process,76 in language which rung in
every competent defense attorney's ears in cases of this sort:
While we may some day be presented with a situation in
which the conduct of law enforcement agents is so outrageous
that due process principles would absolutely bar the govern-
ment from invoking the judicial processes to obtain a convic-
tion, cf. Rochin v. Califonia . . . , the instant case is distinctly
not of that breed. 7
Gould and other attorneys now claimed that day had come. Defen-
dants' first ground of appeal was that "[t]he lawless conduct of govern-
ment officials in this case is so offensive-to the administration of jus-
tice, to Federal-State relationships, and to prevailing standards of
decent behavior that acquittal should have been ordered as a matter of
due process of law."78
73. H. FRmNDLY, supra note 63, at 61 (footnote omitted).
74. 411 U.S. 423 (1973).
75. Id. at 432, 436.
76. Id. at 430-32.
77. Id. at 431-32 (citing Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952)). In Rochin, peti-
tioner successfully appealed a conviction for possession of two morphine capsules on the
ground that the method used by arresting officers to confiscate the capsules violated the
fourteenth amendment due process clause. Rochin, 342 U.S. at 168. During arest, Rochin
swallowed the capsules to prevent confiscation. The officers rushed him to a hospital,
where a tube was used to force an emetic solution into his stomach to induce vomiting.
The morphine capsules were recovered. Id. at 166.
The United States Supreme Court concluded that the method used to seize the evi-
dence was "too close to the rack and the screw to permit of constitutional differentia-
tion." Id. at 172. The Court analogized such conduct to obtaining verbal evidence
through forced confessions, which also "offend the community's sense of fair play and
decency," id. at 173, and had no difficulty finding the officers' conduct a "brutal" viola-
tion of the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 173-74.
78. Defendant-Appellant's Brief, United States v. Archer, 486 F.2d 670 (2d Cir.
1973).
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With solemn mockery the appellants urged the federal appeals
court to reverse their convictions in order to "see that the waters of
justice are not polluted. T7 Their brief declared:
The government committed crimes in this case which are an
affront to the integrity of the administration of justice in this
State. The Government authorized its agents to tell deliberate
lies, under oath, to courts and Grand Juries of the State of
New York. We think no Government has that right.8 0
Other points of appeal were the absence of federal jurisdiction-that
there had been no essential violation of the Travel Act: Bario's inter-
state phone calls were wholly disconnected with the crimes
charged-and a general misuse of federal investigatory power.
The United States Attorneys were certain that all convictions
would be affirmed. The "governmental impropriety" claims were the
desperate and vain hopes of corrupt public officials who sought to di-
vert attention from the overwhelming evidence of their guilt. The in-
vestigation had been clearly warranted and undertaken with care and
concern for constitutional rights. The jurisdictional claims were also
not taken very seriously, as the Travel Act literally applied.
Overconfident, the United States Attorneys blundered. They failed
to take into account that the combined effect of a broadly literal con-
struction of the Travel Act, coupled with a subjectivist application of
entrapment, had left the trial record bare of many important back-
ground facts. In their answering papers, Richard Ben-Veniste and the
other United States Attorneys saw no need to go into minute detail of
the investigation's basis and necessity.
They were probably unaware of Judge Friendly's lectures, and he
was certainly unaware of the real background, the painstaking care and
responsibility assumed by Scoppetta, Shaw, and Seymour: "As far as
appears, the instigators of the scheme had only a generalized belief
that something was rotten in the Queens County District Attorney's
Office.""" The Knapp Commission, appointed by New York's Mayor,
had first sought a federal probe of the city's criminal justice system.
New York City Police Commissioner Murphy had cooperated in the
deception, and the state's chief judge, informed in advance, had given
his informal approval of the simulated crime. Under-informed, what
Judge Friendly and the Second Circuit saw was the federal executive
unnecessarily manipulating a state's judicial and executive branches,
manufacturing federal jurisdiction, and now prosecuting an essentially
local bribery as a federal crime. Henry Friendly, a first rate scholar and
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. 486 F.2d at 675.
1984]
NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW
jurist with solid instincts and acute sensitivity to the federal/state bal-
ance, decided to act as he had lectured. As it appeared to him, the
Archer appeal was the perfect vehicle to restrain the federal govern-
ment and issue serious warnings against future overreaching. The fed-
eral "government agents displayed an arrogant disregard for the sanc-
tity of the state judicial and police processes," and "disdain for all the
participants in the system-including the police, the courts, and the
members of the grand jury, all of whom were subject to the Govern-
ment's fabrications. 82 Unfortunately, Judge Friendly allowed his dis-
taste for federal prosecution of artificially federalized local crime to
merge with what he mistakenly saw as an unwarranted federal investi-
gation of the state's corrupt criminal justice machinery, and he con-
cluded that the investigative techniques utilized were also illegitimate.
On July 12, 1973, the Second Circuit per Judge Friendly unani-
mously reversed all the defendants' convictions, and blasted the
United States Attorneys in an oft-quoted statement which seriously
hampered the fight against corruption for a decade:
We do not at all share the Government's pride in its achieve-
ment of causing the bribery of a state assistant attorney by a
scheme which involved lying to New York police officers and
perjury before New York judges and grand jurors; to our minds
the participants' attempt to set up a federal crime for which
these defendants stand convicted went beyond any proper
prosecutorial role and needlessly injected the Federal Govern-
ment into a matter of State concern."3
The court had accused federal agents of committing "perjury."
The opinion flatly stated as fact that "in this case, . . . the govern-
ment 'authorized' Bario and Murano to engage in crimes under New
York Law.'' " This statement is certainly doubtful, and it is a central
contention of this essay that it is false, i.e., no state crimes were either
authorized or committed by any federal agent.
The United States Attorneys' brief was partly to blame for the
Second Circuit's damaging and bald assertion of government-spon-
sored criminality. "The Government argue[d] that no one was hurt by
the state crimes committed."85 Subsequently United States Attorney
Seymour, defending the investigation, stated why, in his view, Bario
had not committed perjury: "My judgment at that time was that the
element of intent was absent and therefore the law enforcement officer
who was acting under orders was not committing perjury. I don't think
82. Id. at 677.
83. Id. at 672 (footnote omitted).
84. Id. at 675 (emphasis added).
85. Id. at 675 & n.5.
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that was criminal conduct then or now."8' Seymour later insisted that
because Bario was well-motivated he did not intentionally- lie, and
therefore did not commit perjury. Seymour's conclusion was correct,
but his analysis was incomplete.
The whole simulated crime was a "charade"-a favorite defense
characterization-and Bario did intentionally lie under oath. Accord-
ing to the New York Penal Law, perjury requires false swearing.87 A
person "swears falsely when he intentionally makes a false statement
which he does not believe to be true" while giving testimony."8 Intent
is defined as "conscious objective . . . to engage in such conduct. 8 9
Bario and Murano unquestionably swore falsely. Although well-moti-
vated, a lie is a lie. Bario's ultimate objective was to help clean up the
Grand Jury so that in the future, fewer lies would be told to it, but he
did intentionally lie to that Grand Jury under oath. It does the United
States government and its citizens a disservice not to clearly acknowl-
edge what happened.
Although Bario and Murano intentionally lied under oath, they
did not commit the crime of perjury under New York law for a simple
but significant reason. No crimes whatsoever were committed by Bario
and Murano because, as Seymour alluded to but did not emphasize,
there was legal justification. New York Penal Law declares that "con-
duct which would otherwise constitute an offense is justifiable and
not criminal when ... such conduct is required or authorized by law
or by a judicial decree, or is performed by a public servant in the rea-
sonable exercise of his official powers, duties and functions ....
It bears repeating. Acts which would be criminal when done by a
private citizen are justifiable and not criminal when done by a govern-
ment agent in the reasonable exercise of law enforcement power. The
question becomes whether the lies under oath to a grand jury were
"reasonable exercises." A principal objective of this entire account is to
show that such deception in the context of investigating official corrup-
tion is reasonably necessary. Concluding, as Judge Friendly did, that
government acted improperly and unreasonably because agents com-
mitted crimes inverts, if it does not simply beg, the question. First it
must be determined whether deceiving the grand jury was reasonable
under the circumstances, and then criminality vel non follows necessa-
rily. The Second Circuit had simply assumed the very ground in
controversy.
Investigating narcotics, gambling, and other victimless crimes, gov-
86. Minutes of Investigative Technique Hearing, supra note 38, at 187.
87. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 210.05-.15 (McKinney 1975).
88. Id., § 210.00(5).
89. Id., § 15.05(1).
90. Id., § 35.05(1) (emphasis added).
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ernment agents routinely engage in generally forbidden transactions
yet are held to commit no crimes. If simulated criminality is proper for
street crimes, why is it improper in investigating governmental
corruption?
Sometimes government agents really do commit crimes. While the
New York anti-corruption effort was in full swing, White House opera-
tives were committing "authorized" burglaries of the Watergate in the
name of national security. Government agents can become criminals,
falsely justifying their criminality as reasonably necessary. Government
must be checked and restrained, foreclosed from using unreasonable
and illegal means to achieve otherwise valid goals of law enforcement.
Justice Brandeis had expressed this most eloquently in United States
v. Olmstead, which Judge Friendly quoted in Archer:
Decency, security, and liberty alike demand that government
officials shall be subjected to the same rules of conduct that are
commands to the citizen. In a government of laws, existence of
the government will be imperilled if it fails to observe the law
scrupulously. Our government is the potent, the omnipresent
teacher. For good or for ill, it teaches the whole people by its
example. Crime is contagious. If the government becomes a
lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law; it invites every man to
become a law unto himself; it invites anarchy. To declare that
in the administration of the criminal law the end justifies the
means-to declare that the government may commit crimes in
order to secure the conviction of a private criminal-would
bring terrible retribution. Against that pernicious doctrine this
court should resolutely set its face. 1
From the point of view of the federal appeals court, the federal
government had committed state crimes in its unwarranted intrusion
into New York's criminal justice system. Had the time come to apply
Justice Rehnquist's recent caveat in Russell that someday a situation
would be presented where "the conduct of law enforcement agents is so
outrageous that due process principles would absolutely bar the Gov-
ernment from invoking judicial processes to obtain a conviction"?92 No
court had yet invoked that clause. Judge Friendly flirted with it and
came very close to being the first:
We are not sure how we would decide this question if decision
were required. Our intuition inclines us to the belief that this
case would call for application of Mr. Justice Brandeis' obser-
91. United States v. Archer, 486 F.2d 670, 674-75 (2d Cir. 1973) (quoting United
States v. Olmstead, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
92. 411 U.S. at 431-32. See supra note 74-77 and accompanying text.
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vation.... [T]here is certainly a limit to allowing governmen-
tal involvement in crime. It would be unthinkable, for example,
to permit government agents to instigate robberies and beat-
ings merely to gather evidence to convict other members of a
gang of hoodlums. Governmental "investigation" involving par-
ticipation in activities that result in injury to the rights of its
citizens is a course that courts should be extremely reluctant to
sanction. Prosecutors and their agents naturally tend to assign
great weight to the societal interest in apprehending and con-
victing criminals; the danger is that they will assign too little to
the rights of citizens to be free from government-induced
criminality.93
The Second Circuit, on the brink of dismissing the case because of
governmental impropriety, did not take that final step. Instead, it is-
sued a stern warning:
Since we conclude reversal to be required on another ground,
we leave the resolution of this difficult question for another
day. We hope, however, that the lesson of this case may obvi-
ate the necessity for such a decision on our part. We take a
similar view with respect to the question whether this prosecu-
tion should be dismissed because the initiation of the investi-
gation was founded on a grossly inflated conception of the role
of the federal criminal law.
94
Here Judge Friendly referred approvingly to Section 207 of the
proposed reforms of federal jurisdiction already discussed.95 Finally, he
reached the actual ground for reversing the convictions: the absence of
true federal jurisdiction to prosecute. In detailed and scholarly fashion,
he analyzed the legislative history and purposes of the Travel Act and
concluded that in this case it should not be broadly, if literally, inter-
preted. It should not cover a situation where the interstate use of the
telephone was incidental and essentially manufactured by the federal
government. All the convictions were reversed.
Stunned, the United States Attorneys indignantly applied for a re-
hearing en banc, this time fully informing the federal appeals court
about the investigation's background. 96 Michael Armstrong, former
Chief Counsel for the Knapp Commission and newly appointed Dis-
trict Attorney of Queens County, the newly formed State Special Pros-
ecutor's Office, and the Manhattan District Attorney's Office each sub-
93. 486 F.2d at 676-77.
94. Id. at 677 (emphasis added).
95. Id. at 678. See supra notes 69-72 and accompanying text.
96. See 486 F.2d at 683.
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mitted an amicus brief, urging the Second Circuit to revoke its
damaging remarks.
The Special Prosecutor's brief was pointed:
Unfortunately, the Court in its decision went beyond its hold-
ing and criticized the United States Attorney's undercover op-
eration in this case.
... [T]his dictum could have a serious deleterious effect
on State and Federal law enforcement efforts throughout the
country. . . . More particularly, the mission entrusted to this
office-that of rooting out corruption in the State criminal jus-
tice system in this city-cannot possibly be pursued with any
degree of effectiveness without the employment of techniques
similar to those employed by the Government in this case.
These techniques, which were devoid of oppressiveness and vi-
olated the constitutional rights of no one, accomplished what
no other method could do.97
In short, said the Special Prosecutor, the undercover operation
conducted was "a reasonable, imaginative, and effective law enforce-
ment effort."
The Manhattan District Attorney similarly protested:
This Court's dictum disapproving the investigative techniques
in this case should be disavowed. . . . Because [the court's
opinion] indicate[d] that methods that have been and may be
used by [us] . . . are improper, . . . [u]nless disavowed on re-
argument this dictum could seriously inhibit appropriate inves-
tigations of corruption in the system of justice.
The experience of this office in decades of investigating
criminal schemes in the area of narcotics, gambling, official cor-
ruption and other crimes convinces us that on occasion, how-
ever rare, it is necessary for an undercover investigator to fol-
low through his collaboration with criminal elements who are
the targets of the investigation by causing himself to be "ar-
rested" and "prosecuted." Further, when the investigation has
disclosed corruption in the system of justice, it has been occa-
sionally necessary to pursue the case by having a court pro-
ceeding against a "defendant" who is in fact an undercover
policeman.98
97. Brief for the Office of Special Prosecutor Amicus Curiae, petition for rehearing,
United States v. Archer, 486 F.2d 670 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Special Prosecutor].
98. Brief of District Attorney of New York County Amicus Curiae, petition for re-
hearing, United States v. Archer, 486 F.2d 670 (1973) [hereinafter cited as District Attor-
ney]. The Manhattan District Attorney's Office had already conducted a secret investiga-
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The State Special Prosecutor also declared that "undercover in-
vestigations designed to penetrate and expose corruption in our crimi-
nal justice system are necessary and proper law enforcement efforts."99e
Bribery prosecutions in general were difficult, but
[p]rosecutions of individuals in the Justice System are even
more difficult because of the nature of the participants. The
corrupt Judge, the crooked prosecutor and the dishonest law-
yer are the most sophisticated type of criminal. Because they
are intelligent, knowledgeable, and extremely cautious, they
are almost impervious to prosecution.
The undercover investigation instituted by the United
States Attorney in this case was a resourceful and imaginative
attack on this exceedingly difficult problem.100
"In short," concluded the Manhattan District Attorney, "to pre-
serve the integrity of the system of justice, it may be necessary to pre-
pare a fictional case, if that can be done without entrapping the targets
or otherwise violating their constitutional rights." ''
On September 26, 1973, the Second Circuit replied.' 0 ' Mild irrita-
tion showed in the court's grudging concession:
Although the record does not contain proof of many of the
facts now called to our attention by the Government for the
first time as evidence of the background of its investigation, we
do not question that the federal prosecutors had been given
abundant information about the widespread fixing of cases in
the Queens County District Attorney's Office.
03
The court went on to smooth some ruffled feathers:
We readily appreciate the justified indignation this aroused
and can understand the consequent desire of federal law en-
forcement officials to clean these Augean stables of the State.
That Archer has been dismissed from his post as a result of the
Government's efforts is indeed a "good" result as the petition
repeatedly emphasizes. 04
tion where only the police commissioner knew that an undercover agent was joining a
gambling combine. The agent was later arrested, arraigned, tried, convicted and sen-
tenced by an unsuspecting court. He served a short prison term, then rejoined the gam-
blers; only after the investigation was successfully concluded was the court notified and
the agent's criminal record expunged. Id.
99. Special Prosecutor, supra note 97.
100. Id.
101. District Attorney, supra 98.




NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW
But good results sometimes emerge from improper acts. It was one
thing to "appreciate" indignation and "understand" a desire to clean
up New York; another to affirmatively endorse that effort.
Although the federal appeals court did "appreciate" and "under-
stand" the federal prosecutors' desire to clean up New York, and al-
though the court no longer condemned the investigative tech-
niques--"issues which we felt desirable to ventilate .. .but were at
pains neither to decide nor to pronounce dicta"1 05 -the court refused
to endorse the investigation. It did not even renounce its earlier sug-
gestion that federal power had been abused in initiating the investiga-
tion of New York's corrupt criminal justice system. Instead, the court
treated this issue as somehow subsumed in the question of whether
federal prosecution was warranted.
It was not. In the end the court denied the government a rehearing
because there was no federal jurisdiction:
While the Government professes alarm at the precedential ef-
fect of our decision, we in fact went no further than to hold
that when the federal element in a prosecution under the
Travel Act is furnished solely by undercover agents, a stricter
standard is applicable than when the interstate or foreign ac-
tivities are those of the defendants themselves and that this
was not met here. We adhere to that holding and leave the task
of further line-drawing to the future. 106
The Second Circuit per Judge Friendly could have denied the re-
hearing, insisting that with a newly formed State Special Prosecutor's
Office there was no longer a substantial federal interest to prosecute
essentially local crimes of bribery. Judge Friendly might have used the
occasion to announce that a more fully informed court was now per-
suaded that once federal prosecutors were reasonably convinced New
York's criminal justice system was saturated with corruption, the fed-
eral government properly investigated under the guarantee clause of
the Constitution which promises all citizens that each state shall have
a republican government. The Second Circuit also might have en-
dorsed the government's reasonable and necessary investigative tech-
niques. If the Judge had brought his insight and scholarship to bear on
the problem in this way, Archer would stand as the leading analytical
tool for handling the essential investigative and jurisdictional problems
which Abscam raised ten years later.
Few read lukewarm retractions, fewer still quote them. The impor-
tant residue of Archer was Judge Friendly's first blast at the federal
105. Id.
106. Id. at 685-86.
[Vol. 28
BEYOND 1984: UNDERCOVER IN AMERICA
government and its techniques.10 7 Archer hung like a cloud, often cited
by corrupt defendants, and still cited by courts as a leading judicial
condemnation of prosecutorial overreach. Perhaps worse than whatever
precedential value Archer officially possessed, for a time it effectively
restrained prosecutors from vigorously and imaginatively investigating
corruption with the only tools that really work.
The State Special Prosecutor's Office presented the case against
Archer, Klein, and Wasserberger to a state grand jury which indicted
them in November 1973 for the state crimes of bribery and conspir-
acy.1 0 8 After Justice Murtagh refused to dismiss their indictments, de-
fendants appealed, claiming double jeopardy and governmental
misconduct.
On May 20, 1974, a divided Appellate Division (3-2), refused to
dismiss the Archer indictments on double jeopardy grounds, since a
federal court had reversed their convictions solely for lack of federal
jurisdiction, not an element of the New York crimes for which the
three were now being prosecuted.'0 9 Although a bare majority rejected
the double jeopardy claim, all five judges condemned the investigative
techniques. Justice Shapiro expressed a "general agreement with the
disapproval voiced by Judge Friendly in United States v. Archer of the
prosecutorial conduct of the government (both State and Federal).""I 0
He went on to say, however, that the question of whether such conduct
constituted government-induced criminality, violating principles of
fundamental fairness, sufficient to preclude the prosecution of the peti-
tioners should be decided at the trial level on a full record of the
events leading to the prosecution."'
Oddly, Justice Shapiro did not feel constrained in this context
107. 485 F.2d 1213 (2nd Cir. 1973). Worse, the same day the Second Circuit per
Judge Friendly denied the Archer rehearing, a different panel of three judges decided
Rosner's appeal, rejecting his claims of government impropriety. Rosner's was not a suit-
able case for a "sanction against the Government," the court said. Id. at 1227. There was
no illegal wiretapping which
may be so far beyond the bounds of governmental propriety that it is offensive
to a rule of liberty under law. The use of a dummy defendant, the ultimate in
the chicanery of unlawful intrusion, is cut from the same cloth. See United
States v. Archer... In all such cases the Government has been treated as
ruthless beyond justification. It has stooped to conduct well below the line of
acceptability. These strictures, while legal principles in constitutional terms, are
also moral judgments. They assess the guilt not of the defendant but of the
government.
Id.
108. Norman Archer, Frank R. Klein, and Leon Wasserberger were indicted on No-
vember 26, 1973. See N.Y. Times, Nov. 27, 1973, at 45, col. 1.
109. Klein v. Murtagh, 44 A.D.2d 465, 355 N.Y.S.2d 622 (2d Dep't), aff'd, 34 N.Y.2d
988, 318 N.E.2d 606, 360 N.Y.S.2d 416 (1974).
110. Id. at 473, 355 N.Y.S.2d at 630-31 (Shapiro, J., concurring).
111. Id.
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even to mention Judge Friendly's retraction. Nor did the two dissent-
ers, who went further in using the earlier opinion:
To permit this second prosecution to proceed would be totally
unjust, especially as, to use the words of the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals, the Federal Government, itself, "set up" this
crime ". .. by a scheme which involved lying to New York po-
lice officers and perjury before New York judges and grand
jurors.112
Once again prosecutors were on the defensive in their fight against offi-
cial corruption. The task had passed from the United States Attorneys
to the State Special Prosecutors.
On September 18, 1974, without opinion, New York's highest court
unanimously affirmed the Appellate Division's Archer decision, thus
sending the case back down for a full blown pre-trial due process hear-
ing on the background of the investigation and the investigative tech-
niques. 1 3 Finally, it seemed, the technique itself would become the fo-
cus of inquiry and decision.1 4
112. Id. at 475, 355 N.Y.S.2d at 632 (Christ, J., dissenting).
113. Klein v. Murtagh, 34 N.Y.2d 988, 318 N.E.2d 606, 360 N.Y.S. 2d 416 (1974). As a
newly appointed Assistant Special Prosecutor attached to the Queens Bureau, the author
was assigned to prepare for that hearing.
114. At this time, Paul Rao, Chief Judge of the Federal Customs Court, was indicted
for perjury. See People v. Rao, 53 A.D.2d 904, 386 N.Y.S.2d 441 (2d Dep't 1976). See
also People v. Rao, 73 A.D.2d 88, 425 N.Y.S.2d 122 (2d Dep't 1980). The Special Prose-
cutor's office used a simulated robbery case against the targets: Judge Rao, his son Paul
Rao, Jr., and his son's law associate, Salvatore Nigrone. 73 A.D.2d at 91-93, 425 N.Y.S.2d
at 125. One unsuspecting grand jury was misused as a forum to trap the targets into
committing perjury. That perjury case was later presented to a special grand jury, which
indicted the defendants but expressed misgivings at their own role. Id. at 91-93, 425
N.Y.S.2d at 125-26. Unlike Archer, in Rao the technique had not been used out of neces-
sity, nor carefully controlled to produce a case against a major violator involved in signif-
icant corruption. Rather, the 74-year-old Rao was approached by a supposed longtime
acquaintance he had not seen in 40 years, and was asked to help a friend's son who was
in trouble. Id. at 91-92, 425 N.Y.S.2d at 125. Rao advised the agent to see "a lawyer
[who] knew the judge" and recommended his son. 53 A.D.2d at 908, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 447
(Titone, J., dissenting). A year later, Rao was called before a grand jury so he would deny
that statement and be indicted for perjury. 73 A.D.2d at 91-93, 425 N.Y.S.2d at 125-26.
The Rao case was badly managed, and the grand jury trap was inappropriate under
a decision rendered in the interim by the New York Court of Appeals. 73 A.D.2d at 91,
98-99, 425 N.Y.S.2d at 124, 129 (citing People v. Tyler, 46 N.Y.2d 251, 385 N.E.2d 1224,
413 N.Y.S.2d 295 (1978)). In Tyler, the Court of Appeals held that "where a prosecutor
exhibits no palpable interest in eliciting facts material to a substantive investigation of a
crime or official misconduct and substantially tailors his questioning [of a witness before
a grand jury] to extract a false answer, a valid perjury prosecution should not lie." Tyler,
46 N.Y.2d at 259, 385 N.E.2d at 1228, 413 N.Y.S. 2d 299 (citation omitted). Eventually
the Rao case withered, dying the death it probably deserved. See 73 A.D.2d 88, 425
N.Y.S.2d 122 (App. Div. 1980).
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On April 27, 1976, the United States Supreme Court issued its
fourth and, as of 1984, its latest major opinion on entrapment. 15 Fed-
eral appeals courts had split over how to apply Russell to cases where
the government had supplied contraband to a predisposed defen-
dant.116 Hampton, the defendant, claimed that the government both
supplied and purchased the very heroin which it then convicted him
for selling. Hampton requested a special instruction, previously
adopted by the Fifth Circuit, that when the government buys contra-
band from itself through an intermediary, that intermediary has been
entrapped as a matter of law. The trial court refused this instruction
and the Eighth Circuit affirmed. 1"
The Supreme Court affirmed in Hampton v. United States, but
sharply divided 3-2-3.118 Writing for Chief Justice Burger and Justice
White, Justice Rehnquist reiterated a subjective view of entrapment
which had commanded a bare majority in Sorrells, Sherman, and Rus-
sell: "We ruled out the possibility that the defense of entrapment
could ever be based upon governmental misconduct in a case, such as
this one, where the predisposition of the defendant to commit the
crime was established."11 9 Justice Rehnquist went further. He seem-
ingly retracted his Russell caveat that due process might void a convic-
tion of a predisposed defendant where the government had acted
outrageously:
The remedy of the criminal defendant with respect to the acts
of Government agents, which, far from being resisted, are en-
couraged by him, lies solely in the defense of entrapment.
The limitations of the Due Process Clause ... come into
play only when the Government activity in question violates
some protected right of the defendant .... If the police en-
115. Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484 (1976).
116. Compare, e.g., United States v. Twigg, 588 F.2d 373 (3d Cir. 1978) (due process
precluded conviction where undercover agents suggested setting up drug lab, provided
location, supplies and expertise) and Greene v. United States, 454 F.2d 783 (9th Cir.
1971) (conspiracy and bootlegging convictions reversed where government undercover
agents helped to reestablish, and sustain, criminal bootlegging operations that had been
shut down by prior criminal convictions) with United States v. Khatib, 706 F.2d 213 (7th
Cir. 1983) (sale of contraband weapons to one predisposed is not the outrageous conduct
contemplated by Russell) and United States v. Norton, 700 F.2d 1072 (6th Cir.) (under-
cover agent's infiltration of the KKK and his participation in the planning and execution
of a bombing operation is not conduct sufficiently outrageous for court to overturn con-
victions), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1885 (1983).
117. United States v. Hampton, 507 F.2d 832, 834-36 (8th Cir. 1974), aff'd, 425 U.S.
484 (1976).
118. 425 U.S. 484 (1976).
119. Id. at 488-89.
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gage in illegal activity in concert with a defendant beyond the
scope of their duties the remedy lies, not in freeing the equally
culpable defendant, but in prosecuting the police under the ap-
plicable provisions of state or federal law.120
Justices Brennan, Stewart, and Marshall dissented, calling for an
objective entrapment approach which focused not on the particular de-
fendant's predisposition but upon the government's activity.
Where the Government's agent deliberately sets up the ac-
cused by supplying him with contraband and then bringing
him to another agent as a potential purchaser, the Govern-
ment's role has passed the point of toleration .... The Gov-
ernment is doing nothing less than buying contraband from it-
self through an intermediary and jailing the intermediary ....
That the accused is "predisposed" cannot possibly justify the
action of government officials in purposefully creating the
crime."'
Three justices, then, would have eliminated a due process defense
for a predisposed defendant who, by a subjective definition of entrap-
ment, was not entrapped. Three other justices would have adopted an
objective definition of entrapment whereby the defendant's predisposi-
tion would be irrelevant and the government being on both sides of the
contraband transaction would automatically have constituted
entrapment.
The key opinion in Hampton was the concurrence of Justice Pow-
ell, joined by Justice Blackmun. Justice Powell supported the subjec-
tivists' view of entrapment. Hampton, like Russell, was predisposed to
deal drugs and, therefore, regardless of who supplied them, Hampton,
like Russell, was not entrapped. 122 But the concurring justices joined
the dissenters in rejecting Justice Rehnquist's plurality opinion that
"fundamental fairness inherent in the guarantee of due process would
never prevent the conviction of a predisposed defendant, regardless of
the outrageousness of police behavior in light of the surrounding cir-
cumstances."'2 s A due process defense would be available to a predis-
posed defendant where the government had sufficiently overreached.
"Nor have we had occasion yet to confront Government overinvolve-
ment in areas outside the realm of contraband offenses. Cf. United
States v. Archer. . . . In these circumstances, I am unwilling to con-
clude that an analysis other than one limited to predisposition would
120. Id. at 490 (first and second emphasis added).
121. Id. at 498-99 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
122. Id. at 492-95 (Powell, J., concurring).
123. Id. at 492.
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never be appropriate under due process principles."' 24 In the decisive
opinion on entrapment, the Supreme Court invoked Archer to warn
the legal community that outrageous undercover techniques used to in-
vestigate political corruption might yet lead the nation's high court to
dismiss prosecutions of provably predisposed, corrupt officials. As a re-
sult of Hampton, a subjective entrapment defense continued as the
majority rule, but due process remained a viable possibility even to
predisposed and therefore non-entrapped defendants.
What circumstances, what investigative techniques would enable a
defendant successfully to invoke the due process clause? The Court did
not say. The closest it came was in a footnote which quoted Judge
Friendly in Archer: "there is certainly a [constitutional] limit to al-
lowing government involvement in crime. It would be unthinkable, for
example, to permit government agents to instigate robberies and beat-
ings .... ,,125 The nation awaited further word. Because of the 3-2-3
split, a due process defense remained only a possibility, and the Archer
case which Justice Powell had cited gained even greater importance.
Archer was now a state bribery case, sitting on the back burner,
awaiting a mandated pretrial determination by Justice Leonard San-
dler as to whether the government's techniques had been proper or
were so outrageous as to violate due process.' 2 In January, 1977, the
long-delayed Archer "investigative techniques" hearing was conducted
before Justice Sandler. Nicholas Scoppetta, Whitney North Seymour,
and Patrick V. Murphy testified for the People. The defense called
only Vincent Murano, the arresting officer. The facts and circum-
stances of the entire investigation were elicited in several days' testi-
mony, after which Justice Sandler announced his decision.1
27
This essay seeks to demonstrate that any well-informed citizen
would decide in the technique's favor. Sandler was the first judge to
have been fully informed. If he had ruled against simulated crimes and
dismissed the indictments against Archer, he might well have dealt the
technique its death blow in New York. He had every reason to expect
support from the Appellate Division, which had already denounced the
technique while rejecting Archer's earlier appeal. 28 But Justice Leo-
nard Sandler was above all fair-minded and responsible. He not only
bucked the tide, he reversed it.
Finally, after years of continuous vilification from the Federal and
124. Id. at 493 (citation omitted).
125. Id. at 493 n.4 (quoting United States v. Archer, 486 F.2d at 676-77 (footnote
omitted)).
126. N.Y.L.J., Mar. 10, 1977, at 13, col. 4.
127. Id.
128. 44 A.D. 2d 465, 355 N.Y.S.2d 622 (2d Dep't), aff'd, 34 N.Y.2d 988, 318 N.E.2d
606, 360 N.Y.S.2d 606 (1974).
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State judiciary, law enforcement officials who had operated in a re-
sponsible professional manner and, more important, the investigative
technique they had used, received their judicial vindication.
Justice Sandler's "Decision on 'Investigative Technique' Hear-
ing, 1 29 dated March 9, 1977, read in part:
Clearly it was not practical under those circumstances to in-
form either the prosecutor or the Grand Jury of the contrived
character of the case. Moreover, those responsible for the strat-
egy of the investigation could have concluded reasonably that
there was no possible way of confirming the accuracy of the
important information received other than by proceeding with
the presentation of the matter in the Grand Jury in the man-
ner that had been indicated by one of the alleged conspirators.
This highly significant decision concluded:
There is no doubt that the method used here and in Rao[130]
involving deception of the court, the county prosecutor and the
Grand Jury, and governmental participation in what would
otherwise be clearly criminal acts, presents important and
troublesome issues....
I share the deep disquiet expressed by appellate judges
with the deception of the court system inherent in the tech-
nique used here and in Rao. On the other hand, no one could
have served for over a year in my present assignment without
becoming acutely aware of how difficult it is to develop cor-
ruption cases on the prosecutorial and judicial levels .... Of
course, no single investigative tool is wholly indispensable but
I am persuaded that the carefully selective use of the con-
trived crime under appropriately compelling circumstances
comes close to being indispensable in the investigation of cor-
ruption at levels that touch intimately the basic integrity of
the criminal justice system. It may be that, as has been elo-
quently argued, the wrongs implicit in the method are so per-
vasive and unacceptable that no end, however important, can
justify its continued use. Before that conclusion is finally
reached, however, I would think it critically important that a
serious effort be made to determine whether the method may
not be reconciled with basic principles of fairness and justice
by accompanying it with safeguards of judicial supervision and
129. N.Y.L.J., Mar. 10, 1977, at 13, col. 4-5.
130. See supra note 114.
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disclosure to the responsible heads of the institutions under
investigation.131
The next day a New York Times front-page article headlined: "A
Court Upholds Staged Arrests," called Justice Sandler's decision "the
first clear signal to local prosecutors that they can use contrived crimes
to detect official corruption." The decision was "certain to ignite fur-
ther controversy in local, judicial and legal circles."'132
In June 1979, the Appellate Division unanimously affirmed
Archer's state conviction, declaring that because of the earlier tech-
nique hearing, the "issue of alleged prosecutorial misconduct . . . is
now properly before us on a full factual record."'133 Judge Friendly's
federal Archer condemnation was placed in proper context. Having
been apprised more fully, "the Second Circuit muted its criticism
.... The record presently before us is far more complete. . . . Based
upon such record, we hold that the conduct of the law enforcement
agents in this case does not offend due process and that appellant's
prosecution, was, therefore, proper."''
As far as Archer's claims of due process violations, the Appellate
Division applied the test enunciated by the New York Court of Ap-
peals in People v. Isaacson"35 and found that "while the government
created the predicate for appellant's crime by contriving a criminal
131. N.Y.L.J., Mar. 10, 1977, at 13, col. 4-5, (footnote and emphasis added).
132. N.Y. Times, Mar. 10, 1977, at 1, col. 2.
133. People v. Archer, 68 A.D.2d 441, 442, 417 N.Y.S.2d 507, 508 (1979) (citation
omitted).
134. Id. at 446, 417 N.Y.S.2d at 510-11.
135. People v. Isaacson, 44 N.Y.2d 511, 378 N.E.2d 78, 406 N.Y.S. 2d 714 (1978). The
Court of Appeals went further than the Second Circuit had gone in Archer. It found the
police conduct, when tested by due process standards, so egregious as to dismiss. Al-
though the court reviewed the Supreme Court's entrapment decisions which suggested
that a due process defense might be available under the United States Constitution, id.
at 519, 378 N.E.2d at 81-82, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 718, the court barred the prosecution be-
cause the police behavior violated the due process clause of the New York Constitution.
Isaacson's significance is the court's due process analysis of the boundaries of permissi-
ble police conduct. Although there is no precise line of demarcation or calibrated mea-
suring rod to determine whether due process principles have been transgressed in a par-
ticular case, the court listed several factors to be considered:
[W]hether the police manufactured a crime which otherwise would not likely
have occurred, or merely involved themselves in an ongoing criminal activity,
whether the police themselves engaged in criminal or improper conduct repug-
nant to a sense of justice; whether the defendant's reluctance to commit the
crime is overcome by appeals to humanitarian instincts such as sympathy or
past friendship, by temptation of exorbitant gain, or by persistent solicitation in
the face of unwillingness; whether the record reveals simply a desire to obtain a
conviction with no reading that the police motive is to prevent further crime or
protect the populace.
Id. at 521, 378 N.E.2d at 83, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 719.
1984]
NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW
case which could then be 'fixed,' it did not manufacture a crime which
otherwise would not likely have occurred." Furthermore "we hold that
the government itself did not engage in criminal or improper conduct
repugnant to a sense of justice.' 3 ' The court observed that the so-
called government "offenses" under New York law were "performed by
a public servant in the reasonable exercise of his official powers, and
were therefore justified and not criminal.'
137
This Archer opinion closed with a warning:
We would again caution law enforcement officials, when
dealing with corruption within the criminal justice system, that
they may no more engage in flagrant misuse of such system
than the individuals they seek to prosecute. However, we are
persuaded that the conduct of law enforcement officials in this
case was not improper. Although for the future such deception
might more wisely be circumscribed by the development of ju-
dicial guidelines, we hold, to use the words of [Justice San-
dler], that "the carefully selected use of the contrived crime
under appropriately compelling circumstances," which is this
case, is not repugnant to a sense of justice,. . . [and] due pro-
cess does not mandate dismissal of appellant's indictment.'38
It was more than six years in coming, and the major actors had
gone on to play other parts, e.g. Archer prosecutor Ben-Veniste, after a
stint as Watergate Special Prosecutor, was about to become an Abscam
defense attorney, but Archer and its technique-the use of carefully
monitored criminal simulation, even involving lies under oath to an un-
suspecting state grand jury-had received its first appellate judicial
vindication. With little prospect of success, but in order to stay out of
jail, Archer appealed.
On April 24, 1980, the New York Court of Appeals affirmed
Archer's conviction,"s9 and on October 6, 1980, the United States Su-
preme Court denied certiorari. 40 Norman Archer was imprisoned. He
filed for habeas corpus in federal court claiming among other things,
outrageous government conduct in the investigation. Judge Duffy de-
nied the petition without opinion, but permitted an appeal to the Sec-
ond Circuit."
The Archer case had come full circle. Judge Friendly now had a
136. 68 A.D. 2d at 447-48, 417 N.Y.S.2d at 512.
137. Id. at 448, 417 N.Y.S.2d at 512.
138. Id. at 449, 417 N.Y.S.2d at 512-13 (emphasis added).
139. People v. Archer, 49 N.Y.2d 978, 406 N.E.2d 804, 428 N.Y.S.2d 949 (1980).
140. 454 U.S. 85 (1981).
141. Archer v. Commissioner of Correction, 646 F.2d 44 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 454
U.S. 851 (1981).
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rare opportunity to decide Archer's due process claims for a second
time. He could have used the occasion to remove the taint he had im-
posed, to insure that Archer would no longer mistakenly stand as a
judicial condemnation of government overreach, but he did not.
Instead, Judge Friendly merely pointed out that his earlier Archer
opinion had nothing to do with state due process. Echoing the dissent
in Isaacson,142 he noted that in federal cases like Rochin,
143 Russell,1 4
and Hampton,4 5 "unlike Archer's, the impermissible police conduct
was inflicted directly upon the defendant. ' 146 So, not closing the ac-
count, but "[l]eaving open the question whether a case might arise
where conduct of law enforcement officers not thus directly inflicted
was so outrageous as to constitute a denial of due process," Judge
Friendly joined the New York courts at least in concluding that "the
142. Judge Gabrielli wrote in Isaacson: "Had defendant been a direct victim of police
malfeasance, the situation would be quite different." 44 N.Y.2d 511, 527, 378 N.E.2d 78,
87, 406 N.Y.S.2d 714, 723 (Gabrielli, J., dissenting).
143. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952). See supra note 77 and accompanying
text.
144. United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423 (1973).
145. Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484 (1976).
146. Archer v. Commissioner of Correction, 646 F.2d 44, 47 (2d Cir.) (emphasis
added), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 851 (1981). In People v. Isaacson, 44 N.Y.2d 511, 378
N.E.2d 78, 406 N.Y.S.2d 714 (1978), the New York Court of Appeals sustained a due
process defense in a case in which police had threatened, kicked and beaten a third
party, who then acted as an informant against the defendant, luring him across the state
line to be arrested for selling drugs. Id. at 514-18, 378 N.E.2d at 79-81, 406 N.Y.S.2d at
715-17. The court took note of Justice Rehnquist's plurality opinion in Hampton v.
United States, 425 U.S. 484 (1976), in which three Justices agreed that a due process
defense was not available to a predisposed defendant and never available in a case where
the complained-of police conduct was inflicted on a third party. Nevertheless, the Isaac-
son court upheld the due process defense of the concededly predisposed defendant, bas-
ing its decision on the due process provision of N.Y. CONsT. art. I, § 6. 44 N.Y.2d at 519-
20, 378 N.E.2d at 82-84, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 718-19. The two dissenting judges took the view
that the beating of the informant, though "inexcusable .... had no significant connec-
tion with defendant, and in no way violated any of defendant's constitutional rights." Id.
at 527, 378 N.E.2d at 87, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 723 (Gabrielli and Jansen, JJ., dissenting)
(citations omitted). In addition, the dissenters indicated that they would endorse Justice
Rehnquist's view that a predisposed defendant may not assert a due process defense. Id.
at 529, 378 N.E.2d at 88, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 724. See supra note 135. As discussed infra
note 699, a majority of the Court has not up to this point adopted Justice Rehnquist's
view as to the predisposed defendant's being barred from asserting a due process defense
based on police conduct in inducing his acts.
The Supreme Court has, however, apparently adopted Justice Rehnquist's view on
third-party due process claims. See United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727 (1980). In
Payner, the Supreme Court, in a six-Justice majority opinion by Justice Powell, held
that the defendant had no standing to assert a due process defense when IRS agents
hired a private detective firm to steal a briefcase from a third party and surreptitiously
photograph documents which led to evidence used to convict the defendant. Id. at 737
n.9.
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conduct here at issue did not reach that level. We thus still need not
and do not decide the non-constitutional question whether the conduct
in this case would have barred a federal prosecution of Archer.
'1 7 It
was a second rate opinion from a first rate mind.
On October 5, 1981, the United States Supreme Court denied cer-
tiorari, thus ending the Archer saga.148 Few people noticed. Attention
concerning undercover techniques of investigation and governmental
misconduct had long since focused elsewhere. No longer was it a phony
mob hit man; now it was a phony Arab sheik.
Somewhat free of Archer's basic complication of federal-state rela-
tions, but with its own added refinements of enormous bribes pressed
on public officials for acts not clearly detrimental to their constituency,
Abscam has generated an inquiry among well disposed officials in all
three branches of the Federal government into the proper limits to
government sponsored scams and phony worlds constructed to reveal
criminality.
In Abscam, two agencies of the federal executive, the FBI and Jus-
tice Department, simulated a world of easy money inducing federal
and state legislators to exploit corrupt opportunities which the Execu-
tive had created, videotaped, and would then prosecute. Individual
congressmen were indicted for bribery, but in the public eye, the integ-
rity of Congress itself was impugned. By raising entrapment and due
process as defenses, the defendants also placed the Executive police
methods on trial. The people's grand juries would decide to indict, and
their petit juries would decide whether the defendants were guilty or
whether they were not predisposed to commit those crimes and
thereby entrapped. Judges would decide whether the Executive's tech-
niques of investigation were outrageous and warranted dismissing the
prosecutions as violations of constitutionally guaranteed due process.
Although congressmen were the defending targets of the investiga-
tion, Congress also had a vital affirmative role to play in the national
debate. The people's chosen representatives continued to oversee the
national police which had stung them, and continued to supervise the
Justice Department which would prosecute its members. Congress con-
trolled the FBI budget, and it had long been drafting an FBI charter.
Congress also had enormous power over the federal judiciary
which would hear the Abscam cases. All the federal courts except the
United States Supreme Court were ultimately creatures of congres-
sional will. 149 Of course Congress would not consider abolishing the
147. 646 F.2d at 47.
148. 454 U.S. 85 (1981).
149. The Constitution created the Supreme Court and granted Congress the power to
establish lower federal courts. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. Congress exercised its power in
1789 and created the lower federal courts. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. XX, §§ 3, 4, 1 Stat.
73, 74 (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 43, 132 (1982)).
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lower federal courts, nor even restricting their jurisdiction to try Ab-
scam cases,"1 0 but Congress could enact standards which those courts
must use to determine entrapment. A narrow majority of the Supreme
Court, barely but consistently retaining a subjective entrapment de-
fense, had also located it not in the Constitution, but in congressional
choice. 151 The Supreme Court had read into federal criminal laws legis-
lative intent that innocent, i.e. non predisposed, persons should not be
punished. The High Court had long invited the Legislature to legislate,
and explicitly adopt whatever entrapment defense it saw fit. 512 Ab-
scam, therefore, has provided an impetus for Congress to consider and
adopt an entrapment defense, either subjectively focusing upon the de-
fendants' predisposition, or objectively focusing upon the threat the
government's methods of investigation posed to average law abiding
citizens. Congress could make entrapment a jury question or a question
for the judges, and Congress could impose the burden upon the govern-
ment to disprove beyond a reasonable doubt the defendant was en-
trapped, or it could impose upon the defendant a burden of establish-
ing entrapment by a preponderance of the evidence.
150. Congress has the power to modify federal courts' appellate jurisdiction. U.S.
CONST. art. II. § 2. See, e.g., Norris-laGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. § 109 (1982) (limitation on
thepower of federal courts to issue injunctions in labor disputes). See also, Hart, The
Pother of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic,
66 HARv. L. REv. 1362 (1953).
151. In Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435 (1932), although the Court did not say
explicitly that it was applying a subjective entrapment theory, it did hold that the defen-
dant should have been allowed to have the jury consider that the government agent had
placed in the "mind of an innocent person the disposition to commit the alleged of-
fense." Id. at 442. In Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369 (1958), five Justices of the
majority applied a subjective test, but Justice Frankfurter, joined by three other Justices
in his concurring opinion, advocated an objective test. In United States v. Russell, 411
U.S. 423 (1973), subjective entrapment prevailed over objective entrapment by another
five-to-four vote. In Hampton v. United States, 424 U.S. 484 (1976), the three Justices of
the plurality and the two concurring Justices agreed that subjective entrapment contin-
ued as the federal rule, but the three dissenters urged adoption of objective entrapment.
Id. at 496. As discussed infra note 152, the theoretical basis for the subjective entrap-
ment defense is the Court's determination that Congress, in enacting a penal law, would
not intend that non-predisposed persons induced into committing acts by agents of the
government should be subjected to the statute's sanction.
152. Thus, for example, the Court in United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423 (1973),
based the subjective theory on "the notion that Congress could not have intended crimi-
nal punishment for a defendant who has committed all the elements of a prescribed
offense, but was induced to commit them by the Government." Id. at 435. The Court
pointed out in Russell that "[s]ince the defense is not of a constitutional dimension,
Congress may address itself to the question and adopt any substantive definition of the
defense that it may find desirable." Id. at 433. Because Congress has not legislated other-
wise, the judicially fashioned subjective theory, with its focus on the defendant's predis-
position, continues to be the law in federal prosecutions. See, e.g., Hampton v. United
States, 425 U.S. 484 (1976).
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Beyond defining entrapment, Congress had a vital role to play in
limiting future undercover investigations. The courts were only to de-
cide the legality of techniques in cases before them. An investigation
may be constitutional but sufficiently immoral, unwise, intrusive, or
threatening to be outlawed by statute. Congress was to decide the na-
tion's general policy. Perhaps the Executive should be allowed to initi-
ate undercover stings only where there was already reasonable suspi-
cion or probable cause to believe that a particular individual was
corrupt. Whatever Congress legislated would bind the courts' legal de-
cision. Perhaps the Legislature would prohibit Executive undercover
investigations except by Judicial warrant.
Although bloodied from public disgust as Abscam indictments is-
sued and cases went to trial, Congress has engaged in dispassionate
oversight, full inquiry, honest analysis, and has issued recommenda-
tions for the good of the republic. The stakes are enormous: the quality
of life in the United States, the level of privacy and corruption, police
intrusion and police effectiveness. However one may disagree with
their particular recommendations, any fair reading of the record con-
vincingly demonstrates that since February 1980, when Abscam broke,
in its inquiry and oversight, Congress has shouldered its responsibility
fully, and fairly.'5 s
ABSCAM
Having shied away from undercover investigations under J. Edgar
Hoover, in 1976 the FBI was prepared to conduct them, asking Con-
gress for $1,000,000.1" Melvin Weinberg, a former FBI informant, had
been convicted for a front-end scam in which his company, London
Investors, pretending to represent wealthy Arabs seeking business op-
153. See FBI Undercover Operations: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Civil and
Constitutional Rights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982)
[hereinafter cited as Operations Hearings]; Law Enforcement Undercover Activities:
Hearings Before the Senate Select Comm. to Study Law Enforcement Undercover Ac-
tivities of Components of the Dep't of Justice, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982) [hereinafter
cited as Senate Hearings]; FBI Authorization: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Civil
and Constitutional Rights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1981) [hereinafter cited as Authorization Hearings]; FBI Undercover Guidelines: Over-
sight Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981) [hereinafter cited as Oversight
Hearings]; SUBCOMM. ON CIVIL AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON THE
JUDICIARY, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., FBI UNDE.RCOVER OPERATIONS (Comm. Print 1984) [here-
inafter cited as Committee Print]; FINAL REPORT OF THE SENATE SELECT COMM. TO STUDY
UNDERCOVER Aavrnms OF COMONENTS OF THE DEP'T OF JUSTICE, S. REP. No. 682, 97th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1982) [hereinafter cited as SELECT COMM.].
154. SELECT COMM., supra note 153, at 1. This request was the first one since the FBI
was created in 1908 that expressly asked for funds for "undercover activities." Id.
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portunities in the United States, swindled local real estate investors
out of "processing fees" to advance the Arabs' loans.155 Sentenced to
prison at the end of 1977, Weinberg traded probation for cooperation
with the FBI, establishing a similar scam under the name Abdul Enter-
prises, to penetrate the world of stolen and forged securities, and sto-
len art work.15' During the first nine months of 1978, Weinberg helped
the FBI recover almost $2,000,000,000 in phony gold futures and certif-
icates of deposit.
1 57
In October, a middleman named John Stowe contacted Weinberg
and said he might be able to get bank documents from Switzerland
with help from i congressman friend who Stowe said was "as big a
155. Id. at 400. Department of Justice files show that the FBI first formally opened
Weinberg as an informant on June 3, 1969. Weinberg testified that he believed that he
had begun acting as an informant as early as 1965. Weinberg probably participated in
and profited from criminal activities while he acted as an FBI informant. Id. at 399.
When the FBI became aware of this in 1976 his official file as an informant was closed.
Id. at 399-400.
156. Id. at 400-01.
157. Id. at 401-06. The FBI also initiated other undercover operations. "Frontload"
focused on organized crime in construction projects in New York and New Jersey
financed by the Department of Housing and Urban Development. Id. at 325. Two under-
cover FBI agents operated an insurance bonding agency, issuing bonds for construction
projects while investigating fraud and labor racketeering violations. Although plagued by
a double-dealing informant who used the investigation to bilk innocent people, Frontload
did result in the conviction of twelve public officials and organized crime figures, includ-
ing the mayor, deputy chief of police, and school president of Union City, New Jersey.
Id. at 327.
In another operation, code-named "Labou," agents formed a "corrupt" construction
company in order to investigate possible construction fraud in the Washington, D.C.
area. Id. at 329. Funds were budgeted for a complex and expensive operation which in-
cluded maintaining offices and renovating two houses. Id. at 330. The FBI's lack of ad-
ministrative experience in running such a large project resulted in an uncontrollable
overhead and wasted money. Id. at 329. See also Senate Hearings, supra note 153, Sept.
21, 1982, at 9-11, 30 (testimony of Oliver B. Revel, Ass't Dir., FBI).
In July, 1978, at the request of its Seattle field office, FBI Headquarters also ap-
proved an undercover operation codenamed "Buyin." SELECT Comm., supra note 153, at
336. A Washington state police officer had complained that the mayor was taking bribes,
allowing illegal gambling, and promising to support state legislation legalizing gambling.
The FBI sent an undercover agent to invest in a cardroom in Washington. Soon the
agent met a lobbyist who denied the mayor's clout, but offered to introduce the agent to
the Speaker and Majority Leader of the Washington state legislature, who, for bribes,
would support gambling legislation. I
The Seattle field office shifted its focus from local to state political corruption. But
before Headquarters would approve the bribe, it instructed Seattle to corroborate the
lobbyist-middleman's assertions of corruption. A few months later, the Speaker bf the
House showed himself willing to sell his influence: "You don't buy people anymore," he
told undercover agents, "you just rent them." Senate Hearings, supra note 153 Sept. 21,
1982, at 19 (testimony of J. Harper Wilson). By insisting on corroboration of an untested
middleman's allegations before authorizing a bribe offer, FBI procedure in Buyin sharply
contrasted with its contemporaneous practice in Abscam.
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crook as I am."'1' In November, another corrupt middleman described
to Weinberg several recent dealings involving Angelo Errichetti, Mayor
of Camden, New Jersey as well as a state senator. The middleman
claimed to have paid several kickbacks directly or indirectly to New
Jersey public officials. Mayor Errichetti had several more projects in-
cluding a hotel in Atlantic City where he had "a tremendous amount of
juice. '
' 59
On December 1, 1978 Errichetti met Weinberg and Abdul Enter-
prises Chairman McCloud (Agent McCarthy) to discuss opening a ho-
tel in Atlantic City; Errichetti refused to answer Weinberg's question,
"how much we are talking dollars and cents its gonna cost for you to
take care of all of this," referring them to middlemen. 60 When Er-
richetti left the room, the middlemen told Weinberg and McCloud that
the mayor must be paid $350,000 to $400,000 for his help in Atlantic
City. Errichetti would distribute that money as he saw fit."'1
1979 was the year of the Abscam undercover investigation. In Jan-
uary, FBI undercover agent Anthony Amoroso joined the Abscam team
posing as Tony DeVito. 62 On January 8, Weinberg and Errichetti met
in Atlantic City, to discuss payoffs to the New Jersey Casino Control
Commission for Abdul Enterprises' gambling license. The next day Er-
richetti introduced Tony Torcasio, manager of the Atlantic City Holi-
day Inn, to Abdul chairman McCloud (agent McCarthy) and Tony
DeVito (Agent Amoroso). Torcasio was to manage a Penthouse casino
when publisher Bob Guccione obtained financing. After Torcasio left,
Errichetti demanded $25,000 up front and a total of $400,000 to guar-
antee a license. He promised a full refund if the license were not
granted, claiming that three of the five Casino Control Commission-
ers-including the chairman, and vice-chairman were his nominees. 0 3
Two days later Errichetti introduced Alexander Feinberg and bus-
inessman Sandy Williams to McCloud to discuss funding a proposed
titanium mining project in Virginia. Feinberg described himself as a
very close friend and political ally of United States Senator Harrison
Williams; Errichetti had described Feinberg as the Senator's
"bagman."
1 '
The next week the FBI Undercover Operations Review Committee
approved $25,000 to bribe Errichetti. At the Abdul Enterprises Long
Island Office, Errichetti reassured the Abdul Chairman of his influence
158. SELECr COMM., supra note 153, at 406.
159. Id. at 406.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 408.
163. Id. at 243-246, 410.
164. Id. at 410.
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with Kenneth MacDonald, Vice Chairman of the Casino Control Com-
mission, who Errichetti said had close relatives "attached to organized
crime." They also discussed the titanium mine venture; and Errichetti
received $25,000, the first Abscam payoff to a public official.165
Agent Amoroso had been spending most of his time living aboard
and repairing The Left Hand, a sixty-five-foot oceangoing yacht previ-
ously seized by U.S. Customs agents in a drug raid, now captained and
crewed by FBI agents.166 The FBI accepted Weinberg's suggestion to
throw an Abscam yacht party honoring Errichetti; the Mayor actively
participated in compiling the guest list. At a March 20 meeting in
Quantico, Virginia to plan the party, all FBI agents and informants
who would attend were briefed on entrapment and due process issues.
Approximately thirty-five non-FBI guests, including an assortment of
confidence men, fences and swindlers, one of whom called himself
Count Martforte, showed up at the testimonial. Special Agent Richard
Farhart, who spoke Arabic, made a brief appearance as Sheik Yassir
Habib, and presented Errichetti with a "ceremonial dagger," a souvenir
knife Weinberg had bought in Greece. Errichetti in return promised to
present the sheik a gold key to the city of Camden.16 7 Senator Wil-
liams, who was photographed with the sheik, told Weinberg that
McCloud could use his name as a reference for the mining project.168
The yacht was not wired, nor was Weinberg.
Errichetti and McCloud continued to negotiate over how Casino
Control Commissioner MacDonald would receive his bribe. McCloud
wanted to pay MacDonald directly; Errichetti refused, proposing that
McCloud give him $100,000 which Errichetti would give to MacDonald
in a parking lot, McCloud observing the transfer from afar. Subse-
quently Weinberg and DeVito modified this plan, insisting to Errichet-
ti that MacDonald physically be present when the money was passed
to Errichetti. 69 On March 26, the New York FBI Field Office re-
quested $100,000 to pay MacDonald, stating that Errichetti would ac-
cept the money "and turn it over to MacDonald in the presence of
undercover special agents.' 17 0 Headquarters approved, stating, "The
Director has instructed that the $100,000 should be delivered only to
165. Id. at 411.
166. Id. at 417.
167. Id. at 418.
168. Id. at 418-419. In a conversation that Weinberg had with Senator Williams and
Alex Feinberg, Weinberg asked whether the Senator would permit McCloud to use his
name as a reference and whether he would endorse the Piney River Mine project. Sena-
tor Williams assented. Feinberg cautioned, however, that the Senator would not publi-
cize his support and all agreed that the Senator could not say that he was financially
involved in the mine project. Id.
169. Id. at 419.
170. Id.
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Kenneth MacDonald, New Jersey Gaming Commision Control Vice
Chairman. Insure that statements from MacDonald are elicited regard-
ing assurance of casino license prior to providing payment."'171 In addi-
tion, FBI Director Webster had written "Deliver money only to
MacDonald.'
72
MacDonald's situation was somewhat ambiguous. Whereas Er-
richetti was unabashedly corrupt, aggressively pursuing opportunities
and bragging of corrupt contacts, he repeatedly stated that MacDonald
expected no money for his favorable vote and would receive none from
Errichetti. He had shielded MacDonald, insisting there must be no
mention of casino licenses or money. The government could discount
these protestations as the actions of a clever bagman, effectively insu-
lating his principal from direct dirty contact. On the other hand, Er-
richetti might be using an unwitting, innocent MacDonald to give the
appearance of corruptibility, so that he, Errichetti, could charge an
enormous bribe which he would pocket while an unsuspecting Casino
Control Commission decided favorably the Abdul license application
on its merits.
The government, on balance, was correct to offer MacDonald a
bribe. The Senate Select Committee's Final Report,173 from which
much of this Abscam chronology is drawn, meticulously established
"numerous articulable facts to support a reasonable suspicion that
MacDonald was corrupt and that he would take a bribe.' "1 4 But the
investigators were properly cautious, and sought to remove ambiguities
and make the corruption obvious: a bribe to MacDonald for the Com-
mission's license approval.
Headquarters' instructions authorizing payment only after explicit
assurances of favorable action, however, made the meeting more diffi-
cult for McCloud when, the next day, as planned, Errichetti and Mac-
Donald arrived at Abdul Enterprises with its hidden videotape camera.
The three were chatting amiably about Long Island when suddenly
MacDonald dashed to the window and peered out through the venetian
blinds, his back to McCloud and Errichetti, both of whom were stand-
ing near the desk on which lay a briefcase containing $100,000. Er-
richetti announced: "I've come up for the money for the future, my
171. Id. at 420. However, all of the Director's instructions proved fruitless. The
money was delivered to MacDonald and no assurance from MacDonald was obtained.
For a complete discussion of the ambiguities in the events leading up to the March 31,
1979, transaction, see id. at 253-261.
172. Id. at 420.
173. SELECT COMM., supra note 153.
174. Id. at 243. For a complete discussion of the investigation of MacDonald and the
basis of the reasonable suspicion justifying an offer to him to commit a crime, see id. at
241-261.
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boy."175 McCloud responded he had a "big investment in Atlantic
City." As they talked, McCloud opened the briefcase. MacDonald, still
peering out the window and avoiding the transaction behind him, in-
quired about ongoing construction outside. Standing by the briefcase,
McCloud forced the issue, as per instructions, calling on MacDonald to
concede the quid pro quo: "I hope that, Ken, I hope there won't be any




MacDonald did not reply. Closing the briefcase, McCloud reiterated
that without a casino license he would be left with "a piece of dirt...
[b]ecause that's where the money is to be made and that's why we're
all here."' 77 Errichetti took the briefcase, and all three walked out. The
Director's instructions that money be handed directly to MacDonald
only after explicit assurances of favorable official action had not been
followed.
After leaving Abdul Enterprises, an irritated Errichetti and Mac-
Donald joined Weinberg and DeVito in the coffee shop of the Haup-
pauge Holiday Inn. Weinberg informed them that fortunately McCloud
had been demoted and DeVito was now in charge of Abdul Enter-
prises. MacDonald complained that McCloud's performance during the
just completed meeting had "seemed like entrapment."17 8 Errichetti re-
trieved from his car an index of New Jersey state legislators and
checked off those he considered corrupt. This was the second list the
Mayor had given Weinberg. The day before, March 30, although
neither tape-recorded nor noted in any FBI memo, Errichetti had
given Weinberg a handwritten list of eight politicians who he claimed
were corrupt or corruptible. Among those were two United States Con-
gressmen, including Michael Myers.17
Meanwhile, Weinberg was stalling businessmen pressing to be paid
and loaned money by Abdul, while he in turn was pressing Penthouse
publisher Guccione to pay a bribe. Weinberg initially targeted Guc-
cione without any basis to believe that he was corrupt or corruptible.
No middleman had identified him as such, but Weinberg applied pres-
sure on others to reveal the Penthouse publisher's mob contacts. He
sought to instill distrust in the publisher's background and financial
prospects, strongly hinting to Guccione's hotel manager and construc-
tion contractor that Penthouse would never obtain the necessary ca-
sino license. Finally, on April 5, 1979, having failed, with Erichetti, to
determine Guccione's mob connections, Weinberg met the publisher at
175. Id. at 420
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 421. For a complete discussion of the MacDonald transaction, see id. at
241-262.
179. Id. at 421.
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Abdul Enterprises' office. Weinberg assured Guccione "As long as I can
explain to the Board of Directors, they don't give a damn who you're in
bed with, believe me. They also realize ... being in the gambling busi-
ness, you're not stupid, that you gotta have the right people behind ya,
or forget it. You're not gonna make it. They can rip you off too fast."
"Mel I don't want to disappoint you. I hate to disappoint you. I
know what you're getting at," Guccione replied, "No way, Mel ....
This is on the heads and the eyes of my children. I have five chldren,
alright? On the eyes of my children I am not connected with anybody.
I am totally my own man. I am 100 percent owner of all of my compa-
nies, I owe nothing to nobody, nobody sits on my back, nobody has any
pull with me. No one and least of all anybody like that, who is likely to
cause me problems in getting licenses and that sort of thing."1'
Weinberg continued to insist Guccione was connected with organ-
ized crime, and Guccione steadfastly denied it, expressing confidence
that he would obtain a casino license on the merits. Weinberg said he'd
heard the Casino Control Commission would deny it. "Mel, believe
me" Guccione answered, "it is not possible for them to deny me a li-
cense." Finally, Weinberg explicitly conditioned Abdul financing upon
Guccione's agreement to offer a casino commissioner a bribe: "I'm even
authorized to even go further and I'm telling you it's between me and
you, and if you want it, we'll do it. We'll pay it... I don't care what it
costs, to guarantee your license, we'll give you the money." 81 In the
end Guccione held fast. He would not authorize a bribe. If he somehow
were denied the license and financing he knew he merited, Abdul En-
terprises would have first option on his casino site.
In retrospect, the pressure brought to bear on this private citizen
by FBI informant Weinberg was unconscionable. Guccione's continued
resistance in the face of that repeated pressure and serious threat to
his livelihood put to shame many public officials who were to succumb
to much less. In the end, Bob Guccione, Penthouse publisher, with-
stood it all. The honest citizen simply but steadfastly said "no."
Weinberg's main focus in Abscam was Senator Williams' titanium
venture. When Weinberg raised the issue of government contracts with
Sandy Williams, the Senator's close business associate, Williams was
reluctant to discuss the subject over the telephone until Weinberg reas-
sured him that the phone was "clean." Sandy Williams assured Wein-
180. Id. at 143-49. The next day, April 1, Weinberg double dealt the FBI and met
Errichetti at a rest stop on the Long Island Expressway to receive his portion of the
$100,000 bribe. Id. Earlier, Weinberg had arranged with Errichetti for the private payoff,
and he covered his tracks that April Fool's day by creating a taped telephone conversa-
tion with Errichetti that seemed to occur at 2:30, thus giving him an alibi which fooled
the FBI for two years.
181. Id. at 217.
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berg they would obtain all necessary permits. But when Weinberg
pushed "there's a lot of government contracts that's, you know, on the
chemicals," Sandy Williams replied, "Right."
"Now, can [Senator] Williams get us the bid on them?" Sandy
Williams answered, "Well I don't know about that.
'182
Weinberg's question was proper. He was attempting to learn what
Senator Williams was willing to do for his undisclosed interest in the
venture. A sheik might well want valuable assurances before he loaned
$100,000,000 and the FBI legitimately wants to know what a United
States Senator will promise a foreign potentate for a hidden interest in
a valuable defense-related project.
News reports that the United States Government needed titanium
for sheathing submarines gave Weinberg an excuse to determine
whether Senator Williams would use his influence corruptly. On May
30, Weinberg asked attorney Feinberg, the Senator's reputed "bag-
man," whether the Senator would solicit government titanium con-
tracts on their behalf. Feinberg said Williams would try.
1 83
The Senator, Feinberg, and others met with DeVito (Agent Amo-
roso) and Weinberg at the Hotel Pierre in New York on May 31 to
discuss the Senator's aid in obtaining titanium contracts. Senator Wil-
liams did very little talking at the meeting, but vaguely indicated he
would try to use his influence. The FBI sought more explicit assur-
ances. Weinberg emphasized the importance of the Senator's influence.
Recognizing that Williams' reticence was putting off the Abdul inves-
tors, the Senator's associates subsequently assured Weinberg that al-
though he was quiet, the Senator could be depended upon to assist the
venture."8 '
On June 14, 1979, Weinberg attempted to get Feinberg to put in
writing that the Senator would obtain government contracts by re-
questing "resumes" for the sheik, specifying what each participant in
the venture would contribute. 8 5 Weinberg had urged Feinberg to be
very explicit, promising to destroy the documents, but he complained
the resumes Feinberg presented to DeVito "don't tell him [the sheik] a
damn thing," about what the Senator would do for his share of the
loan. 88 Feinberg steadfastly refused to put in writing that Senator
Williams would guarantee contracts. DeVito suggested the Senator and
sheik meet face to face. Everyone agreed, particularly Errichetti, that
the Senator would have to "come on strong."' 87 Feinberg promised to
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 220.
185. Id. at 230.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 231.
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tell the Senator what he had to do. On June 19 Feinberg reported to
Weinberg the results of a meeting between himself, Errichetti and the
Senator: "No problem whatso. . . .He understands the whole god-
damn shmear.'18
The next day, June 28, only minutes before Senator Williams met
the sheik, in what became perhaps the single most controversial and
criticized incident of the Abscam investigation, Weinberg and Errichet-
ti briefed the Senator on what to say to the sheik."' 9 In this, the fa-
mous "coaching incident" which Weinberg recorded, Weinberg told the
Senator to "forget the mine" and instead "stress how important you
are."190 The Senator was to say, "Without me there is no deal. I'm the
man. I'm the man who's gonna open the doors.'"' As he offered the
very words the Senator should speak, Weinberg urged Williams to view
his impending speech as "all bullshit" and "all talk.
'1 9 2
A few minutes after his improper coaching session, on June 28,
1979, Senator Williams met the sheik and, as instructed by Weinberg,
bragged on camera about his influence, stressing the importance of ti-
tanium to the government.
July 1979 saw the sudden development of the famous "asylum sce-
nario," the principal mechanism for offering bribes to congressmen.
The precise origin of the asylum scenario is unclear. During the March
yacht party a middleman named Carpentier had mentioned that he
could obtain immigration cards through corrupt INS contacts, a father
and son named Alexandro. At the end of May, DeVito reminded Car-
pentier of his claim, explaining that the sheik owed a debt to a friend
which he could discharge by bringing his colleague's son into the
United States from Ireland as a permanent resident alien. On July 14,
in a meeting with a middleman, Weinberg raised the possibility that
the sheiks might have to suddenly flee their country, and feared diffi-
188. Id. In response, Weinberg explicitly asked if the Senator knew that he had to
come on strong. Feinberg answered, "Yeah, that's right. Eric made it very clear. So did
I." Id.
189. In conversations in mid-May with middleman John Stowe, who, FBI records
showed, had been linked years earlier with Representative Jenrette in an alleged bank
fraud and embezzlement scheme, Weinberg began to develop what became Abscam's
principal theme: Arabs "always like to have friends in high office." Id. at 423. By "doing
something for the Congressman," the sheik would know "he has got a friend in high
office." Id. Money was no object. The FBI knew that both Stowe and Representative
Jenrette were at this time in financial difficulty.
190. Id. at 232.
191. Id.
192. Id. Thus, there seem to be two important elements to the June 28 coaching
session: (1) the importuning to "come on strong"; and (2) the assurance that the words to
be used were mere talk and "bullshit."
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culty getting into the United States. The sheiks were looking for every
political friend they could get.
1 9 3
One of Errichetti's neighbors told his golfing partner, Philadelphia
lawyer and city councilman Louis Johanson, that Errichetti had con-
nections with wealthy Arab investors. Johanson passed this informa-
tion to his law partner Howard Criden, one of whose clients was seek-
ing financing and a buyer for a hotel in Atlantic City. If Abdul
Enterprises financed his clients in this apparently legitimate deal, his
law firm stood to earn up to five million dollars. On July 26, DeVito
and Weinberg met with Criden, Johanson and Errichetti aboard The
Left Hand. Criden and Johanson presented their casino prospectus.'"
At the close of the meeting, DeVito suggested a cruise north along
the Intracoastal Waterway. The conversation was not recorded, but
skipper Rusty Allen (Agent George Allen) pointed out a yacht he said
belonged to Anastasio Somoza, the recently deposed Nicaraguan dicta-
tor. Spontaneously referring to the previous day's Miami Herald arti-
cle about Somoza's problems in obtaining political asylum in the
United States, DeVito confided to Errichetti and Criden that his em-
ployers, Sheiks Habib and Rahman, were convinced that, like the Shah
of Iran, they too would be forced to leave. When they sought asylum in
the United States, the sheiks were anxious to ensure they would not
face Somoza's problems. Agent Amoroso had not cleared this asylum
scenario beforehand, and he might have been following up on Errichet-
ti's earlier list of corrupt politicians which included congressmen, or
Weinberg's representation of the Irish immigration favor desired by
the sheik. But, in any event, suddenly the asylum scenario was fully
developed. Errichetti said he had the right political connections.
DeVito said money was no object. Criden and Johanson knew the sheik
would appreciate their help in contacting congressmen. 9
Errichetti via Criden and Johanson told Weinberg and DeVito he
would be able to produce helpful congressmen at $100,000 each. "How
many can you handle?" asked Errichetti. "As many as you can give me,
I can handle" replied Weinberg. 96 It was the sheik's "number one pri-
ority." Errichetti said he might be able to produce five or six.
1 9 7
Slowly but surely, perhaps unconsciously, the emphasis of Abscam
had shifted. Begun to recover stolen property, the investigation had
moved via Errichetti into municipal corruption, and the involvement of
Senator Williams. With the asylum scenario now out front, Abscam
193. Id. at 79.
194. Id. at 427.
195. Id. at 427-428.
196. Id. at 428.
197. Id. at 429.
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would take off as a political corruption case targeted at congressmen
and INS employees.
Meanwhile, the titanium venture moved forward. At a meeting at
the Kennedy Airport Hilton on July 11, Feinberg, Sandy Williams, Er-
richetti, Weinberg, DeVito et al. established three separate corpora-
tions, adopted bylaws, and elected directors and officers.198 Feinberg
endorsed Senator Williams' shares in blank. Abdul Enterprises had
promised a $100,000,000 loan which the FBI would never deliver. Not
yet ready to close down Abscam, the agents had to stall for time. Thus,
shortly after forming the corporations, on July 25 Weinberg informed
Errichetti that another group of Arab investors might buy the titanium
mine and processing plant, producing a $70,000,000 profit, but only if
Senator Williams guaranteed his continued support of the venture. 1°9
In retrospect, this "unquestionably huge" inducement is very
troubling if only for its size. Whereas the Williamses and Feinberg had
originally requested a $100,000,000 loan, this new scenario promised
Senator Williams alone an instant $12,600,000 profit, his 18% share of
$70,000,000. Whether or not every person has a price, few of us inside
or outside the United States Senate are likely to find out whether we
would succumb to such enormous rewards in return for vague assur-
ances we might never fulfill, which in any event were not clearly to the
nation's injury. The instant profit was 1,500 percent larger than the
next highest bribe given any congressman in Abscam. Did the FBI
have a responsibility to replicate what they knew or suspected as real
corrupt marketplace conditions? These questions ultimately troubled
the courts and Congress, and should trouble all citizens. 00
On August 5, Brooklyn Organized Crime Strike Force attorneys
John Jacobs and Lawrence Sharf, who had reviewed the audio tape of
the Senator Williams "coaching session," told Weinberg not to "push
198. Id. at 426.
199. Id. at 236, 429.
200. In United States v. Williams, 529 F. Supp. 1085 (E.D.N.Y. 1981), aff'd 705 F.2d
603 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 524 (1983), Judge Pratt held that, given his posi-
tion and background, the $12.6 million in profit to Senator Williams was not so large as
to constitute entrapment or due process outrageousness. Id. at 1102. In United States v.
Myers, 527 F. Supp. 1206 (E.D.N.Y. 1981), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 692 F.2d 823 (2d
Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 2438 (1983), Judge Pratt said:
No matter how much money is offered to a government official as a bribe or
gratuity, he should be punished if he accepts. It may be true, as has been sug-
gested to the court, that "every man has his price"; but when the price is money
only, the public official should be required to pay the penalty when he gets
caught.
Id. at 1228.
The Select Committee felt that the amount of money offered to Senator Williams
was astonishing. Nonetheless the Committee agreed with Judge Pratt that "the office of
a Senator should not be for sale at any price." SELEcT CoMm., supra note 153, at 237.
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things."'20 1 "Let events take their natural flow," Jacobs told Weinberg;
coaching was "not a good idea. '20 2 Later that day, Senator Williams,
along with his wife and two aides, arrived at the Kennedy Interna-
tional Airport lounge, on their way to Europe. DeVito gave the Senator
his stock certificates, which Feinberg had endorsed in blank. Also that
day, from a hotel at the airport, DeVito called INS employee Alexan-
dro at his home. The next day Alexandro told DeVito that his client
should come to the United States and promised to arrange a phony
marriage to allow him to stay.
On August 8, Errichetti told DeVito and Weinberg that Represen-
tative Myers was ready at any time. DeVito said that Myers would
"have to introduce some kind of legislation, some kind of bill or some-
thing. ' 208 Errichetti replied, "Whatever you say." Abdul Enterprises
cut the bribe in half to $50,000.
The next day, assistant United States Attorneys Edward Plaza
and Robert Weir, whom United States Attorney Robert Del Tufo had
assigned to investigate and prosecute New Jersey's Abscam cases, con-
fronted FBI agents and Weinberg with their discovery that the Abscam
investigation lacked adequate controls. Key meetings had not been
taped, nor memorialized. The United States Attorneys had read the
transcript of the Williams coaching incident. Plaza argued that Wein-
berg was "putting words into peoples' mouths. And you can't tell some-
body what it is you're going to say and afterwards prosecute him for
it."'204 Weinberg protested that unless they told people what to say,
they would not have any cases. One of the FBI agents expressed regret
not that the coaching incident had taken place, but that it had been
recorded.
To the United States Attorneys, this coaching incident constituted
outrageous governmental behavior. At the very least the coaching was
unfortunate, but the Senate Report, characterizing it as "shoddy inves-
tigative work" which "provide[d] a glaring example of the FBI's failure
to control and supervise Weinberg," also concluded that this incident
did not overbear Senator Williams' will.205
As the Senate committee analyzed it, the coaching incident con-
tained two elements: (1) importuning the Senator to "come on strong"
and (2) "assuring him that his words were mere talk and bullshit.
' '20 6
Up to a point the first aspect was positive; we want a public official's
corrupt intent made as clear and unambiguous as possible, especially
201. SELECT CoMM., supra note 153, at 429.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 430.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 234.
206. Id. at 232.
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because bribery's essence may be "mere words: the promise to perform
an official act in return for something else of value. '20 7 Contraband is
tangible but bribery often requireg inference and interpretation. "The
crucial evidence, therefore, consists of the words actually used and the
circumstances evincing the speaker's intent. '20 8 Weinberg's telling the
Senator that his words were "mere bullshit," however, was especially
objectionable. As the Senate report states it, "if Weinberg meant to
convince the Senator to lie to the sheik about his willingness to use his
senatorial office corruptly, Weinberg was attempting to induce the Sen-
ator to engage in conduct other than the classic form of bribery that
the FBI was seeking to establish. A lie of that nature would still evince
a willingness to commit fraud, but fraud was not the FBI's goal. '209
Bribery was.
Looking back on this coaching incident, virtually everyone now
agrees with Plaza and Weir that the FBI had blundered by allowing its
untrustworthy informant to meet with its principal target unaccompa-
nied by an agent, moments before a crucial bribery event, and put
words in the target's mouth.
Many critics of Abscam and the undercover technique point to the
coaching incident and flaws like it to prove that whenever the govern-
ment creates fictitious worlds, the true intentions of targets are impos-
sible to determine. But the Archer investigation shows that with a
trained undercover agent as the primary actor, corrupt intentions of
corrupt public officials may be clearly revealed, even as those corrupt
officials describe falsely events which they do not truly believe.
On August 21, FBI headquarters approved $50,000 to bribe Con-
gressman Myers.210 The next day, Myers described his role in the
House of Representatives to DeVito and hidden videotape cameras. Af-
ter DeVito repeated the asylum scenario, Myers responded: "Where I
could be of assistance in this type of matter, first of all, is private bills
that can be introduced. . . .With me in his corner his chances are one
hundred percent better than they would be without somebody like me
in his corner." '211
"Well, that's why we're putting up this kind of money."
"I'm gonna tell you something real simple and short," said the
Congressman. "Money talks in this business and bullshit walks. And it
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district to provide a cover for his immigration support. DeVito agreed
they would protect Myers, and gave the Congressman an envelope con-
taining $50,000: "Spend it well." "Pleasure," said Myers, accepting
it.218 The meeting ended, and as Errichetti escorted Myers to the
lobby, the Congressman handed him the envelope and drove with Jo-
hanson to Philadelphia. Errichetti returned to the hotel room, com-
plained the bribe had been halved, but agreed to introduce other con-
gressmen whose support would cost $50,000 each. Errichetti also
promised to produce a powerful State Department official.
214
Errichetti then met Criden at Kennedy Airport, removed $15,000
and gave him the envelope with the balance. Criden returned to his law
firm, and consulting with his partner, decided to to take $10,000 and
tell Myers there had only been $25,000. Myers and Johanson arrived
and divided the remaining money with Criden. The Congressman took
$15,000.215
Lederer, the next Representative to accept a videotaped $50,000
bribe, on September 11 assured DeVito "we're on the same vibes.
21
1
Weinberg and DeVito presented the asylum scenario and asked the
Congressman about private legislation. "Private bill, sure." Lederer re-
peated Myers' theme and urged the sheik to invest in Philadelphia to
justify his introduction of a private immigration bill.217 DeVito handed
him a brown paper bag containing $50,000.
A week later Errichetti said he could produce 10 more congress-
men from different parts of the country. When Weinberg asked Criden
who he had lined up, Criden answered "Who do you want? Within rea-
son I can produce almost anybody you want. Would you like some
Governors? Congressmen, Senators, Governors, what else?"2 8 He knew
a dozen public officials. Did Weinberg want California politicians, a
Texas politican, a State Department official? "Let's run with it until it
stops," said Weinberg.219
Through the help of another middleman, Criden arranged to de-
liver Congressman Thompson, complaining to Weinberg that "to con-
vince these guys [members of Congress] to do this number is not as
easy as you think it is .... I got to talk to eighty guys before you grab
two or three that are even interested in doing something. '2 0 It was
encouraging, if true.
On October 20, Representative Murphy, with Criden, met DeVito
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 432.
216. Id. at 433.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 434.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 435-36.
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and Weinberg at the JFK Hilton. The Abdul representatives outlined
the asylum scenario, and DeVito suggested Abdul investments in Mur-
phy's congressional district would give him the cover for his support. "I
don't think there will be any problem," said Murphy, and requested
they invest in a shipping company.221 DeVito offered Murphy and
Criden a briefcase containing $50,000. Murphy declined to take posses-
sion, turning to Criden: "Howard why don't you take that."
222
Not every public official proved corrupt. Congressman Hughes, for
example, declined to come to a meeting, and at the last moment Sena-
tor Pressler was substituted by a middleman without having been
briefed in advance as to the meeting's corrupt purpose.223 When con-
fronted with DeVito's explicit statement: "we've got the money, okay,
and we're willing to put out the money ... $50,000 is no problem," the
Senator explained: "We do seek contributions, but we can't make any
promises or any ... other than to listen and to be educated, but then
to make a judgment, you know ... I can't promise that I would intro-
duce 'X' bill for 'X' person if something happens. '224 It is a fine line
between legitimately accepting substantial campaign contributions
from individuals and organizations and selling your office, a fine but
crucial line in our political system. Senator Pressler stayed clearly on
the legitimate side of it, and in a textbook example of shrewd polite-
ness, he did credit to himself and his office:
It would not be proper for me to promise to do anything in
return for a campaign contribution, so I would not make any
promises or any-I mean you can judge, you can hear my gen-
eral philosophy and then you'll make a judgment, but I can't,
you know, you can't make a commitment to do anything in
these campaigns. Indeed, I would not feel intellectually honest
doing that, you know, until I'm faced with the situation.
22
On December 4, DeVito and Weinberg met Congressman Jenrette
at Abscam's Washington townhouse. Jenrette agreed to introduce a
private bill for the sheiks; and DeVito stated the terms: $50,000 up
front and $50,000 more when the act was done. The Congressman pre-
ferred that his law partner receive the bribe as a legal fee. Jenrette told
DeVito he was under federal investigation and so he would wait to ac-
cept money until he could better assess his prospects. "There's nothing
I'd rather do than walk out with it [the money]," the Congressman
221. Id. at 438. For a complete discussion of the October 20, 1979, meeting with Rep-
resentative Murphy, see id. at 277-85.
222. Id. at 438.
223. Id. at 440.
224. Id. at 441.
225. Id.
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said. "I got larceny in my blood. I'd take it in a goddamn minute. '2 2 6
After some vacillation over whether Jenrette must accept the
money personally, DeVito gave middleman Stowe $50,000. Stowe re-
turned to Jenrette who telephoned DeVito to confirm Stowe had ar-
rived with the money. On January 7, 1980, Jenrette and Stowe met
DeVito and Weinberg at the Washington townhouse.22" 7 Jenrette raised
the asylum scenario and stated that he thought Senator Strom Thur-
mond would assist with private legislation in the Senate, but that the
Senator would not meet them at Abdul's townhouse and would only
accept money through an intermediary.
The next day, Congressman Kelly met DeVito and Weinberg at
the Washington townhouse. Weinberg had been told that Kelly would
not take money personally, and DeVito should not offer it to him.
Weinberg proposed that DeVito hand middleman Ciuzio the money in
Kelly's presence. Ciuzio answered, "That's okay. But don't say, 'Hey,
Congressman.' You know what I mean? You can't make him a ...
hood, you know. '228 Weinberg repeated that DeVito would insist on
knowing that Kelly was receiving the money. Alone with Kelly, DeVito
outlined the asylum scenario and the money he was offering. Kelly re-
sponded, "This thing ... will be helpful to me and ... maybe...
down the road sometime, you can do me a favor. But in the meantime,
whatever those guys are doing is all right, but I got no part in that...
your arrangement with these people is all fine ... you have my assur-
ance that ... I'll stick by these people."229
In the end, Kelly told DeVito to give the money to Ciuzio in his
presence, stating "It's a very complicated thing ... for me to start
dealing in money. ' 23 0 The Congressman would be most protected,
DeVito suggested, if he took money directly from DeVito in private.
Kelly agreed and accepted $25,000, promising to do whatever it took to
assist the sheik.
On January 14, a suspicious Congressman Murphy, who was being
stalled on his shipping venture, hired a private investigator to deter-
mine whether Abdul representatives were really con artists or, worse,
government agents. After examining telephone and street directories
and questioning neighbors of Abdul Enterprises' Washington and Long
Island offices, the investigator informed Murphy four days later that
Abdul was a government front.2"1
In a last attempt to strengthen their case against Senator Harrison
226. Id. at 444.
227. Id. at 446.
228. Id. at 446-47.
229. Id. at 447.
230. Id.
231. Id. at 447 n.115.
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Williams, DeVito and Weinberg urged Feinberg to set up a meeting
with the Senator and the sheik. On January 15, Feinberg and the Sena-
tor met DeVito, Weinberg, and Sheik Yassir Habib at the Plaza Hotel
in New York.23 2 After introductions, all withdrew, leaving the Senator
and sheik alone with the hidden videotape cameras. DeVito com-
mented as he left that a call the sheik had been expecting had not yet
come. The sheik said he wished to be interrupted.
The sheik assured the Senator about financing the titanium deal,
and asked him as a personal favor to assist in immigration legislation.
Such private legislation was possible, but very difficult to enact, said
the Senator, but he "welcome[d] the chance to know you better and to
support this effort. 233 Eventually the sheik raised the issue of money:
"I, will for your help and assistance-I would like to give you,
some money for, for permanent-""No."
"Residence."
'No, no, no. This is ... When I work in that area, that kind of
activity, it is purely a public not, no. 234
At this crucial moment, while the Senator was refusing to accept
money in return for legislation, he was interrupted by DeVito who
walked into the room, informing the sheik of a phone call in the pro-
cess of being transferred. The Senator forced the conversation back to
the money he was refusing: "You are most gracious. Within our, my
position, when I deal with law and legislation, it is, it is, it is not on,
it's it's, er not with, within-. ' '2 35
At this moment the phone rang, and the sheik left the room. The
prearranged call was from Agent Farhart's (Sheik Habib's) supervisor
and Prosecutor Puccio who were monitoring the meeting as it took
place. They instructed Farhart to get more specific commitments from
Senator Williams.
When the sheik re-entered, the Senator again returned the conver-
sation to his refusing money for legislation, and vaguely linking his im-
migration support with the titanium venture: "I find it a desirable
thing, to do, for you, personally, and it's part of creating something of
value, bringing in that ore.
'236
The sheik asked the Senator for more details about the legislative
process; the Senator began to ask personal questions; the sheik shifted
the conversation back to the mine, and the Senator pressed the sheik
232. Id. at 448. For a complete discussion of the January 15, 1980 meeting with Sena-
tor Williams, see id. at 237-40.
233. Id. at 448.
234. Id.
2351 Id. at 238, 448.
236. Id.
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on the timing of the deal. Again the phone rang, and the sheik left the
room. His supervisor told agent Farhart to try to get the Senator ex-
plicitly to link his assistance on immigration to the titanium venture.
When the sheik returned, the Senator announced he was leaving.
Agent Farhart boldly sought the connection by saying a deal would be
closed by the end of the month, if he were assured permanent
residence.
Senator Williams responded, "You can leave with my assurance
that I will do those things that will bring you on for the consideration
of permanency. Quite frankly, I can't issue that ... I cannot person-
ally. It, is a law. And it has to be, goes through the whole dignified
process of passing a law. I can give you my pledge. I will do all that is
necessary to get that to the proper decision. '237 After Senator Williams
once more gave his "absolute pledge" to "do everything in my power to
advance [the sheik's] permanency," the sheik and the Senator rejoined
the others.
2 38
Their conversation had been interrupted at unfortunate and un-
planned moments. Senator Williams should have been allowed to pur-
sue his clear rejection of the bribe. The government failed to achieve
what it sought: an unambiguous promise to introduce legislation in re-
turn for something of value-the titanium venture. But, however
flawed, the FBI had a case against the Senator.
With Abscam leaking and scheduled for shut down by the end of
the month, a Philadelphia offshoot was authorized to run only for ten
days. On January 11, 1980, the final phase was rushed into being when
Weinberg called Criden, and told him the sheik was looking to build a
hotel in Philadelphia. 239 Criden suggested that rather than use con-
gressmen to facilitate the hotel project, "we may be able to give you
more help" in Philadelphia. "Who do you know there?" asked Wein-
berg. "Everybody!" replied Criden. "Remember, I got a partner who's a
city councilman.
240
The next week Criden met with the sheik's representatives,
Michael Cohen (Agent Michael Wald) and Ernie Polos (Agent Ernest
Haridopolos), at the Barclay Hotel in Philadelphia, where the FBI had
set up its videotape facility. Cohen reiterated the sheik's interest in
building a hotel in south Philadelphia. The sheik had sent them to
237. Id. at 238.
238. Id. A Justice Department memorandum dated November 27, 1979, states that it
would be necessary to recontact Senator Williams to obtain an overt act for a
prosecutable case of bribery and conspiracy. Williams later argued that the government's
case against him should fail by their own admission. Judge Pratt rejected this. 529
F.Supp. at 1100-01.
239. SELEcT Co~im., supra note 153, at 447.
240. United States v. Jannotti, 673 F.2d 578, 582 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 457 U.S.
1106 (1982).
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handle possible problems such as zoning, condemnations, and vari-
ances. To Criden's reassurance that "you don't have any problem. You
got two of the strongest guys"'241 in Congressmen Myers and Lederer,
Cohen suggested the sheik was aware of the difference between na-
tional and local government: "He wants to be assured that the munici-
pal government and he can coexist.
'242
"How do you want me to satisfy you? '2 43 asked Criden.
Cohen replied, "I'm sure the easiest way is for me to deal with
someone in municipal government and I can go back .... Titles im-
press the man, as you know, from past experience .... If he receives
those assurances from someone with a title sounds appropriate, eh, I
buy it, he buys it."
' 244
As requested, Criden explained the structure of municipal govern-
ment and mentioned that George Schwartz, the City Council President
was "a powerful guy."
'245
"Can I deal with him while I'm here in town?" asked undercover
agent Wald, truly in a hurry.
"I don't know. I gotta get hold of my partner."
"Can I deal with your partner?"
"Oh, sure" replied Criden.24 After further discussion, Criden con-
tinued "[a]s far as Johanson is concerned, you can talk as candidly as
you want." However, said Criden, Schwartz might want "to handle it
indirectly.
' '247
Cohen asked what the "tariff" would be for Johanson and
Schwartz, and Criden answered "twenty-five" for Johanson and
"another fifty" for Schwartz. Cohen balked at $50,000.248
"You want to go thirty on this guy?"
"Will he bite at thirty?" Cohen asked, "I mean does that take care
of him?"
Criden suggested, "let me try it. . . .I'll run it up the flagpole.
24 9
Several hours later attorney Criden returned with his partner,
Councilman Johanson. Cohen (Agent Wald) again discussed the pro-
posed hotel construction, explaining he wanted to avoid delays in ob-
taining variances and permits. Johanson assured him that inspectors
from Licenses and Inspections, building inspectors, plumbing inspec-








248. Id. at 582-83.
249. Id. at 583.
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minute because they're gonna be told not to . ..because the word's
gonna come down, that this is a vital project."'2 50
Discussing the political situation in Philadelphia and the city
council in particular, Councilman Johanson bragged of his own and
Schwartz's importance, stating that he, Schwartz and majority leader
Jannotti "run the city council. '251 Cohen asked about Jannotti, and
Johanson agreed that because of his seniority, Jannotti might well be
included. Agent Polos made sure Johanson acknowledged the money
before handing it to him: "How much is it?"
"Twenty-five," replied Johanson.
"Okay," said the sheik's representative, "we have to have these
proper assurances. You do us a favor, we're doin [sic] you a favor."
"Obviously," said Criden.
"Sure," said Johanson. Johanson received the $25,000.
Cohen reiterated the exchange: "And for 25 we've got a friend."
"Right," said Johanson.
252
Polos gave Criden $5,000 for Johanson's appearance and promised
him another "five for the next delivery. '253 Criden did not know Coun-
cil President Schwartz personally, and used as an intermediary Judge
Thomas Shiomos of the Philadelphia County Court who advised
Schwartz of Criden's wealthy Arab clients looking to invest $150 mil-
lion in a hotel. There would be a "fee" for Schwartz's "advice" in
building the complex. Judge Shiomos said he didn't think there was
anything "improper," but that Schwartz could judge for himself.
Schwartz stated that he "would be interested in anyone willing to in-
vest $150 million."2"
On January 23, 1980, Criden and Schwartz met Cohen (Agent
Wald) at the Barclay suite. Cohen explained "the purpose" for his
visits to Philadelphia [was] to firm up ... what we consider to
be a major investment here.... [T]he gentleman cares to
make a major investment here because he seems to like Phila-
delphia, and he has been told that it would.., be in his best
interest to have an investment ... in an area where he ...







254. Id. at 584.
255. Id.
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"Philadelphia is a nice city," said the city council president. "Phil-
adelphia has been on the move since 1952. And, business climate in
Philadelphia is good.
'25 6
So far it all seemed legitimate. Now Cohen became more explicit:
We want to put [a hotel] up. Now we know that there are
problems inherent in any major construction, in this city and
any other city. What I am trying to do is take care of any po-
tential problems long before they exist .... We can forsee cer-
tain problems such as... zoning and variances and this type
of thing .... municipal government, how it effects those vari-
ous things, but we don't want to be faced with problems down
the road.2 57
Schwartz "responded to this overture with a soliloquy on his own
power."
28
Agent Wald became specific: "Is it fair to say that by doing busi-
ness with you, uh... my zoning problems become...
"Right."
"You don't have any," added Criden. 5 9
Asked again whether he could control the various factions of the
city council, Schwartz for the first time adopted a corrupt mode of
speech: "We got five or six [new] members that came in. Uh, you tell
me your birth date. I'll give them to you for your birthday. '26 0 But
after reiterating his control, Schwartz declared that although he could
not promise that the hotel project would not have any problems, those
problems would not be "insurmountable" as long as the project "is a
proper project."
"I am not putting up a cathouse," said Cohen.
"It's going to be legitimate," assured Criden.
"That I take for granted, or I wouldn't be here," said Schwartz.8 1
Was this window dressing, or was it a city council president truly
representing Philadelphia's best interests by guaranteeing that there
would be no insurmountable petty problems to bog down a large legiti-
mate construction project?
Schwartz gave assurances: If the project violated "some minor...
type statute or ordinance or ... something. . .. [262] If it isn't some-
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dled, and I can, I can't think of anything that couldn't be handled...
through a variance procedure of some kind.12 3 As long as the project
wasn't too idiosyncratic and eccentric, various boards and commissions
as well as the city council, all "part of the organization" were in his
effective control.
2"
Eventually Cohen spoke of money: "We've talked to Howard
[Criden], you know, the figures, the dollars we're talking are in the
right ballpark. We're ... ",25
Schwartz interrupted: "That's not my prime concern. I'm inter-
ested in a good project. I'm interested in tax rateables. I want to see
Center City develop . .. anything else that's going to add to the tax
rateables of the city, that's going to create jobs."
"I am again quick to say that I'm not really interested in the City
of Philadelphia, to be candid," the undercover agent replied.
"Well, I have to be. I have to be," the city council president
countered.
26 6
Reviewing Schwartz's assurances, Cohen concluded: "I can go back
and say I met a gentleman. We had a business deal, uh, I've made a
friend in Philadelphia."
"Yes" said the City Council President.
"And things are taken care of.
"Right."




Shortly thereafter, Cohen opened his briefcase and, without dis-
cussion, handed Schwartz an envelope containing $30,000 which
Schwartz placed in his jacket without counting. Then Cohen repeated
the quid pro quo: "The legislative problems we've taken care of?."
"No problem," said Criden.
"Right" said Schwartz and the council president left while Criden
remained to receive his $5,000.28
Presidents of city councils do not "give" their new members away
as "birthday presents," nor should they accept $30,000 to guarantee
that otherwise legitimate major projects will not run into typical bu-
reaucratic hassles. But had Schwartz really "sold" his office? He had
neither demanded money, nor promised to do anything illegal, or con-
trary to Philadelphia's best interests.
The next day, January 24, 1980, the FBI paid its last Abscam
263. Id.




268. Id. at 587.
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bribe, to perhaps its most innocent target.260 Harry P. Jannotti, major-
ity leader of the Philadelphia City Council, was briefed by Cohen
(Agent Wald):
We are prepared to make a major investment in this city, al-
right, and, ah, we have incredible funding but it's still a major
investment even for the people that I represent at this time.
Ah, it's not a drop in the bucket even for them. It's a fair
amount of money and ah, the way these people do business, is
somewhat different than the way we do business in this coun-
try, they don't think. They just can't tolerate nor can they put
up with psychologically any problems that arise. Now these
types of problems do arise but they can be handled, but the
type of problems that would get back to my employer. He can't
deal with them, and he turns to me and says I thought we had
all this settled in Philadelphia. So, that's why I'm here, simply
to take care of any problems now.2"'
"Far in advance," said Jannotti.
Cohen replied:
It's really not that far I don't think. .. 2' But at least enough
in advance that when the time comes, it's over and done with,
everything is nice ... problems I can foresee ... zoning, any
variances that we have to obtain any, ah, committee type
things we'd would have to, ah, deal, with, with City Council ali,
inspections licensing the whole gamut .... well you were in
that type of business in an allied situation and I'm sure you
can appreciate the petty things that arise, that have to be
handled.
27 2
Jannotti replied to these representatives of a fabulously wealthy
sheik whose Arab "way of doing business and psychology" differed rad-
ically from his own, a sheik who absolutely insisted that all problems
be ironed out in advance before initiating the hotel project:
First of all, you're going to invest a substantial amount of
money and, ah, what you'll be doing is bringing into the City of
Philadelphia a substantial amount of money, and this will cre-
ate jobs, will create a tax base and from ah what I gather eve-
rything that you want to do will be strictly, ah on board. I
mean there's nothing phony about it.
27
269. For a complete discussion of the bribe paid to Harry Jannotti, see id. at 587-89.
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The sheik's representative assured him: "It's a legitimate
operation."
Jannotti continued:
As long as it's, long as it's a legitimate, legitimate operation, ya
know, any legitimate operation we will fight for because, alh, ya
know why shouldn't we fight for a legitimate operation? If the
operation is legitimate, it's going to bring a tax base into the
City of Philadelphia, its going to bring employment into the
City of Philadelphia, ah, this is, this is basically our job,
George [Schwartz] 's job and my job, ala, to try to get as much
money into the City of Philadelphia and as many jobs into the
City of Philadelphia as we possibly can.""
Jannotti's conversation doesn't sound corrupt. Nor did it become
more so, although Agent Wald dutifully tried to make explicit a cor-
rupt quid pro quo. "[B]y dealing with you here this evening and, and,
the gentleman I, I spoke with last evening, can I go back with those
assurances?"2 75
"I don't see why not, as you say, ya know, its a legitimate project




Criden must have sensed that Jannotti sounded too innocent to be
paid; he interjected, "Michael [Cohen] wants to be sure that he has a
friend if he has a problem."
"Oh certainly," assured Jannotti.
"If something arises, if something arises that needs a city council
vote to be very specific, a city council vote is needed on the thing, can I
count on your vote?"
"Why sure," said Jannotti. "First of all we'll go over it again, you
have a legitimate project, you're going to invest thirty-six million dol-
lars in the City of Philadelphia, which is going to create a tax base and
going to create employment."
"Right but-"
"A lot of legitimate, ah, things get bogged down," interjected agent
Polos, "we don't want to be bogged down."
"No, I can't see this being bogged down," assured Jannotti. 77
Jannotti had made it clear; there was no reason to fear nor cause
for corruption. The Arabs had a legitimate project that would bring
jobs and tax revenue to Philadelphia. That was all the reason he
needed to support it and make sure the project sailed smoothly.
274. Id. at 587-88.
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Cohen then explicitly reintroduced perhaps the least proper gov-
ernment scenario in Abscam-the Arab mind:
Let me give you a short insight into the Arab mind. . . [It's
at times difficult to understand now ah, I can appreciate it be-
cause I've had both worlds and I can relate ah, you know, you
folks are here, right, they think differently, they deal differ-
ently, their psychological process are alien to the way. . . . I
understand exactly what you're saying. O.K. I'm coming up
with something that's going to help the City of Philadelphia. It
would help, as it would help any city. Ah, he [the sheik] does
not look on it that way. They do business, differently. They
pay the freight up front. They make friends, right, and then
where there, there is a potential problem that I don't mean, I
don't mean a problem that would necessarily close down con-
struction and throw the project out of Philadelphia.2 78
After more discussion about city council politics, Cohen said "I
would just as soon save the money, but I can't go back."27 9 Had not
Criden interjected "I understand," the entire sentence might have
read:
I would just as soon save the money, but I can't go back and
tell my Arab sheik with his Arab mind and Arab way of doing
business that I am sure we will have no problems although I
did not pay off municipal officials because those officials as-
sured me that our legitimate project was in their city's best
interests, and therefore they support it. He will not hear that;
he would not understand it.
Imaginary dialogue is not necessary to show Jannotti's morally
ambiguous situation. Cohen assured Jannotti:
[Y]ou've been in business all your life.... I was sent to Phila-
delphia to pay for certain things because that is the psychology
and that is the method of business that these people are use[d]
to, and that is how they conduct business, they conduct with
everybody they do. That's why I'm here. I understand their
psychology. I've been involved with them long enough, al to
make it a major part of my life, a majority of my life.280
The Councilman replied:
Well, you know, just on the basics of what you said and what
278. Id.
279. Id.
280. Id. at 588-89.
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they want to do, it's enough for me to get on the floor and
argue. I don't have to, even care what else they want to come
up with. My basic point is, the fact that, ah what's coming in
here, and this has been our job, to bring as much business, and
ah tax base and employment to the City of Philadelphia. If
that's the way they want to do business that's all right too.281
Agent Wald pressed for assurances:
Can I go back, ah, ah, to my employer, the Sheik and tell him
that I dealt with a man, ... with you, Thursday night, explain
who you were, what your position is and say, "he and I con-
ducted a cash business transaction and he guaranteed me, we
don't have a problem in Philadelphia. We ah, ah City Council's
on our side, the man has the influence with the Finance Com-
mittee, he has influence.
'28 2
Jannotti replied, "[y]ou wouldn't be able to say we don't have a
problem. Problems might arise, but problems ah, you might say
problems can be solved.
'28 3
"OK, you can handle those problems we presume," said the agent.
"I don't see why not if it's a legitimate, if it's a, if it's a legitimate
if its a, if its a legitimate enterprise, it's a legitimate piece of business,"
stammered Jannotti.
28 4
Again and again Cohen (Agent Wald) tried to get Jannotti to con-
cede he was taking a bribe to do something corrupt, or at least some-
thing he otherwise would not have done. And each time, the under-
cover agent failed.
"By making friends with you this evening, if we have to go to City
Council and say look, ya know, give us a break, right, get us some legis-
lation that this is OK. That it's in the right neighborhood, that the
time-"
Criden interrupted: "If you want a street for example let's say
changed from a two way to a one way OK, maybe that will help you."
Wald interjected, "OK," and Criden continued, "handle your traffic
pattern."
"We handle that everyday," said Jannotti.
28 5
The most agent Wald could get from Jannotti was, "We'll go in
there and battle, we'll go in and battle."
"You're with us?" asked agent Wald.
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"Certainly, we'll go in and battle," Jannotti replied.288
Wald then took from his briefcase an envelope containing $10,000,
handed it to Jannotti, and asked if "that amount is sufficient." Ac-
cepting the envelope, Jannotti answered, "We've discussed it."
"You know how much it is?" asked Polos.
Criden urged, "Tell him, you can tell him."
"How much is it?"
"Tell him?"
"We won't even discuss it," insisted Jannotti, obviously
uncomfortable.
"OK, but you did discuss it with Howard?"
"OK we won't even discuss it."
"Is this arrangement please, pleasing to you?"
"As I say, we won't even discuss it."
"OK, well, we've done our business," said Criden.
And so they had. Jannotti departed, a future convicted criminal, a
corrupt(ed) public official.
287
That same day, Myers was told he might have to start introducing
immigration legislation soon. The Congressman complained he had
been shortchanged in August. Cohen agreed to give Myers $35,000 ex-
tra for the August meeting and $50,000 to handle hotel problems with
local government. On January 27, Congressman Jenrette told DeVito
he had spoken to Senator Thurmond "in a very vague way," and he
could not produce the Senator for a meeting.288 The Senator would not
accept money or give assurances in advance, said Jenrette. But on Jan-
uary 29 middleman Stowe told Weinberg that although the Senator
would not make assurances in return for money, he would accept
money after he introduced the legislation. 8 9 This claim was never
tested.
Meanwhile, inquiries from NBC, The New York Times, and News-
day revealed increasing awareness of Abscam. Criminal Division Chief
Philip Heymann agreed with FBI Director Webster that all significant
leads had been followed. The investigation was surfacing quickly, the
agents were tired, and while an investigation like this could go on end-
lessly, increasingly middlemen were reaching out to politicians beyond
their immediate "string of associates. '290 The FBI had turned away no
one, following every significant lead evenhandedly. As Webster later
testified: "You do not try to keep going on and on and on. The point
gets made. The deterrent effect gets made at some reasonable
286. Id.
287. Id.
288. SELECT COMM., supra note 153, at 450.
289. Id.
290. Operations Hearings, supra note 153, at 413.
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point."29' The Philadelphia phase, the primary reason for the exten-
sion, had netted the President and majority leader of its city council.
Enough was enough.
TRIALS AND HEARINGS
Once Abscam went public, Justice Department officials were under
pressure to prepare and present cases as quickly as possible, lest the
November 1980 elections occur while the government possessed sub-
stantial evidence of candidates' criminal conduct. Party primaries
would take place even sooner.
Abscam's last phase produced its first, and perhaps most morally
troubling indictment: In May, along with Philadelphia City Council
President Schwartz and Councilman Johanson, majority leader Harry
P. Jannotti was indicted for accepting money pressed upon him by rep-
resentatives of foreign businessmen.29 The next day a Brooklyn grand
jury indicted Johanson, his law partner Criden, along with Congress-
man Ozzie Myers and the most corrupt official in Abscam, Camden
Mayor Errichetti.'9 '
Congressman Lederer's indictment immediately followed,29' and
within weeks, Representatives Jenrette, Murphy, Thompson, and Kelly
were also indicted,'29 5 leaving U.S. Senator Harrison Williams as the
subject of intense speculation but no formal action.
Videotapes showing Congressman Myers taking an envelope con-
taining $50,000 from an undercover FBI agent, boasting of his congres-
sional influence, and similar evidence easily convinced a jury which at
the end of August, 1980, convicted Myers and his three codefendants
in the first Abscam trial.9
Mayor Errichetti returned to Camden convicted of bribery, ex-
posed as a throughly corrupt organized crime connected facilitator of
the fix. Large segments of the city he had sold out embraced him tu-
multuously, and the Camden City Council rejected a resolution calling
for Errichetti's voluntary resignation. 97 The United States House of
Representatives, on the other hand, for the first time since the Civil
291. Id.
292. N.Y. Times, May 23, 1980, at A13, col. 1.
293. Id. May 28, 1980, at 1, col. 1.
294. Id., May 29, 1980, at 1, col. 1.
295. John W. Jenrette was indicted on June 13, 1980. Id., June 14, 1980, at 1, col. 2.
John M. Murphy and Frank Thompson were indicted on June 18, 1980. Id., June 19,
1980 at 1, col. 1. Richard Kelly was indicted on July 15, 1980. Id., July 16, 1980, at A10,
col. 3.
296. United States v. Myers, 527 F. Supp. 1206 (E.D.N.Y. 1981), aff'd in part, rev'd
in part, 692 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 2438 (1983).
297. N.Y. Times, Oct. 10, 1980, at B4, col. 5.
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War, voted 376-30 to expel one of its own, Myers, who personally urged
his colleagues to recognize that he'd been "set up.
'298
Jannotti and his cohort were convicted next.2 19 So, too, Congress-
man Jenrette.300 Senator Williams was indicted,30 1 and Representative
Murphy, who had been renominated while under indictment, was un-
seated in the November elections.
The Abscam legal process, an inexorable series of indictments, tri-
als, and convictions, was quickly gathering steam, well on its way to a
clean sweep of all involved, when it struck its first major judicial obsta-
cle: On November 26, 1980, Federal District Court Judge John Fullam,
who had presided at Jannotti's trial, set aside the jury's guilty verdict,
and granted the defendant's motion of acquittal.3 0 2 This opinion, the
first of many Abscam judical pronouncements, was a strong but re-
sponsible denunciation of the government's investigation. Fullam's
opinion was designed to withstand executive counterattack on appeal
by encompassing a set of independent grounds for dismissing the
convictions.
The first ground-lack of federal jurisdiction-was on a different
plane from all the others. In considering his court's jurisdiction to have
tried the case in the first place, Judge Fullam was deciding his own
right to decide. Whether or not a court has jurisdiction is prior to, and
independent of, whether it finds the investigative techniques accept-
able or the defendants guilty. Judge Friendly had seized upon this in
Archer when he held there had been no violation of the Travel Act by
the interstate telephone calls and therefore, no federal case at all.
3
03
Jannotti had been indicted under the "Hobbs Act," which prohib-
ited "in any way or degree. . . affect[ing interstate] commerce. . . by
. . . extortion." 30 ' For Judge Fullam "the issue. to be decided" was
whether the government had proved "the necessary nexus" between
Jannotti's actions and interstate commerce.305
Jannotti, of course, was unconcerned with interstate commerce
when he accepted $10,000 from the sheik's representative. He had no
intent, so legally there was no attempt or conspiracy to affect com-
merce. On the other hand, if Jannotti had thought about it, the hotel
298. H.R. 794, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., 126 CONG. REc. 10301-09 (1980).
299. United States v. Jannotti, 501 F. Supp 1182 (E.D. Pa. 1980), rev'd, 673 F.2d 578
(3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1106 (1982).
300. N.Y. Times, October 8, 1980, at 1, col. 1.
301. See United States v. Williams, 529 F. Supp. 1085 (E.D.N.Y. 1981). Senator Wil-
liams was charged with bribery, 18 U.S.C. § 201(c) (1982), accepting a criminal gratuity,
18 U.S.C. § 201(g) (1982), conflict of interests, 18 U.S.C. § 203 (1982), and interstate
travel for unlawful purposes, 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (1982). 529 F. Supp. at 1091.
302. 501 F. Supp. at 1205.
303. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
304. 501 F. Supp. at 1184 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a) (1976)).
305. 501 F. Supp. at 1184.
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construction project apparently would involve materials moving in
commerce. Judge Fullam held, however, that not appearances but real-
ity governed: the federal jurisdictional element could not be estab-
lished by "purely hypothetical potential impacts on commerce."306 A
fictitious hotel could never involve any actual movement of materials.
Additionally, the extortion component was defined broadly to include
"obtaining property... induced... under color of official right.
'3 0 7
Jannotti had not requested the bribe and had even "made it very clear
that the payments would not be necessary." Therefore, concluded
Judge Fullam, he could not have "extorted" the payment. Citing and
applying Judge Friendly's Archer warning that "federal courts should
not sanction the artificial federalization of purely state crimes," Judge
Fullam held that to permit a federal criminal conviction here would
substantially stretch the definition of extortion, and expand federal ju-
risdiction in "derogation of the criminal jurisdiction of state courts. In
my judgment, it is impermissible to treat federal jurisdiction thus
doubly expansively: first by extending it to passive acceptance of gra-
tuities by public officials, and second by extending it to purely hypo-
thetical situations."30' This bribery was essentially a state crime pun-
ishable under state law. "To permit this kind of artificial federalization
would effectively remove virtually all of the limitations upon the crimi-
nal jurisdiction of federal courts, and would be utterly contrary to ac-
cepted notions of federalism."309
This essay has already emphasized that a state's police powers, its
essential sovereignty, include defining, investigating, prosecuting and
punishing crime. And it is certainly true, as both Judges observed, that
there has been a "stretching" of federal jurisdiction beyond the inten-
tion of the framers, and beyond what most of the people who ratified
the United States Constitution anticipated. Although the Hobbs Act
perhaps should not have reached this situation, i.e., there should be no
federal jurisdiction over local bribery based on interstate commerce,
Judge Fullam is unconvincing in maintaining that the crucial differ-
ence is the scam. The Hobbs Act should not reach essentially local
crimes but if it does reach real situations, it may also reach simula-
tions. If there are adequate grounds, state or federal, to investigate, the
scam should not preclude jurisdiction.
Lest a federal appeals court disagree, reverse his decision, and rec-
ognize his jurisdiction, Judge Fullam also attacked the convictions on
two other levels. Considering the actual conduct of the government and
the mental state of the defendants, the Judge held that as a matter of
306. Id. at 1185.
307. Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1951(b)(2) (1976)).
308. 501 F. Supp. at 1185.
309. Id. at 1204.
19841
NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW
constitutional right (due process) and also congressional policy against
entrapment, the convictions could not stand.3 10
The judge reviewed a divided Supreme Court's decisions in Sor-
rells,3 1' Sherman,3 12 Russell,31 3 and Hampton.3 1' Hampton's 3-2-3 split
had left the doctrinal principles of entrapment and due process splin-
tered, but Judge Fullam discerned certain "guiding principles" which
emerged with clarity from these pronouncements:
1. It is perfectly proper for law enforcement officials to en-
gage in undercover activities, including deception and
trickery, where both the purpose and effect of their activi-
ties is to enforce the law by ferreting out and exposing
criminal activities. Entrapment issues arise only where the
government induces or persuades a person to commit a
crime, or actually participates in the commisssion of the
crime.3 15
It is not clear that government's "participation" automatically
substitutes for inducement so as to raise entrapment. If, for example, a
judge were convinced that some participants in a criminal enterprise
were really undercover agents, but the agents were wholly passive, only
acting on the suggestions or commands of the defendants, it is not cer-
tain that an entrapment issue has arisen. The thrust of the first princi-
ple, however, is noncontroversial: entrapment requires government
inducement.
2. Under no circumstances is it permissible to convict of
crime a non-predisposed defendant who was induced by
government agents to commit the crime charged. No mem-
ber of the Supreme Court has ever expressed any doubt as
to the correctness of this principle, although varying rea-
sons have been put forth from time to time for its
justification.310
This proposition is not obviously true. Those Supreme Court Jus-
tices who had dissented from defendants' convictions because they
310. Id. at 1187-1205.
311. Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435 (1932). For a discussion of Sorrells, see
supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text.
312. Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369 (1958). For a discussion of Sherman, see
supra notes 47-55 and accompanying text.
313. United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423 (1973). For a discussion of Russell, see
supra notes 74-77 and accompanying text.
314. Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484 (1976). For a discussion of Hampton,
see supra notes 115-25 and accompanying text.
315. 501 F. Supp. at 1189.
316. Id.
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urged an objective standard of entrapment might well affirm a convic-
tion of an extremely weak-willed, mildly induced, non-predisposed de-
fendant. For the subjectivist majority, however, the non-predisposed
governmentally-induced defendants are the core of the entrapped.
3. A predisposed defendant may properly be convicted not-
withstanding that he was induced by government agents to
commit the particular crime charged, so long as the induce-
ment is not such as would be likely to cause a person of
reasonably firm moral convictions to stray into
criminality.31 7
While it is true that the properly induced predisposed defendant
is the core of the manifestly corrupt, the Court has split on why this
person is not entrapped. For the subjectivist majority, a predisposed
defendant by definition can never be entrapped. 318 For the objectivists,
a defendant could only be entrapped if the government's inducement
were improper. 19
4. A predisposed defendant may properly be convicted not-
withstanding governmental inducement or creative involve-
ment, unless the conduct of the government agents was so
outrageous as to ... be deemed a violation of due process.
The converse of this statement, namely, that even a predis-
posed defendant cannot be convicted if the Government's
conduct amounted to a violation of due process, probably
also represents the view of a majority of the members of
the Court, although some may regard it as still an open
question .... 320
This last sentence is not the converse but the strict logical
equivalent of the statement immediately preceding. If the one is true
so is the other true: Both statements amount to the proposition that
among the governmentally induced, only those predisposed may be
convicted whose due process rights have not been violated by govern-
mental outrageousness.
Justice Rehnquist's plurality opinion in Hampton rejected this
proposition. For those three justices, by definition a predisposed defen-
dant could never have had his own constitutional rights violated by





321. 425 U.S. at 490. See supra note 146.
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that sometimes due process violations could prevent convicting even a
predisposed defendant.1
22
Under Judge Fullam's fourth principle, espoused by a Supreme
Court majority, what was sufficient governmental overreach to violate
due process? Most entrapment claims, Judge Fullam observed, arose in
narcotics cases and "because of the extreme danger to the public inher-
ent in narcotics trafficking, it [was] plainly necessary to avoid placing
undue restrictions upon the scope of permissible police activi-
ties. . . . ,,-1 Of course, this essay principally argues that official cor-
ruption directly threatens the republic, and therefore the public inter-
est also demands no undue restrictions upon honest government's
investigation of corrupt government. Obviously the question in both
contexts is what is "undue"?
Any government undercover operation produces a particular crime
at a particular time and place that would not have occurred but for
government involvement. This is no less true with the single agent pos-
ing as a helpless elderly victim on a park bench preyed upon by a mug-
ger than it is with an elaborate scam. All the Justices in Russell and
Hampton agreed at least that a defendant who was "ready and willing
to commit crimes of that type" was predisposed although the govern-
ment supplied the necessary opportunity, not in itself an extraordinary
inducement.32 4 Critics often complain that the government may never
"create a crime which would never have otherwise occurred." Taken
literally, this would outlaw all undercover opportunities. Judge Fullam
seemed to lose sight of this momentarily when, after analyzing Hamp-
ton and Russell he observed in Jannotti, "[tihe question still is, did
the Government induce the defendant to commit a crime he would not
otherwise have been likely to commit?"3 25 More precisely he ought to
have said, "The question still is, did the government induce the defen-
dant to commit a crime of the type which he would not otherwise have
been likely to commit?"
Those who blur the distinction between a particular crime and
type of crime often complement that confusion by talking of govern-
ment "illegality" as if it were per se improper for a government irvesti-
gating agent to engage in an act which if done by a private person for
private motives would constitute a crime.
Judge Fullam rejected this:
As a practical matter, however, the fact that the actions of the
government agents were themselves illegal will often have very
322. 425 U.S. at 491-95 (Powell, J., concurring); id. at 499 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
323. 501 F. Supp. at 1190.
324. Hampton, 425 U.S. at 489-90; id. at 493 (Powell, J., concurring); id. at 497
(Brennan, J., dissenting); Russell, 411 U.S. at 433-36; id. at 437 (Douglas, J., dissenting);
id. at 442 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
325. 501 F. Supp. at 1190 (emphasis added).
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little bearing upon their power to persuade. A non-predisposed
defendant would ordinarily not be likely to be lured into crime
merely by being made aware that others were willing to com-
mit unlawful acts.32
Furthermore, "a rule precluding successful prosecution whenever the
conduct of the government agents is shown to have been illegal would
provide the sophisticated criminal with a ready means of determining
whether a person he is about to deal with is or is not an undercover
agent.M
27
In theory, the government's inducement was a question separable
from the defendant's predisposition, but for Judge Fullam, subtle real-
ity confounded apparently simple doctrine. "[I]t is not always possible
to achieve complete compartmentalization in this context. That is, it is
sometimes impossible to achieve a correct resolution of the predisposi-
tion question in total disregard of the nature of governmental
inducement.
3 28
The Supreme Court had not explored in depth what constitutes
the mental state properly characterized as "predisposition." Each court
therefore must undertake its own analysis without guidance from the
top, focusing upon the defendant's state of mind and inclinations
before an initial exposure to government agents. "But the distinction
between a predisposed and a non-predisposed state of mind is not nec-
essarily clearcut."32  Like so many other life experiences which law
classifies discretely, predisposition was a continuum:
At one extreme is the defendant who customarily engages in
this type of criminal activity as a way of life, and who enthusi-
astically embraces any additional opportunities for such activi-
ties. At the other extreme is the resolute individual who would
not commit a crime of this type under any circumstances. In
between are many gradations: the person who occasionally
commits crimes of this type, and would be willing to do so
again only if a particularly favorable opportunity should pre-
sent itself; the person who has previously succumbed to temp-
tation, but is making a sincere and concerted effort to resist
such temptations; the previously innocent person who is weak
and easily influenced.330
Judge Fullam omitted another important type: the previously in-
nocent person who would succumb only to a huge inducement which
326. Id.
327. Id.
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realistically should never be offered. If, as cynics who claim to be real-
ists contend, every person has a price, then the essence of incorrupti-
bility might consist in pricing oneself out of the corrupt market. This
works only if one's price is substantially above the going market rate,
and if the government's inducement is within range of the market
price for corruption.
Judge Fullam's conclusion that inducement and predisposition
were inextricably linked was profoundly important, but, when he ob-
served, "the stronger the inducement, the more likely that any result-
ing criminal conduct of the defendant was due to the inducement
rather than to the defendant's own predisposition, ' 331 the judge over-
looked an important aspect of their relationship. The Third Circuit too
had adopted a so-called "unitary approach" where "inducement...
enters as an element of predisposition which the Government must dis-





What Judge Fullam, and the Third Circuit, had overlooked was a
fairly obvious fact of human nature connecting inducement and predis-
position: The greater the inducement, the greater almost anyone's pre-
disposition to accept it. It is not that with great inducement, the crime
is not the result of predisposition. Just the opposite: the greater the
inducement, the more likely that a defendant is actually predisposed to
a crime of that type. And this is especially true of a previous innocent
who would only accept an unrealistically large inducement.
A problem for those of us who advocate a subjective view of en-
trapment, who wish to ensure that only the predisposed are convicted,
is that our concern would theoretically be met by a government that
offered astronomical incentives, which we could be certain any defen-
dant was predisposed to take.
This problematic relationship between predisposition and induce-
ment was confirmed in a discussion I had recently with a close friend
who is a scrupulously honest narcotics bureau chief in a local prosecu-
tor's office. "The government should be able to offer any bait to every
public official and if they take it, they deserve their punishment," he
maintained.
When I asked "if a first time non-trafficking possessor of a small
amount of marijuana offered you $10 million to falsely indicate his co-
operation so as to justify dismissing the charges, and you could do it
without being caught, are you certain you would refuse?," he paused,
then admitted that he might be predisposed to take that bait, but he
steadfastly maintained that if caught he too deserved severe
punishment.
331. Id. at 1192 (quoting United States v. Watson, 489 F.2d 504, 511 (3d Cir. 1973)).
332. Id.
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The bureau chiefs response avoids the issue: since there are no
perfect people, almost everyone is predisposed to criminality with a
great enough inducement. If we limit our public offices to public offi-
cials who would never under any circumstances, real or imagined, com-
mit any impropriety, then our public offices will go unfilled. What is
largely overlooked is not that sometimes a great inducement rather
than a predisposition is the cause of crime, but that a great induce-
ment will actuate a pre-existing disposition which is not dangerous to
the public precisely because it is fantastic.
So, unless otherwise suspicious, the sweeter the deal, the more
likely we are predisposed to accept it. Therefore, inducements should
not be too alluring, precisely because and not in spite of the fact that
they will thereby attract the predisposed. There are predispositions
which should not be punished.
The relationship between predisposition and inducement may be
more complicated yet. Judge Fullam might be right; they may be inter-
related. One can assume a preexisting predisposition actuated by an
enormous inducement, but the inducement may create the disposition.
We may desire certain ends, and strive to fulfill them only because we
know they are impossible to achieve.
To whittle away the time during a losing softball game, a group of
us sat with a mirror in our hands trying to reflect the sunlight and
blind the pilot in a jet flying several miles above us. We adolescents
tried mightily to make the speck go into a tailspin and crash. We felt
free to try; we felt free to want to. Were we predisposed mass murder-
ers? Only under impossible conditions. In some sense, being ethical
means pricing oneself out of the market, and channelling corrupt urges
into unrealizable fantasies.
What might be an Honest Politician's fantasy? An immensely rich
potentate offers him a fortune to perform acts that are unquestionably
in his constituents' best interest. He tells the Prince that it's not neces-
sary, that he'll do it anyway, but in this fantasy the Prince insists he
will feel better and will only create jobs and rebuild the slums if the
politician accepts money: A fantasy, from a world not like ours. Here,
people do not pay substantially for favors they know they can get for
free on merit.
Law abiding citizens have a right to imagine themselves commit-
ting crimes, having illicit sex, etc. We may lust in our hearts. If the
government hooks into our otherwise unrealizable fantasies and makes
them a punishable reality, then it is the root of our evil.
What is disturbing about Jannotti as Judge Fullam detailed the
facts is the "Arab mind." Despite Jannotti's protestations, "I would
vote for a legitimate project regardless; our job, to bring as much busi-
ness and employment to Philadelphia; if that's the way they want to
do business, that's all right too," it was insisted that the "Arab mind"
1984]
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required the payment of money to ensure "friendship." The federal
government may have made an unrealistic ideal dream fantasy into ap-
parent reality and then prosecuted Jannotti for his manifested predis-
position.33 3 As it structured the situation, the government makes it dif-
ficult to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Harry Jannotti was
predisposed to engage in corruption at market conditions. Jannotti
may be no real threat; like almost anyone, however, he was at some
level predisposed to corruption and foolish not to be suspicious when
fantastic opportunity knocked.
While in some respects Jannotti is a sequel to Archer, as Judge
Fullam presented the facts the two defendants were very different pub-
lic officials. Jannotti did not ask for money; he made it clear no pay-
ment was necessary. Government agents first insisted that unless
money passed their principals would not spend millions to revitalize
Philadelphia, in contrast with the corrupt defense attorney Klein who
set the price, demanded full payment up front, and assured the agent a
fix was the only way.
334
As Judge Fullam described the Jannotti situation, "it was clear
that the defendants would not be asked or expected to do anything
improper on behalf of the proposed hotel venture; and they agreed to
do nothing inconsistent with their obligations as members of the City
Council, working for the benefit of their constituents." 36 On the other
hand, Archer, and certainly Klein, took $15,000 in order to fix a gun
possession case.
Guilt required proof of predisposition beyond a reasonable doubt;
but the enormous inducement here precluded the government from re-
lying solely on the fact that the defendants did accept the money as
proof beyond a reasonable doubt that they were predisposed. Some-
times a defendant's ready acquiescence in the government's suggestion,
or his displayed familiarity with criminal techniques has justified a
finding of predisposition. For example, Klein had boasted of a shop-
ping bag of cases to fix-"every case is a fix these days." But not Jan-
notti. "[I]n my judgment," said Judge Fullam, "there is no evidence
whatever in this case tending to show that, when the Government's
overtures first came to the attention of the defendants, they were al-
ready predisposed to accepting bribes.
'336
Therefore, since there was "no evidence whatever" of predisposi-
tion, the jury's factual conclusion beyond a reasonable doubt that there
was predisposition and therefore not entrapment was not reasonable.
The judge so ruled: "The evidence was, as a matter of law, insufficient
333. See supra notes 269-87, 317-20 and accompanying text.
334. See supra text accompanying note 39.
335. United States v. Jannotti, 501 F. Supp. at 1200.
336. Id.
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to establish the defendants' predisposition beyond a reasonable
doubt.
331 7
Judge Fullam acknowledged his "distress and disgust at the crass
behavior the tapes reveal. The jury's verdict represents a natural
human reaction to that evidence," but the defendants were still en-
trapped.338 "Viewed in its entirety, the Philadelphia aspect of the Ab-
scam investigation was plainly designed not to expose municipal cor-
ruption, not to determine which officials were corrupt, but merely to
ascertain whether, given enough inducement, city officials could be
corrupted."
3 39
This led him to one last reason for reversing defendants' convic-
tions: Even if he were wrong and there were federal jurisdiction under
the Hobbs Act, and if the jury's conclusion beyond a reasonable doubt
that Jannotti was predisposed and not entrapped were sustainable,
there remained a due process claim. A majority of the Supreme Court
(although not Justice Rehnquist himself) had reaffimed Justice Rehn-
quist's invitation in Russell that some day government agents' outra-
geous behavior would constitutionally mandate acquittal.3 40 Judge Ful-
lam noted that so far the Supreme Court had not explicitly disposed of
any case on this basis, but the Third Circuit had so decided one case:
United States v. Twigg, a drug case where government agents estab-
lished and ran a drug laboratory.3 1 Judge Fullam continued, "in U.S.
v. Archer, cited with approval in the [key] concurring opinion in
337. Id.
338. Id. at 1205.
339. Id. at 1200.
340. See United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 431-32 (1973); supra note 77 and
accompanying text.
341. United States v. Jannotti, 501 F. Supp. at 1203-04 (discussing United States v.
Twigg, 588 F.2d 373 (3d Cir. 1978)). In Twigg, the defendants were convicted, inter alia,
of illegally manufacturing methamphetamine hydrochloride (speed), a controlled sub-
stance. The defendants became involved in the crime through an informant working for
the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA). At the request of DEA officials, the informant
established a "speed" laboratory with the defendants. DEA agents supplied the inform-
ant with phenyl-2-propanone, the ingredient most difficult to obtain in the manufacture
of "speed." They provided twenty percent of the glassware and rented a farmhouse in
which the informant and defendants could establish the laboratory. The agents selected
a chemical supply outlet and arranged for the informant to purchase materials under a
false business name. In addition, the informant was entirely in control of the laboratory
and synthesis of the speed.
The jury found that the defendants were predisposed to the commission of the
crimes charged, thus rejecting the defendants' entrapment defense. The Third Circuit
reversed, holding that "the nature and extent of the police involvement in this crime was
so overreaching as to bar prosecution of the defendants as a matter of due process of
law." United States v. Twigg, 588 F.2d at 377. The court added, "[a]lthough no Supreme
Court decision has reversed a conviction on this basis, the police conduct in this case
went far beyond the behavior found permissible in previous cases." Id.
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Hampton, the court expressed the view that dismissal on due process
grounds would be appropriate where the undercover work of the gov-
ernment agents included the commission of several independent
crimes, including perjury before a grand jury.'3 42 (Remarkably, the
original Archer misperception had lingered to affect Abscam.)
In determining whether government conduct was outrageous, "the
court must consider the nature of the crime and the tools available to
law enforcement agencies to combat it."3 3 This essay argues what
Judge Fullam did not admit; official corruption is a special problem
and requires special techniques, but the judge did helpfully explore the
issue:
While municipal bribery may be "fleeting" and "elusive," so
that governmental subterfuge and even creative involvement
may be necessary to combat it, the techniques employed here
went far beyond the necessities of legitimate law enforcement.
It would undoubtedly be permissible for government agents to
set up an undercover business entity, either real or imaginary,
as an attractive target for corrupt overtures by city officials,
and even to hint that such overtures would be welcome. It
would also probably be permissible for the undercover agents
to initiate bribe proposals, at least in connection with sus-
pected ongoing corrupt activities on the part of the targeted
officials.
344
Of course this essay argues more strongly that it is certainly neces-
sary and proper for undercover agents to initiate such bribe proposals
even to untargeted officials. "But," continued Judge Fullam, "it is
neither necessary nor appropriate to the task of ferreting out crime for
the undercover agents to initiate bribe offers, provide extremely
generous financial inducements, and add further incentives virtually
amounting to an appeal to civic duty.
'34 5
So held the Judge-there was no jurisdiction, the defendants were
entrapped and their due process rights were violated: "[W]hatever may
be the appropriate role of federal law enforcement in detecting and
punishing municipal corruption, it is surely not within the legitimate
province of federal agents to embark upon a program of corrupting
municipal officials, merely to demonstrate that it is possible."
'3
4"
Offering public officials as birthday presents to the sheik's repre-
342. 501 F. Supp. at 1203.
343. United States v. Twigg, 588 F.2d 373, 378 n.6 (citing Hampton v. United States,
425 U.S. 484, 495 n.7 (Powell, J., concurring)), quoted in Jannotti, 501 F. Supp. at 1204.
344. 501 F. Supp. at 1204.
345. Id.
346. Id. at 1204-05.
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sentatives was "crass behavior" by the defendants, "[b]ut, in the long
run, the rights of all citizens not to be led into criminal activity by
government overreaching will remain secure only so long as the courts
stand ready to vindicate those rights in every case.
' '
4
Judge Fullam's decision was front page news. The first federal
court to rule on Abscam convictions had judged the federal executive
guilty of overreach and, therefore, the state legislators not guilty of any
crime, even though, as the judge admitted, "the evidence permitted,
although it did not compel, the inference that the payments repre-
sented bribes paid in exchange for the defendants' assurances of using
their official positions to pave the way for expeditious completion of
the project.
s3 4
Although Representatives Thompson, Murphy and Lederer were
convicted soon after, they, along with Jenrette and Myers, who were
already seeking to have their Abscam convictions reversed, took heart
from Jannotti. Judge Fullam's opinion was not binding on other fed-
eral judges such as Judge George Pratt, who had presided over most of
the other Abscam trials, but the defendants had scored first with their
most sympathetic member. Newspapers reported that during the trial
of Representative Richard Kelly of Florida, the only Republican
charged in Abscam, Judge Bryant had privately told lawyers that the
government's undercover operation had an "odor to it that was abso-
lutely repulsive. 3 49 Judicial Abscam was a long season and Jannotti
was only the first phase of the first contest. Acquitted by Judge Ful-
lam, Harry Jannotti resumed his seat on the Philadelphia City Council.
The New York Times ran editorials endorsing Judge Fullam's cau-
tion in overturning Jannotti's convictions, expressing hope that Judge
Pratt would now examine Abscam as a whole. The newspaper also gra-
tuitously urged Congress to hold hearings focusing not only on the
"costs and benefits but also the investigative standards and prosecu-
tion policies of undercover operations."35 0
The House Judiciary Subcommittee on Constitutional and Civil
Rights had been doing just this. Immediately after Abscam broke, on
March 4, 1980 and before any indictments had been issued, the head of
the Justice Department's Criminal Division, Philip Heymann, and FBI
Director William Webster had appeared before the committee charged
with FBI oversight, and, without going into the particulars of Abscam,
347. Id. at 1205.
348. Id. at 1184.
349. N.Y. Times, Jan. 10, 1981, at 1, col. 5. Kelly implausibly claimed he was en-
trapped while really conducting his own secret corruption investigation. United States v.
Kelly, 539 F. Supp. 363, 377 n.58 )(D.D.C. 1982), rev'd, 707 F.2d 1460 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 104 S. Ct. 264 (1983)).
350. N.Y. Times, Dec. 7, 1980, § 4, at 22, col. 1.
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had explored problems, dangers, and benefits inherent in undercover
operations and safeguards which the FBI had incorporated. 31
In the waning days of the Carter Administration, Attorney Gen-
eral Civiletti, who defended Abscam despite Judge Fullam's ruling in
Jannotti, released the "Attorney General's Guidelines on FBI Under-
cover Operations." Eighteen months in the making, the Guidelines
codified practices about which Heymann and Webster had testified
before the House Subcommittee. They provided that FBI headquarters
and an Undercover Operations Review Committee, composed of desig-
nated FBI officials and Justice Department lawyers, were to authorize
and supervise all "sensitive" operations. The guidelines classified as
"sensitive" all investigations involving a reasonable expectation of cor-
rupt action by a public official, untrue representations by an under-
cover agent concerning innocent persons, and, except for the purchase
of stolen or contraband goods, those investigations where agents or co-
operating individuals engaged in any activity otherwise proscribed by
federal, state, or local law as a felony or serious crime. Also "sensitive"
were investigations where an undercover agent supplied an item or ser-
vice unavailable to criminal actors but for the government's participa-
tion, and those in which an undercover agent ran significant risk of
being arrested and continuing undercover, or giving false testimony in
any proceeding in an undercover capacity. 52
The Review Committee would "carefully assess the contemplated
benefits" of a proposed sensitive undercover operation and measure
those against the "operating and other costs" including "the risk of
harm to private individuals or undercover employees, the risk of harm
to reputation, or privileged or confidential relationships, and the risk
of invasion of privacy." '
A sensitive operation had to be designed to "minimize the risks of
harm and intrusion." Unless "justified to obtain information or evi-
dence necessary for paramount prosecutive purposes," to "maintain
credibility or cover" with criminals, or "avoid danger of death or seri-
ous bodily injury," no agent could engage in "any activity that would
constitute a crime under state or federal law if engaged in by a private
person acting without the approval or authorization of an appropriate
government official."35' And except in an emergency, advance written
approval was required before an agent engaged in an otherwise illegal
activity which, in any event, the FBI must take "reasonable steps to
351. Oversight Hearings, supra note 153, at 115.
352. UNITED STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL, GUnELINES FOR FBI UNDERCOVER Ac ivTisS
§ B (1980), reprinted in SELECT Comm., supra note 153, at 49.
353. Id. § F, reprinted in SELECT COMM., supra note 153, at 54.
354. Id. § F(4), reprinted in SELECT COMM., supra note 153, at 54.
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minimize." 355 Agents were flatly prohibited from acts of violence, or
obtaining evidence through illegal wiretapping, mail openings, breaking
and entering, or trespass amounting to an illegal search. 56
A section entitled "Authorization of the creation of opportunities
for illegal activity" began with the declaration: "Entrapment should be
scrupulously avoided. Entrapment is the inducement or encouragement
of an individual to engage in illegal activity in which he would other-
wise not be disposed to engage. 357 This section codified the three
safety features which Heymann and Webster emphasized in their testi-
mony before Congress: Whoever approved an undercover operation
should be satisfied that a) the corrupt nature of the activity is
reasonably clear to potential subjects; b) there is a reasonable
indication that the undercover operation will reveal illegal ac-
tivities; and c) the nature of any inducement is not unjustifi-
able in view of the character of the illegal transaction in which
the individual is invited to engage.358
The guidelines declared, "Under the law of entrapment, induce-
ments may be offered to an individual even though there is no reasona-
ble indication that that particular individual has engaged, or is engag-
ing, in the illegal activity that is properly under investigation." 59
However, the Director must in writing find that either
there is a reasonable indication, based on information devel-
oped through informants or other means, that the subject is
engaging, has engaged, or is likely to engage in illegal activity
of a similar type; or
The opportunity for illegal activity has been structured so
that there is reason for believing that persons drawn to the op-
portunity or brought to it, are predisposed to engage in the
contemplated illegal activity.3 60
By their own declaration these guidelines were for "Internal De-
partment of Justice guidance" only and "not intended to, do not, and
may not be relied upon to create any rights, substantive or procedural,
enforceable at law by any party in any matter civil or criminal." 61
On February 19, 1981, almost a year after Heymann and Webster
had appeared before it, the House Judiciary Subcommittee on Consti-
355. Id. § I, reprinted in SELEcT COMM., supra note 153, at 54.
356. Id.
357. Id.
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tutional and Civil Rights, chaired by Congressman Don Edwards, a for-
mer FBI agent and admitted critic of the undercover technique, con-
tinued its series of hearings concerning its ongoing task of FBI
oversight. "Now, we are here today," said Congressman Edwards "to
examine those [FBI] guidelines in light of constitutional principles, so-
cial utility, and public policy. '36 2 The ranking minority member, Rep-
resentative Henry Hyde, criticized these "midnight regulations and
guidelines which appeared at the last moments of the Carter adminis-
tration" as "unacceptable" in that they "restrict[ed] the flexibility of
the FBI" and overcentralized control in Washington rather than leav-
ing it with the local United States Attorneys: 6 3 "I am anxious to hear
the comments of today's witnesses, but I must assert that I personally
wholeheartedly believe in the law enforcement value of undercover op-
erations which do not legally entrap the victim. Moreover, I believe the
overwhelming majority of Americans would take the same position." 36'
The day's witnesses were two law professors, Geoffrey R. Stone of
the University of Chicago, and Michael Seidman of Georgetown. At the
outset, Professor Stone conceded that undercover operations were "ex-
traordinarily effective" in proving consensual crimes such as corrup-
tion, and that tapes resulted in airtight cases. Furthermore, as Hey-
mann had testified, widespread use of spies, secret agents, and
informers could "effectively generate an atmosphere of distrust and
suspicion among potential 'targets,"' thus having an enormous deter-
rent effect. 65 But because of their extraordinary potency, the tech-
niques also seriously threaten privacy. Stone's purpose that day was to
explore the potential conflict between effective undercover operations
and legitimate expectations of privacy.
Typically, an effective undercover agent must initiate and gradu-
ally create a relationship of trust; the agent must win the target's confi-
dence through deception. This carefully manipulated false relationship
was a very serious intrusion on privacy, "strikingly similar to and per-
haps even greater than" intrusions of other investigative techniques.366
For Stone and other critics, monitored undercover activity without
prior judicial authorization undermined conversational privacy no less
than wiretaps, eavesdrops and bugs for which the Constitution re-
quired advance judicial authorization based upon probable cause.36
362. Oversight Hearings, supra note 153, at 1 (statement of Rep. Don Edwards, Sub-
comm. Chairman).
363. Id. at 2 (remark of Rep. Hyde).
364. Id.
365. Id. at 3 (statement of Prof. Geoffrey Stone).
366. Id.
367. Although the Supreme Court initially found wiretapping not an unreasonable
search and seizure in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 466 (1928), the Court
reversed its thinking following the passage of the Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, §
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Moreover, Stone pointed out, unlike wiretaps and bugs, spies and
informers saw as well as heard. Whereas a warrant requirement to
search a house for papers and personal effects checked the Executive
acting openly as an antagonist, an undercover agent was often unwit-
tingly invited into the target's home. "The undercover operation, if not
carefully controlled, would thus have the anomalous effect of enabling
government to invade the individual's privacy through deceit and
strategem when it could not otherwise lawfully do so. ''s But, Stone
acknowledged, the United States Supreme Court had consistently held
that deceit by informers and secret agents to elicit information from
unsuspecting targets did not amount to a "search" within the protec-
tion of the fourth amendment.869
In its oft-cited decision regarding electronic eavesdropping,
United States v. White,3 70 the Supreme Court majority, per Justice
White, considered "what expectations of privacy are constitutionally
justifiable,"371 and affirmed its earlier holding in Hoffa v. United
States372 that "however strongly a defendant may trust an apparent
colleague, his expectations in this respect are not protected by the
Fourth Amendment when it turns out that the colleague is a govern-
ment agent. 3 7 3 The fourth amendment afforded "no protection to 'a
wrongdoer's misplaced belief that a person to whom he voluntarily
confides his wrongdoing will not reveal it.' No warrant to 'search and
609, 48 Stat. 1105 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 609 (1982)). Nardone v. United
States, 302 U.S. 379, 382 (1937). In Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967) and Katz v.
United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), the Court created a framework upon which Congress
based the wiretapping section of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of
1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, § 801, 82 Stat. 197. The congressional findings specify:.
To safeguard the privacy of innocent persons, the interception of wire or oral
communications where none of the parties to the communication has consented
to the interception should be allowed only when authorized by a court of compe-
tent jurisdiction and should remain under the control and supervision of the
authorizing court.
Id. § 801(d).
In the undercover context, governmental officials deceitfully participate in and
overhear those very same conversations. The intrusion upon conversational pri-
vacy is functionally the same. As in the case of wiretapping and electronic bug-
ging, the undercover operative will inevitably learn not only about the target
individual's criminal intentions, if any, but also about his personal, political, reli-
gious, and cultural attitudes and beliefs-matters which are, quite simply, none
of the government's business.
Oversight Hearings, supra note 153, at 3 (statement of Prof. Geoffrey Stone).
368. Oversight Hearings, supra note 153 at 3-4 (statement of Prof. Geoffrey Stone).
369. Id. at 4. See United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971); Hoffa v. United States,
385 U.S. 293 (1966); On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747 (1951).
370. 401 U.S. 745 (1971).
371. Id. at 752.
372. 385 U.S. 293 (1966).
373. 401 U.S. at 749.
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seize' is required in such circumstances. ' ' 37 4 White simply extended
Hoffa's logic: if an agent or informant could report a conversation
without a warrant, that agent could also record it or transmit it elec-
tronically without a warrant. "Inescapably, one contemplating illegal
activities must realize and risk that his companions may be reporting
to the police," the Court stated. "If he has no doubts or allays them, or




Stone found this approach "unsatisfactory whether as a matter of
constitutional law or as a matter of policy. 3' So had the dissenters in
White. Justice Douglas, in a moving opinion, observed that discussing
it in "legalistic" terms "clouded and concealed" the issue.3 77 Electronic
surveillance was not merely a modern form of what the ancients knew
as eavesdropping: "To equate the two is to treat man's first gunpowder
on the same level as the nuclear bomb. Electronic surveillance is the
greatest leveler of human privacy ever known.
373
The issue for dissenting Justices Douglas and Harlan was the qual-
ity of life of a free people: "The concepts of privacy which the Foun-
ders enshrined in the Fourth Amendment," said Douglas,
vanish completely when we slavishly allow an all-powerful gov-
ernment proclaiming law and order, efficiency and other benign
purposes, to penetrate all the walls and doors which men need
to shield them from the pressures of a turbulent life around
them, and give them the health and strength to carry on ....
Monitoring, if prevalent, certainly kills free discourse and
374. Id. (quoting Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 302 (1966)).
375. 401 U.S. at 752.
376. Oversight Hearings, supra note 153, at 4 (testimony of Prof. Geoffrey Stone).
377. 401 U.S. at 756 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
378. Id. Justice Douglas quoted Justice Brennan, recognizing a qualitative difference
between electronic surveillance and traditional disguise:
The risk of being overheard by an eavesdropper or betrayed by an informer or
deceived as to the identity of one with whom one deals is probably inherent in
the conditions of human society. It is the kind of risk we necessarily assume
whenever we speak. But as soon as electronic surveillance comes into play, the
risk changes crucially...
... Electronic aids add a wholly new dimension to eavesdropping. They
make it more penetrating, more indiscriminate, more truly obnoxious to a free
society. Electronic surveillance, in fact, makes the police omniscient; and police
omniscience is one of the most effective tools of tyranny.
Id. at 759-60 (quoting Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 465-66 (1963) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting)). Justice Douglas warned of "the use of electronic surveillance which, uncon-
trolled, promises to lead us into a police state." 401 U.S. at 760 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
"[E]xtensive intrusions into privacy made by electronic surveillance make self-restraint
by law enforcement officials an inadequate protection. . . ... Id. at 761-62. Its advocates
"should spend some time in totalitarian countries and learn first hand the kind of regime
they are creating here." Id. at 765.
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spontaneous utterances. Free discourse-a First Amendment
value-may be frivolous or serious, humble or defiant, reac-
tionary or revolutionary, profane or in good taste; but it is not
free if there is surveillance.
37 9
Professor Stone expressed much the same fears: "The unrestrained use
of such operatives . .. has at least the potential to undermine that
sense of trust which is essential to the very existence of productive
social, business, political, and personal-as well as criminal-
relations.
'380
Any citizen who appreciates the openness of American society and
is horrified by a totalitarian police state must be cautioned by these
statements. Nevertheless, this essay advocates widespread use of un-
dercover techniques to uncover political corruption while vigorously
opposing any transformation into Orwellian Big Brotherism. The key,
again, is double standards-distinctions between "public" and "pri-
vate" targets-between public officials and private citizens, acting in
public or private capacities.38'
The Supreme Court had reasoned that because we necessarily as-
sume the risk that our friends and associates will betray our confi-
dences, the fourth amendment does not protect us against the simula-
tions of government agents. Criticizing the Court's opinion in White,
Professor Stone acknowledged a public/private distinction but applied
it only to the source and not the subject of intrusions:
Insofar as such persons act solely in their private capacities
and not in cooperation with governmental officials, their be-
trayals undoubtedly fall beyond the scope of the amendment's
379. 401 U.S. at 762 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Justice Harlan also expressed it
powerfully Third party bugging would
undermine that confidence and sense of security in dealing with one another
that is characteristic of individual relationships between citizens in a free
society.
... [W]ords would be measured a good deal more carefully and communi-
cation inhibited if one suspected his conversations were being transmitted and
transcribed. Were third-party bugging a prevalent practice, it might well
smother that spontaneity-reflected in frivolous, impetuous, sacrilegious, and
defiant discourse-that liberates daily life. Much off-hand exchange is easily for-
gotten and one may count on the obscurity of his remarks, protected by the very
fact of a limited audience, and the likelihood that the listener will either over-
look or forget what is said, as well as the listener's inability to reformulate a
conversation without having to contend with a documented record. All these val-
ues are sacrificed by a rule of law that permits official monitoring of private
discourse limited only by the need to locate a willing assistant.
Id. at 787-89 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (footnotes omitted).
380. Oversight Hearings, supra note 153, at 4, (statement of Prof. Geoffrey Stone).
381. See infra text accompanying notes 648-50.
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concern. The analysis shifts markedly, however, once govern-
ment enters the picture. The risk that the individual's confi-
dant may be fickle or a gossip is of an entirely different order
from the risk that he is in reality an undercover agent, commis-
sioned in advance to report the individual's every utterance to
the authorities. In the latter situation, we are no longer dealing
with the risk of misplaced confidence inherent in the nature of
human relationships; we are dealing instead with government
action designed explicitly to invade our privacy and to end in
deceit and betrayal. . . .The notion that our willingness to as-
sume one risk means that we must necessarily assume the
other is doubtful at best.
38 2
The Court's logic, said Professor Stone, would commit us to the
absurd conclusion that because we assume a risk that private citizens
will invade our privacy by tapping our telephones, bugging our offices
and ransacking our homes, we must assume the risk that government
agents will tap our phones and search our houses.383 Furthermore, he
pointed out that distinguishing between genuine friends and associates
and "skilled professional dissemblers specially trained in the art of de-
ception" was not a "particular skill" that "citizens of a free society
should ordinarily have to acquire."
38
4
In short, relying on the distinction between public and private,
Professor Stone's
critical question-the question that must ultimately be an-
swered by Congress-is whether and to what extent law-abid-
ing citizens in a free society should be entitled confidently to
assume that their supposed friends, confidants, lawyers, and
other associates are [in fact what they appear to be, and are
not] in reality clandestine agents of government secretly re-
porting their activities and conversations to the authorities. 38 5
"Citizens in a free society" obscures again the very distinction
among targets, which Professor Stone applied to agents. This essay ar-
gues that we should treat our targets differently if they are public offi-
cials. By talking of the importance of being able to go about our daily
business not forced to wonder whether we are being monitored, Stone
fails to distinguish the government official who perhaps should always
act as if he were being monitored when (ab)using the public trust, from
a private citizen who should be free to seek and assume genuinely pri-
vate relationships.
382. Oversight Hearings, supra note 153, at 4 (statement of Prof. Geoffrey Stone)
(emphasis added).
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Professor Stone urged that an undercover agent should be permit-
ted, without probable cause, to explicitly propose a criminal transac-
tion to a public official only "in the context of a non-trust relation-
ship." He would also "permit the essentially unrestrained use of some
of the most common, most effective, and least intrusive techniques for
the investigation of official corruption." He would "allow, for example,
an agent operating an undercover bar to offer a bribe to a municipal
building inspector in return for a license. When such operations be-
come more intrusive, however, probable cause should be required."6
Why? "This is not a matter of 'double standards' or 'special treat-
ment' for government officials. Private citizens in essentially compara-
ble settings-trust relationships and political associations and activi-
ties-are entitled to basically the same protections. 38 7 Here again, he
had denied separate standards for private and public targets, as if
double standards necessarily operated in favor of the public officials.
We, the people, want to feel free and secure in private action and
conversation. But perhaps in a healthy republic public officials en-
trusted with public power always should feel some insecurity in the
apparent privacy with which they act, ostensibly for the public benefit.
Professor Geoffrey Stone's warnings were salutary, and his recom-
mendations responsible. "[N]o one would sensibly suggest that the
government be prohibited absolutely from engaging in undercover in-
vestigations." Rather, he sought "a reasonable accommodation of com-
peting investigative and privacy interests," which demanded "a higher
threshold standard for initiating undercover operations."38 88 Since, for
Stone, undercover intrusion upon privacy was equal to or greater than
taps and bugs, he urged a probable cause standard whenever an under-
cover operation was likely to intrude significantly upon the privacy of a
trust relationship. Adopting a personal/impersonal distinction, he ex-
empted from this probable cause requirement all undercover opera-
tions in which the agent and target "interact essentially as strangers or
mere casual acquaintances."3819
Professor Louis Seidman followed Professor Stone and shifted the
focus from privacy to entrapment. Although Seidman found the FBI
guidelines a constructive first step toward controlling the obvious dan-
gers posed by undercover operations, they "appear[ed] to authorize
some conduct which was probably illegal, and other conduct, which
... is surely unwise."3 90 He traced the problem of entrapment back to
386. Id. at 7.
387. Id. (emphasis added).
388. Id. at 4.
389. Id. at 6.
390. Id. at 12 (testimony of Prof. Louis Seidman).
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Eden391 and through the six major judicial opinions to date: the four
United States Supreme Court opinions, Sorrells, Sherman, Russell and
Hampton, and two federal appellate court decisions, Archer and
Twigg.392 The guidelines could fill the void left by sketchy Supreme
Court case law concerning government overreach. Furthermore,
one of the reasons why the case law is unclear is because the
Court has said repeatedly that it's not our job to decide ques-
tions of policy about law enforcement, that's Congress' job, and
it would be wrong, therefore, for Congress now to turn around
and say "We're not going to do anything about this, because
the Court has settled it." The buck has to stop someplace, and
I think it's Congress' responsibility to make the hard judgment
about what kind of law enforcement techniques are permissible
and what kind are not.
93
Chairman Edwards cut the discussion short, reminding the law
professors of political reality:
Thank you. That would be a most satisfactory solution, but it's
not at all likely to take place. That's the real world. We have a
kind of a definition of "entrapment" as enunciated in various
court decisions; there has to be, there should be a predisposi-
tion, and when the government goes too far, when the conduct
is outrageous, then it's entrapment. Is that about what it
amounts to? 94
"That's about it, Congressman," said Seidman.3 95 Edwards had
merged entrapment and due process, but in effect he was correct. His
391. Id.
392. Id. at 12-13. For a discussion of Sorrells, see supra notes 45 & 46 and accompa-
nying text. For a discussion of Sherman, see supra notes 47-55 and accompanying text.
For a discussion of Russell, see supra notes 74-77 and accompanying text. For a discus-
sion of Hampton, see supra notes 115-25 and accompanying text. For a discussion of
Archer, see supra notes 81-107 and accompanying text. For a discussion of Twigg, see
supra note 340 and accompanying text.
393. Oversight Hearings, supra note 153, at 26 (testimony of Prof. Louis Seidman).
During questioning, Stone too had urged an independent role for Congress:
Especially in the entrapment area, it is terribly important that Congress under-
stand that it's not in any way, shape, or form bound by the Court's formulation
of entrapment. It's not a Constitutional concept .... Rather than attempting to
unravel the entrapment doctrine as formulated by the Court, Congress should
rethink the issue anew and devise its own formulation of entrapment. The
Court's approach should be viewed as merely one form of the defense which
might or might not be accepted by Congress.
Id. at 30 (testimony of Prof. Geoffrey Stone).
394. Id. (statement of Rep. Don Edwards, Subcomm. Chairman).
395. Id. (testimony of Prof. Louis Seidman).
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political sense that Congress would refuse to legislatively alter the Su-
preme Court's subjective entrapment standard also may be correct.
Professor Seidman praised the guidelines' "important and com-
mendable safeguards" for reducing risks of entrapment, i.e., making
the corrupt nature of the deal "reasonably clear" to potential suspects
and only offering the "going rate."396
Congressman Hyde interrupted Seidman to consider the difficulty
in distinguishing legitimate lobbying from corruption:
A fascinating poll might be taken of every Member of Congress
as to whether or not they have ever been offered $500 to get
someone in from India, to introduce a private bill. I daresay,
most have .... If you're talking $500 or talking $25,000 or
$200,000, I grant you it's a whole different circumstance. You
don't get offered $200,000. But I think it would be fascinating
to find out from a goodly representative number of Congress-
men from all over the country . . . how many have been of-
fered, and not necessarily in an overtly criminal way, but you
know-a campaign contribution that is so closely tied in with
helping to get this person in .... I have been made uncom-
fortable by people wanting to make a contribution, very close
to a request for-and it was quite obvious, and of course I re-
jected it out of hand. But I daresay it's happened with a lot of
Members.397
Honestly admitting how it really works, Congressman Hyde sug-
gested that sometimes offers of financial support are so subtly or con-
tingently linked to future official action as to blur the distinction be-
tween legitimate campaign contribution and proffered bribe.
There is legal ambiguity arising from the offer of a bribe or a polit-
ical contribution in return for a political act when the understandings
are left unstated, but there is a meeting of the minds. Should the
guidelines themselves create special precautions, special requirements,
when dealing with a substantive crime which, by its nature, is ill-
defined?
Professor Seidman reiterated that
one of the commendable aspects of the guidelines is that they
do provide that the undercover agent should make unambigu-
ous and clear the illegal nature of the conduct to the partici-
pant. I'm a little uncertain how one does that without blowing
396. Id. at 13.
397. Id. at 17-18 (statement of Rep. Henry Hyde).
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one's cover. It seems to me it would require some skill. But I
think that is a commendable safeguard. 9 8
He also endorsed another safeguard: "Tempting a subject with an
excessively attractive inducement really serves no public purpose, if it
is unlikely the subject would ever be forced to face such a temptation
but for the government's intervention."39 9 But although it limits in-
ducements to the "going rate," government might still ensnare "harm-
less subjects" who otherwise would never have been approached with a
criminal proposition. "There is an ironic inverse relationship between
the potential harmfulness of a suspect and the risk of entrapment. The
more innocent and naive a subject is, the less likely he is to know what
the 'going rate' is" for criminal activity and, therefore, the smaller the
inducement which may be necessary to entrap him. 00
Professor Seidman's argument cuts both ways. Perhaps the more
innocent and naive subject is more likely to be predisposed to corrup-
tion only at an unrealistically high price, unaware that others are will-
ing to sell their offices for much less. Naive innocence might well price
itself out of the corrupt marketplace.
For Professor Seidman, the critical weakness of the FBI guidelines
was their failure "to limit the offering of inducements to those reasona-
bly suspected of criminal activity. 40 1 He urged that undercover opera-
tions be carefully targeted on subjects for whom there was already con-
vincing evidence of predisposition. This requirement of predisposition
overlapped Professor Stone's call for judicially warranted probable
cause.
Seidman also urged that the guidelines flatly prohibit government
agents from supplying a target with an item or service absolutely indis-
pensable and not otherwise available. Although the Supreme Court has
not directly ruled on this, "[t]here is good reason to think that such
government conduct runs afoul of the due process limitations on un-
dercover operations.' 4 2 Moreover, whether constitutional or not, it was
bad public policy. A defendant caught by such a ploy might be predis-
posed to commit the crime if given an opportunity and, therefore,
could not claim entrapment. But such a defendant was, "by definition,
harmless since the unavailability of a crucial item makes it impossible
for him to commit the crime .... When the Government supplies the
item, it is therefore creating the crime which otherwise would not oc-
cur, for the sole purpose of prosecuting the perpetrator.'
0 3
Finally, Seidman urged Congress to "make these guidelines worth
398. Id. at 30 (testimony of Prof. Louis Seidman).
399. Id. at 17.
400. Id.
401. Id.
402. Id. at 14 (statement of Prof. Louis Seidman).
403. Id. at 20.
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something more than the paper they're written on," by making their
violation a defense to a criminal prosecution. 0'
Subcommittee Chairman Edwards declared that day's testimony
"very helpful." The witnesses essentially had agreed in their criticism.
As Chairman Edwards said, police,
whether they're federal or state or local, [who] randomly just
go around all our cities and stop people on the street and offer
people bribes or offer them money or try to sell them drugs or
anything . . .would produce serious damage to the fabric of
our society if we approved that sort of thing." °5
Echoing Justice Douglas, Professor Seidman added, "I think that's
right .... There's no legitimate purpose served by conducting little
tests of the morality of people. It's hard enough with the tests that
people have to contend with in the real world without government
making it harder still for people to walk the straight and narrow."406
The next week, M.I.T. sociologist Professor Gary Marx, testifying
before the committee, addressed
the broader social and policy issues raised by police undercover
work. Questions of legality are of the utmost importance, but
they should not be the only issues considered. The mere fact
that a tactic is legal should not be sufficient grounds for its use.
Its ethical, practical, economic, and social implications must
also be considered.40 7
Admitting the well-publicized advantages of Abscam described by
Webster and Heymann, Marx wanted to emphasize "possible disadvan-
tages, abuses and costs," and finally, to "speculate on what recent un-
dercover work may imply about the changing nature of social control in
America."
4 8
The sociologist presented a typology of undercover police work.4 0 9
Most public attention had focused on the targets who might be victims
of government trickery and coercion rather than autonomous criminals.
The key legal questions were: Did the person violate the criminal law
and was he predisposed to do this? Coercion, trickery, or a highly se-
ductive temptation made the determination of predisposition very dif-
ficult. Almost by definition and as a common fact of human nature,
people tend to be more predisposed toward the more enticing. The real
404. Id. at 30.
405. Id. at 25 (statement of Rep. Don Edwards, Subcomm. Chairman).
406. Id. (testimony of Prof. Louis Seidman).
407. Id. at 33 (statement of Prof. Gary Marx).
408. Id. at 34.
409. Id.
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difficulty for Professor Marx as for Judge Fullam apparently was that
highly seductive inducements rather than predisposition cause the tar-
get's criminality.
Causation is a very difficult problem in law no less than in physics.
If a match is struck in a room full of gas, the single cause of the result-
ing explosion might be seen as the gas or the match, depending upon
ordinary expectations in that setting. An extraordinary inducement
which triggers an otherwise harmless predisposition into a corrupt act
may be said to have caused the crime there and then. The predisposi-
tion, however, no less clearly exists. In fact, by actuating crime, that
extraordinary inducement makes the target's predisposition manifest,
and therefore the predisposition's existence becomes more clear and
certain. Again, this is a flaw with the subjective entrapment viewpoint.
Marx's statement that if there is "a highly seductive temptation" then
"the determination of predisposition is very difficult" does not make
obvious sense.
Professor Marx identified three common forms of trickery. First,
offering the illegal action as a minor part of a very attractive socially
legitimate goal. The targets are lured into the activity on a pretext:
The goal is legal and desirable and the illegality is secondary. 10 Judge
Fullam found this repulsive in Jannotti.41 1 A second trick was to hide
or disguise the illegal nature of the action. "Ignorance of the law is no
excuse for its violation. However, the situation seems different when
one is led into illegal activities by government agents who claim that
no wrongdoing is occuring. Here the agent may be both exploiting ig-
norance and generating a subterfuge.' 1 2 Marx claimed that Senator
Williams had been so victimized. Defendants were apparently led to
believe that they could make money without having to deliver on any
promises. The Senator was coached and assured that although the
Arab mind made it necessary for him to brag about his own connec-
tions and importance solely for appearances, he really made no com-
mitment to be actually influenced by any payment.
41 3
A third type of trickery was to weaken a target's capacity to ra-
tionally distinguish right from wrong.41' People with diminished
mental capacity, juveniles, addicts in a state of withdrawal or those in
a weakened state or under extreme pressure, were more susceptible to
persuasion and less able to distinguish right from wrong.
410. Id.
411. United States v. Jannotti, 501 F. Supp. 1182 (E.D. Pa. 1980), rev'd, 673 F.2d 578
(3d Cir.), cert. denied 457 U.S. 1106 (1982); see supra notes 341-47 and accompanying
text.
412. Oversight Hearings, supra note 153, at 34 (testimony of Prof. Gary Marx).
413. Id. at 35.
414. Id.
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This last method is repulsive primarily because we do not want to
be preyed upon by government in our own weak moments. Yet, here
too, distinguishing (as Marx does not) private from public is helpful.
We have a right to know in advance whether a public official, who
wields significant public power and is constantly under pressure, will
succumb to temptation. At the other extreme, private citizens in their
private capacity should not be prey unless the government has proba-
ble cause. In between are the difficult cases: private citizens in their
quasi-public capacity, e.g., builders who might be induced by high
profits to erect unsafe buildings and pay off inspectors to overlook vio-
lations; and public officials in their private capacities, e.g., legislators
who break laws prohibiting sexual misconduct, gambling, or drug
possession.
Professor Marx pointed out a troubling situation in Abscam in
which a target believed by the investigators to be an alcoholic was
given liquor after he first refused a bribe attempt. Suppose, however,
that this were a public official whose honesty could routinely be over-
come by liquor? Since he might be making decisions which affect this
nation's security, wouldn't the people's Executive properly test this of-
ficial's strength under drink?
415
Participation in crime, said the sociologist, may emerge from fear
of not participating rather than free choice. When coercion is mixed
with temptation the incentive to participate can be too strong.
416
Furthermore, Professor Marx pointed out, in most complex activi-
ties, whether business, politics, or academia, there are legal grey areas
where secret investigations also could routinely unearth violations:
Those who get ahead in organizations are often those who
make things happen by breaking rules and cutting through red
tape. Rules are often general, contradictory, and open to varied
interpretations. As those in law enforcement bureaucracies
know too well, organizations have a vast number of rules which
are overlooked until a supervisor wants to nail someone."
17
Some of the new police undercover work has lost sight of the
profound difference between carrying out an investigation to determine
if a suspect is in fact breaking the law and carrying it out to determine
if an individual can be induced to break the law. As with God testing
Job, the question, "Is he corrupt?" was replaced with the question, "Is




418. Id. at 36.
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permitted Satan to test beyond endurance without any prior suspicion
of corruption.
Professor Marx made his plea for judicial warrants simply: "The
creation of a tempting opportunity and the actions of the undercover
person can affect conversation and behavior in ways that a hidden non-
human recording device never can. It is surprising that the former is
not regulated by the courts."4 19
As he saw it, politicians, for whom public reputation is central,
were particularly vulnerable to the unwarranted effects of undercover:
Damaging their reputation destroys their professional calling.
Involvement as a suspect in the apparatus of covert govern-
ment investigation cannot help but cast a shadow on a person's
reputation. To be secretely video-taped or tape-recorded and
then to have this made public will convey a presumption of
guilt to the uncritical. For the unprincipled it offers a tool for
character assassination.
4 0
But this essay argues that a public/private distinction points just the
opposite way to justify more easily exposing public officials as targets.
If random surveillance of public officials operating with the public
power were accepted, when publicized in a single instance, it would
connote nothing, much like an IRS audit today, by which we may be
chagrined but not shamed or damaged in reputation. When public offi-
cials' behavior is frequently sampled, no politician need be ashamed by
publicity of an integrity "audit." Heymann was moving in this direc-
tion when he suggested that one of Abscam's strengths was that the
Justice Department had targeted no one; the unwitting middlemen did
that.421 This separation from political or other improper motivation is
complete when targets are selected randomly. The opposite approach is
advocated by those like Professors Stone, Seidman, and Marx, who de-
mand a high predicate suspicion before initiating any such undercover
investigation.
Marx warned that unregulated power to test integrity at will of-
fered a means of slander, and opportunities for blackmail and coercion.
Incriminating information could be filed away as long as those impli-
cated continue to cooperate. Furthermore, employees required to re-
port illegal activities face double testing. Having rejected an under-
cover bribe, they may then be suspended for failing to report it.
422
Informers, "whose professional lives routinely require deceit, lying,
and covering up" were the "weakest link in undercover systems." They




422. Id. at 36-37.
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"whether out of self-interest or deeper psychological motives, some in-
formers undergo a transformation and become zealous super-cops cre-
ating criminals, or sniffing them out, using prohibited methods." More-
over, "the bridge to the truth is further weakened when informers draw
brokers or middlemen into the operation." In the end, "what police
need to have done but cannot themselves do legally, may be delegated
to others. The greater the restrictions on police, the greater the delega-
tion.' 4 23 Informers could be monitored, to some degree, observed the
sociologist, "but the crucial and generally unknowable issue is what
takes place off the tape recording.'
4 24
Furthermore, informers often commit their own crimes apart from
their role in law enforcement.
The informer-controller relationship is usually seen to involve
the latter exercising coercion over the former. Through a kind
of institutionalized blackmail, the threat of jail, or public de-
nouncement as an informer, is held in abeyance as long as co-
operation is forthcoming. What is less frequently realized is the
double-edged sword potential of such relationships. When not
able to hide criminal behavior, the skilled, or fortunately situ-
ated informer may be able to manipulate or coerce the control-
ler as well, with a kind of stand-off resulting.
425
The price of gaining informers' cooperation may be to ignore their rule
breaking. Beyond "this principled non-enforcement," these situations
lend themselves well to exploitation by informers for their own crimi-
nal ends. As Marx observed, "major cases may require the government
to deal with master con artists operating in their natural habitat. They
are likely to have a competitive edge over police.
'4 26
Professor Marx continued his penetrating look into the informant/
agent relationship:
Even more troubling are cases where informers can essentially
blackmail police into granting them permanent immunity. This
happens when a trial and related publicity would reveal dirty
tricks and illegality on the part of government agents, secret
sources, techniques of operation, projects or classified
information.
Undercover work offers greater risks and temptations to
the police involved. Undercover situations tend to be more
fluid and unpredictable than with routine patrol or investiga-
423. Id. at 37.
424. Id.
425. Id. at 38.
426. Id. A criminal may feel much more psychologically comfortable when he can
corrupt a respected figure. "Look at X; I can't be as rotten as I am made out to be."
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tive work. Undercover agents are removed from the usual con-
trols of a uniform, a badge, a visible supervisor, a fixed place of
work, radio or beeper calls and a delineated assignment. These
have both a literal and symbolic significance in reminding the
officer who he or she is.
Unlike conventional police work, the undercover agent
tends to deal only with criminals and is always carrying out
deception. A criminal environment and role models replace the
more usual environment. The agent is encouraged to pose as a
criminal. The ability to blend in and be liked and accepted, is
central to effectiveness. It also serves as an indication to the
agent that he or she is doing a good job. As positive personal
relationships develop the agent may experience guilt and
ambivalance may develop over the betrayal inherent in the de-
ceptive role being played. The work is very intense. The agent
is always "on." For some operatives the work becomes almost
addictive. The agent may come to enjoy the sense of power the
role offers and its protected contact with illegal activity.
Isolation from other contacts and the need to be liked and
accepted can have unintended consequences. "Playing the
crook" may increase cynicism and ambivalence about the po-
lice role and make it easier to rationalize the use of illegal and
immoral means, whether for the agency or corrupt goals. In his
novel Mother Night, Kurt Vonnegut tells us that "we are what
we pretend to be, so we must be careful about what we pretend
to be! '4
27
Bob Leuci's experience confirmed this. Marx is correct. A fre-
quently overlooked cost of undercover operations is the toll they take
on undercover agents themselves.
Marx continued:
The financial rewards from police corruption, particularly in
gambling and narcotics, can be great and chances for avoiding
detection rather good. Ironically, effectiveness and opportuni-
ties for corruption may often go hand in hand. Police supervi-
sors and lawbreakers may face equal difficulties in knowing
what undercover police persons are really up to.
428
Professor Marx shifted his focus to innocent third persons. Some-
times undercover businesses became hurtful competitors of legitimate
businesses. In other situations, "the most private and delicate of
human emotions and relationships were violated under the mantle of
427. Id. at 39.
428. Id.
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government deceit.' 2 9 He cited a case where an undercover agent, pen-
etrating the Weather Underground, got one of his targets pregnant and
convinced her to get an abortion, after which he was reassigned.3 0 Po-
lice undercover also indirectly harms innocent third parties as non-uni-
formed police impersonators increasingly prey upon an unsuspecting
public.
The sociologist offered a checklist of dimensions by which to con-
trast types of undercover operations:
1) Public or police initiated? Was an investigation launched in
response to a citizen complaint or manifest crime pattern on the one
hand or was it initiated by the police? "One of the liberty enhancing
aspects of the Anglo-American legal system is its historic tendency for
police to be mobilized in response to citizen complaints, rather than on
their own initiative. This is a function of the historical distrust of gov-
ernment and concern over abuses."''
2) Intelligent or random choice of targets? Were targets or loca-
tions chosen on the basis of intelligence or by random integrity test-
ing? Marx pointed out that traditionally, anti-crime decoy units were
deployed in response to an informant's tip or complaints of merchants,
wives whose husbands lost money gambling, or parents concerned
about temptation for minors. This "reactive" police behavior intro-
duced a degree of citizen control and limited police discretion. For Pro-
fessor Marx, "at one extreme and most troubling" were investigations
undertaken entirely at police initiative without grounds for suspicion
that crime was occurring: random integrity tests, or "trolling" for
would-be offenders with no predicate suspicion. 4 2 At the other ex-
treme, targets or locations were carefully chosen on the basis of crimi-
nal intelligence: Here the goal was to gather evidence and apprehend a
person thought to be criminally predisposed, rather than to see at what
point people would break the law if given a contrived chance.
3) Passive or active? Was the crime initiated by a self-selection
process where suspects came forward to seize available opportunities,
or did the police set the crime in motion? Was the undercover role
essentially passive or active? How active was it? Did the agent supply
the idea and plans for the crime, or particular expertise? Of course, all
429. Id. at 40.
430. Id.
431. Id. at 42. This essay argues that such a statement does not apply when the tar-
get is itself government already corruptly abusing its authority. Especially when the goal,
as in Archer, is to uncover ongoing corruption in the criminal justice system it is appro-
priate for uncorrupt government to initiate probes into corrupt government. Here the
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other things equal, the more passive the law enforcement role, the
fewer the problems.
4) Victim or co-conspirator? Did the undercover agent play a vic-
tim or a co-conspirator? Illegal initiative may come from a suspect and
the undercover agent plays a passive role; at the other extreme an
agent plays the willing partner who conspires with a target to break the
law. Examples of the former are the decoy park bench drunk waiting to
be rolled, or a garbage collection business awaiting attempts at extor-
tion. Assuming that the temptation offered by the decoy victim was
consistent with what was going on in the natural environment, the use
of a victim was less problematic.
Undercover opportunities structured so that those who criminally
exploit them must be predisposed, and those that involved the targets'
self-selection clearly were preferable to the government selecting who
was to be tempted and taking aggressive actions. Where government
agents pose as victims, self-selection is likely.
5) Natural or artificial? The more the undercover creation is a
part of the natural world, the less problematic: the less deception the
better. At the other extreme were the artificially contrived worlds of
Archer and Abscam.
6) Informer or Agent? Finally, for Professor Marx, all other
things equal, the undercover role should be played by police or inform-
ers rather than unwitting middlemen.
433
Marx wondered whether the FBI guidelines would be applied seri-
ously and rigorously, or, in typical bureaucratic fashion, come to be
applied as mere ritual.434 Monday morning quarter-backing from the
safety of the university or newsroom, far removed from responsibility
or first hand experience, was dangerous, the sociologist admitted. But
although the guidelines were a compromise between the needs of citi-
zens in a democratic society and the needs of law enforcement, there
was a decided tilt toward the latter.
Finally, in perhaps the most penetrating portion of his testimony,
Professor Marx discussed how Abscam type operations portend a long-
term "subtle and perhaps irreversible change in how social control in
our society is carried out. 43 5 Roughly a half century ago, Secretary of
State Henry Stimson opposed changes in national security practices,
observing that, "Gentlemen do not read each other's mail. 436 Today,
with routine surveillance and invasions of privacy, "his observation
seems touchingly quaint.
'437
Today, "we are experiencing a general shift away from the ideas
433. Id. at 43.
434. Id.
435. Id. at 45.
436. Id. at 46.
437. Id.
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central to the Anglo-American police tradition," warned Marx.3 8 The
modern English police system which America inherited was established
in 1829 to prevent crime by using a uniformed, visible, twenty-four-
hour presence.439 As social conditions changed and the deterrent effect
of this visible force diminished, an alternative conception of the police
function has gradually emerged.440
Authorities operating under controlled conditions with non-uni-
formed police now seek selectively to increase crime opportunities. An-
ticipatory police strategies have become more prominent. Secretly fa-
cilitating crime under controlled conditions offers control over the
"demand" for police services impossible with traditional reactive prac-
tices. Whenever a market is created rather than arising from a re-
sponse to citizen demand, there are dangers of exploitation and misuse.
Once undercover resources are provided and skills are developed, the
tactics may be used indiscriminately. Given pressures on police to pro-
duce, and the power of such tactics, it is an easy move forward from
targeted to indiscriminate use of integrity tests and from investigation
to instigation.
Professor Marx continued:
The allure and the power of undercover tactics may make them
irresistible. Just as any society that has discovered alcohol has
seen its use rapidly spread, once undercover tactics become le-
gitimate and resources are available for them, their use is likely
to spread to new areas and illegitimate uses. To some observers
the use of questionable or bad undercover means is neverthe-
less justified because it is used for good ends. Who after all
cannot be indignant over violations of the public trust on the
part of those sworn to uphold it. [But] there is no guarantee
that bad means will be restricted to good ends.
Fronu current practices we may not be far from activities
such as the following. Rather than infiltrating on-going crimi-
nal enterprises, or starting up their own pretend ones, police
agents (such as accounting specialists) might infiltrate legiti-
mate businesses to be sure they are obeying the law, or would
obey it if given a government engendered chance not to. In the
private sector husbands or wives, or those considering marriage
might hire attractive members of the opposite sex to test their
partner's fidelity. Businesses might create false fronts using
undercover agents to involve their competitors in illegal actions
438. Id.
439. See id. at 46. See also 4 L. RAuzNowicz, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH CRIMINAL LAW
158-67 (1968).
440. Oversight Hearings, supra note 153, at 46 (testimony of Prof. Gary Marx).
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for which they would then be arrested. A rival business could
be sabotaged by infiltrating disruptive workers . .441
Such techniques may be rationalized by a hope that they will have
a general deterrent effect, but while the costs and risks of illegality
may be increased, the committed criminals may simply become more
clever, and raise their rates.
"Law enforcement," observed Professor Marx, "is very different
from other forms of government service such as education, since we
self-consciously limit its effectiveness by balancing it against rights and
liberties. Simply put, we want law enforcement to be optimally, rather
than maximally, effective and efficient. '442 The spread of ever more so-
phisticated ruses and elaborate surveillance damages trust in a society.
"American society is fragmented enough without adding a new layer of
suspiciousness and distrust. The greater the public's knowledge of such
tactics the greater the distrust of individuals for one another.
'443
Free and open speech protected by the Bill of Rights may
be chilled for everyone. After Abscam, for example, people in
government cannot help but wonder who it is they are dealing
with. Communication may become more guarded and the free
and open dialogue traditionally seen as necessary in high levels
of government inhibited. Similar effects may occur in business
and private life.
4 4
In totalitarian countries undergoing liberalization a major demand
is the abolition of secret police and secret police tactics. "Fake docu-
ments, lies, subterfuge, infiltration, secret and intrusive surveillance,
and reality creation are not generally associated with United States law
enforcement. However, we may be taking small, but steady steps to-
ward the paranoia and suspiciousness that characterize many totalitar-
ian countries. '44 5 Once set in motion they become part of the culture,
and are not easily undone.
The cry of wolf is easy to utter and hence to dismiss. Liberty is
complex and multifaceted and in the context of democratic
government there are forces and counter-forces. Double-edged
swords are ever-present. Tactics which threaten liberties can
also be used to protect them.
However, neither complexity, sophistry, nor the need for
prudence in alarm sounding should blind us from seeing the
441. Id. at 46-47.
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implications of recent undercover work for the redefinition and
extension of government control. The issues raised by recent
police undercover actions go far beyond whether a given con-
gressman was predisposed to take a bribe or the development
of effective guidelines.
Such police actions are part of a process of the rationaliza-
tion of crime control that began in the 19th century. Social
control has gradually become more specialized and technical,
and in some ways more penetrating and intrusive. The state's
power to punish and to gather information has been extended
deeper into the social fabric, though not necessarily in a violent
way. We are seeing a shift in social control from direct coercion
used after the fact, to anticipatory actions involving deception,
manipulation and planning. New technocratic agents of social
control are replacing the rough and ready cowboys of an earlier
era.4
46
Professor Marx's warning is powerful and plausible. Every free-
dom-loving citizen must take it seriously. There are, however, impor-
tant distinctions which the sociologist refused to make, and his state-
ment was by its own admission one-sided, emphasizing the costs of
undercover and not its benefits.
Representative Hyde, the subcommittee's chief defender of the
technique, led the counterattack: Did Professor Marx recognize bene-
fits in testing people whose "vulnerability, susceptibility or accessibil-
ity" to criminal acts is high, e.g., a bank teller, a cashier at a racetrack.
"Do you see some therapeutic value to having them know that they're
being tested occasionally?
'447
Professor Marx replied, "First, it makes a difference whether or
not people are told that such tests will be a part of the conditions of
employment. I think when they're not told it is inappropriate to use
the tactic."'448 Marx had made an enormous concession, especially if a
distinction between public and private acts is adopted. It should be
understood by every public official, all who swear an oath of allegiance
to the United States Constitution, that as a condition of employment
they consent to surveillance of every use of public power.
Representative Hyde pressed Marx on the value of undercover
techniques. Would he outlaw them entirely because of their inherent
danger? No, conceded the sociologist, but they must be carefully super-
vised and should really only be tactics of last resort. "I think before
using them, one should ask the question: Is there an alternative way of
446. Id.
447. Id. at 62.
448. Id.
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getting this information? Is getting this information worth the risks
that, in fact, are there?"' 9
Hyde respectfully characterized Marx's presentation as "fascinat-
ing and well worth studying," but he did not perceive as realistic the
fear of an "omnipresent police presence . . . in this country."' 0
The next day Associate Deputy Attorney General Paul Michel,
who had played a key role in drafting the FBI guidelines, defended
them before the subcommittee. Michel labeled "impractical" critics
who urged that government must have probable cause to believe a par-
ticular individual had engaged in similar past crimes before offering
him a present opportunity."51 Investigations were "inherently and un-
avoidably evolutionary."'"52 They typically began with uncorroborated
suspicions, and progressed through partially corroborated suspicion
and ultimately to the point of probable cause to arrest and indict.
To require probable cause before we even take the investiga-
tive step of making an offer is to trap the FBI in a Catch 22. If
we already had probable cause of the past crime, we could sim-
ply make an arrest and prosecute for that past crime. In fact,
the very need for making the offer is to convert some reasona-
ble indication of criminality into strong and clear evidence that
would amount to probable cause.
453
Nor was "reasonable suspicion" an appropriate prior requirement if
that denoted some degree of certitude that a particular individual was
involved.4"
Michel emphasized the role of "judgment," which precluded rigid
rules and guidelines in these investigations. For example, while it was
advisable to record conversations between cooperating middlemen and
targets, a per se rule would be defeating: "[A] wary criminal could then
insist on face to face meetings and search the intermediary, knowing
that if the suspected middleman is cooperating with the government he
will be wearing recording equipment, and if he is not, he cannot possi-
bly be cooperating with the FBI.'' 455 In short, experience had led the
designers of the guidelines to conclude that "unlike the domestic secur-
ity context, in the undercover context, it was neither feasible, nor de-
sirable or necessary, to have categorical prohibitions.'
56
The sharpest questioning came from Subcommittee Chairman Ed-
449. Id. at 64.
450. Id. at 65.
451. Id. at 83 (testimony of Assoc. Atty. Gen. Paul R. Michel).
452. Id.
453. Id. at 84.
454. Id.
455. Id. at 90.
456. Id. at 106.
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wards and Assistant Counsel Cooper. To Edwards' concern about con-
trolling an unwitting middleman like Errichetti, Michel replied, "There
is no way we can stop them. And we didn't start them. He was already
out there doing that .... We didn't put him into that business, and
we're not in a position to put him out of that business.
457
"Is it worth it?" asked Cooper, "Do undercover operations really
produce results which justify all the intrusions and risks that the
guidelines so well identify?"
"It's not even a close question," replied Michel, "they were clearly
worthwhile."
"Why do you think that our undercover operations are effective in
controlling crime?" Cooper pressed.
Michel answered:
I don't mean to be flip, but in a sense, the answer could be
because they put people in jail, and they do it better than
other techniques. They do it better because the odds of convic-
tion are even higher. They do it better because the odds of pre-
trial motions resulting in the case never getting to an adjudica-
tion of guilt or innocence are vastly reduced. They do it better
because they focus on major actors and criminal enterprises by
stripping away the layers that ordinarily insulate those actors
from effective investigative pursuit.
4 58
The Associate Deputy Attorney General noted here his disagree-
ment with those who found undercover operations most intrusive. On
the contrary, asserted Michel, "they are far less intrusive than most
other significant techniques." Wire tapping was
far more intrusive. The wire tap gets everybody who uses the
telephone. It gets every conversation. It's inherently indiscrimi-
nate. An undercover operation doesn't normally get into some-
body's political or religious beliefs. When people come to our
sting operations, or other operations, they come to talk about
crime. We don't get involved ... in peripheral aspects of their
life.
45 9
"But," conceded Michel, "crime fighting is inherently a little bit of
a messy business,' 464 and in the end crime fighters must take certain
risks and engage in somewhat unsavory practices with unsavory mid-
dlemen and informants who will "exaggerate or fabricate or do crazy
457. Id. at 95.
458. Id. at 108.
459. Id.
460. Id. at 109.
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things themselves," but "you try to hedge your bet.'4'1
What was out of bounds for the government? Chariman Edwards
focused upon section B(f) of the proposed guidelines which forbade a
local supervising agent to initiate an undercover operation where an
agent or informant will give sworn testimony in an undercover capac-
ity.46 2 "Do you mean," demanded the Subcommittee Chairman, "that
in some cases, the witness might be testifying under oath, without re-
vealing his real identity?" The purpose of the section required that
such a decision be made by headquarters, replied Michel. Chairman
Edwards pressed: "Well, under any circumstances, could the witness be
authorized to commit perjury?
463
Michel's reply revealed how significant and unfortunate was the
stain of Judge Friendly's first Archer opinion and how ineffective as a
stain remover was the subsequent state vindication of the technique: "I
think that the answer to that, under the Archer cases and other cases,
is basically no.
' '4"
Later Cooper returned to these "sensitive circumstances" listed in
section B of the guidelines.
Sensitive circumstances are not prohibitions and therefore, it
leaves the possibility that any one of these sensitive circum-
stances can be approved.... Now when the chairman asked
you about the Archer situation, about the possibility of an un-
dercover employee perjuring himself, you indicated that you
thought that that could not, . . .that was against the princi-
ples of the case, and therefore, could not be approved. Are
there any other circumstances listed here that you think fall
into that category? ...
Even among experts who argued against per se rules, Archer had
been misperceived, and had come to stand as an absolute and proper
prohibition of an undercover agent's making a false statement under
oath.
The Associate Attorney General-representing the national Exec-
utive-emphasized, "successful crime fighting ultimately requires ac-
ceptance of our work by the courts, including the appellate courts
which review convictions we obtain, and by the Congress which annu-
ally appropriates funds we need and affords us authority for our
activities.' 46 6
461. Id.
462. Id. at 103.
463. Id.
464. Id.
465. Id. at 112.
466. Id. at 83.
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Abscam was under attack by thoughtful experts testifying before
Congress, by New Jersey's former federal prosecutors crying foul, and
by Judge Fullam who had overturned Jannotti's convictions, holding
the techniques entrapping and fundamentally unfair, outrageous gov-
ernmental overreach. Those techniques aimed at corrupt public offi-
cials had been stained, perhaps permanently, by misapprehensions of
Archer, which Judge Friendly did not remove with his second Archer
opinion of April, 1981.
The technique's fate looked bleak when on July 24, Judge George
C. Pratt, before whom most of the major Abscam defendants had been
tried, issued his detailed opinion, United States v. Myers.6 7 At this
critical moment, had Myers been another scathing denunciation of the
investigation and its techniques, it might have spelled an end to effec-
tive federal anticorruption efforts for a long time to come. Instead, de-
nying on every ground all the defendants' motions to have their convic-
tions dismissed, Judge Pratt's unequivocal support for the investigative
techniques reversed the momentum and evened the score.
In familiar fashion the judge reviewed the Supreme Court's quar-
tet of decisions on due process/entrapment, that "difficult, concep-
tually slippery and philosophically controversial concept." '68 He sum-
marized Hampton: "three judges would make predisposition the only
issue; three judges would eliminate predisposition entirely; and the de-
cisive two concurring votes ... indicate that predisposition is not only
relevant but will be dispositive in all but the 'rare' case where police
over-involvement in the crime reaches 'a demonstrable level of
outrageousness.' ,,469
Regardless of his personal preferences, Judge Pratt, like Judge
Fullam, a lower federal court judge, was bound by honest analysis of
doctrine:
Until further word from the Supreme Court, therefore, as a
matter of strict legal precedent, this court must assume that
while the subjective view of entrapment is the general guide, it
is nevertheless subject to an overriding exception that under
either the court's supervisory power or the due process clause,
a predisposed defendant cannot be convicted if police over-in-
volvement in his crime reaches "a demonstrable level of
outrageousness. "470
But "[n]o clear standard had evolved" as to exactly what conduct
467. 527 F. Supp. 1206 (E.D.N.Y. 1981), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 692 F.2d 823 (2d
Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 2438 (1983).
468. Id. at 1220.
469. Id. at 1221.
470. Id. at 1222.
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by law enforcement was "outrageous. ' '471 Judge Pratt cited leading
cases (including Archer) from various federal appeals courts revealing
several important factors, twenty-two of which he listed. These
included:
1. Did the government agents initiate or instigate the criminal
activity? 2. Was the government's participation essential to the
crime? ... 4. Was the activity of the government agent, when
viewed alone, criminal? 5. How easy or difficult is the job of
law enforcement officers in combatting the kind of criminal ac-
tivity involved? 6. Do the police need to use the kinds of tac-
tics utilized in order to effectively detect the crime? 7. Did the
government provide the instruments or implements to commit
the crime? ... 14. Did the government's agents perjure them-
selves by false reports to the police, to a judge, or to a grand
jury?... 19. How important was the crime and its detection
in the overall social scheme? . . .472
Applying these factors, Judge Pratt rejected the defendants'
claims that their indictments should be dismissed because the under-
cover operation created crime rather than uncovered it. Government
agents had created an opportunity, "[b]ut their involvement falls far
short of being 'outrageous' for two reasons," observed the judge.
In the first place, each of the legislators could simply have said
"no" to the offer. Second, the extent of governmental involve-
ment here is far less than that in Hampton .... [W]here the
government was active on both sides of a narcotics sale, the
Supreme Court did not consider the agents' conduct to be
"outrageous"; a fortiori, here where the agents acted only on
one side, by offering money to congressmen in return for fa-
vors, the involvement of the undercover agents was not
"outrageous. ' 47 3
In a footnote Judge Pratt suggested that "[a] closer analogy to Hamp-
ton would be if the FBI, in order to prosecute the middlemen Criden
and Errichetti, had not only offered the bribe money, but also supplied




As to target selection, "the constitution does not require reasona-
ble suspicion before a congressman may be made the subject of an un-
dercover sting.'' 47 5 Judge Pratt here supported Heymann's view that
passive selection was a strength:
471. Id.
472. Id. at 1223.
473. Id- at 1225.
474. Id. at 1225 n.15.
475. Id. at 1226.
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The agents did not set out to offer bribes to any particular con-
gressman. They set no standards, established no criteria. In-
stead, the middlemen ...carried the word that money was
there for the taking by any congressman who would promise to
give legislative aid to the sheik's need for asylum in the United
States.
Weinberg had accurately characterized it: "We put out the word that
money was available, we had a honey pot and the flies came.
476
Nor did Judge Pratt find the inducements which the government
offered the defendants
overwhelming, designed to overpower their otherwise adequate
resistance and to induce honest and innocent people to commit
a crime they would normally avoid .... Certainly none of
these defendants were in the position Judge Fullam found Jan-
notti and Schwartz to be in: "either take the bribe or lose the
investment for your community.
'477
He further analyzed the nature of improper inducements:
While there may be "inducements" that are "overwhelming,"
such as a threat against the life of a loved one, when the in-
ducement is nothing but money or other personal gain, this
court does not believe that the size of the inducement should
be a determinative factor in whether a public official can be
prosecuted for accepting it. No matter how much money is of-
fered to a government official as a bribe or gratuity, he should
be punished if he accepts. It may be true, as has been sug-
gested to the court, that "every man has his price"; but when
that price is money only, the public official should be required
to pay the penalty when he gets caught. In short, as a matter
of law, the amount of the financial inducements here could
not render the agents' conduct outrageous or
unconstitutional.
478
In Jannotti Judge Fullam had rejected any such per se approach,
but Judge Pratt was correct at least in finding that "in these inflation-
ary times, $50,000 is simply not an overpowering sum of money. -The
agents sought to keep the bribes reasonable and realistic in light of all
the circumstances. 479 Although Myers' inducement in these circum-
476. Id.
477. Id. at 1227.
478. Id. at 1227-28 (emphasis added).
479. Id. at 1228.
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stances was not outrageous, some financial inducements may be outra-
geous by virtue of their size.
Perhaps Judge Pratt's most significant contribution in Myers was
his support for the investigative tactics, because bribery was serious
and difficult to detect.
"Although discovered and prosecuted less frequently than drug
trafficking, political corruption through bribery is regrettably found
among public officials, not only in this country but abroad ....
[C]learly it is not simply a 'sporadic, isolated criminal incident.' "480
Like drug offenses, bribery is difficult to detect. Both are "victimless
crimes" in the sense that no one with knowledge of the usual transac-
tions has a motive to report the illegality to law enforcement officials.
Moreover, with bribery, nothing more is required than the
quick passing of money in return for a promise of performance
by the public official of an act that appears to be an appropri-
ate part of his public duties. With drug deals, at least one part
of the transaction is clearly illegal-the contraband. With brib-
ery both parts of the transaction are apparently legitimate: 1)
money; and 2) actions by public officials. Detecting bribery,
therefore, is probably even more difficult than detecting drug
offenses.
Some would say, however, that mere difficulty of detection
does not create a need for undercover, infiltrating tactics such
as were used in Abscam. More is needed, specifically a serious
harm to society, and there are those who would argue that
bribery and corruption in our public officials should be viewed
with a tolerant "boys will be boys" attitude. This argument the
court rejects categorically. Honesty, integrity, truthfulness and
sincerity are essential qualities for effective leadership in our
society. Tolerance of corruption has no place here. The cyni-
cism and hypocrisy displayed by corrupt officials, pretending
to serve the public good, but in fact furthering their own pri-
vate gain, probably pose a greater danger to this country than
all of the drug traffickers combined. Corrupt leaders not only
betray their constituents, but also contribute to a moral decay
in American society that many view as the forerunner of eco-
nomic, political and social disaster.
This court believes that the great majority of government
officials, including those in Congress, are honest, hard-working,
dedicated and sincere. However, the government needs to have
available the weapons of undercover operations, infiltration of
bribery schemes, and "sting" operations such as Abscam in or-
480. Id. at 1229 (quoting United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 432 (1973)).
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der to expose those officials who are corrupt, to deter others
who might be tempted to be corrupt, and perhaps most impor-
tantly to praise by negative example those who are honest and
square-dealing. Without the availability of such tactics, only
rarely would the government be able to expose and prosecute
bribery and other forms of political corruption. 8'
Near the end of his lengthy opinion Judge Pratt attacked the New
Jersey Federal Prosecutors, who, he accused, had taken
a negative view of everything about Abscam. They acted as if
they had convinced themselves that the highest duties of a
prosecutor were to manufacture arguments for defendants, to
follow an ultra-cautious approach, and to be skeptical of all
new investigative techniques. Throughout. . . they urged the
Justice Department to move more cautiously and slowly. In-
deed, they did not want to move at all until every possible flaw
in the investigation could be meticulously checked.
Of course, the government must not infringe the constitu-
tional rights of any of its citizens, and New Jersey's abstract,
cautious approach to law enforcement activities has great ap-
peal in some circles of government, of law, and of academia.
But such hesitation and caution is unrealistic in the practical
hurly-burly of a fast moving investigation that would not wait
for lengthy reflection, but instead demanded immediate deci-
sions, aggressive attention, and imaginative, courageous re-
sponses to rapid developments.
48 2
This was criticism calculated to sting, and while it detracts some-
what from the detached sentiments which make up most of this inci-
sive opinion, the judge's frustration shows. "If all federal prosecutors
were as hesitant to proceed in the uncharted Abscam waters as was the
New Jersey office, federal law enforcement in this country would be
about as effective as was New Jersey's with the New Jersey Abscam
people-i.e., there would be few, if any, indictments."' 83
"There is no perfect case," observed Judge Pratt, and this was no
exception, but all in all, Abscam did the government credit. The "de-
fendants' crass conduct here reveals only greed, dishonesty and corrup-
tion" and their "major defense has been that they were tricked into
committing the crime on videotape." By contrast, although "the gov-
ernment's conduct of the investigation was not flawless," it "reflects a
moderate, fair, careful approach to an undercover investigation which
481. 527 F. Supp. at 1229 (emphasis added).
482. Id. at 1246.
483. Id.
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suddenly and unexpectedly proved effective in uncovering corruption
in Congress. '484 Responding the next day, New Jersey Prosecutor Del
Tufo contended that the judge had a "warped" view of a prosecutor's
proper role.
48 5
Judge Pratt respectfully addressed Judge Fullam's Jannotti con-
demnation of Abscam: "Judge Fullam was obviously influenced
strongly by the tenuous connection between the Philadelphia trial
events and federal jurisdiction, and he expressly disapproved the 'arti-
ficial federalization of purely state crimes.' ,,486 Furthermore, said
Judge Pratt, the Philadelphia defendants had
made no commitment that they would be influenced in their
decisions. Indeed, they were so anxious to have the sheik con-
struct his hotel complex in the city that the mere offer to make
such an investment would have guaranteed any reasonable var-
iances required. Defendants had not requested the bribe pay-
ments and they made it clear that such payments were
unnecessary.
487
This sharply contrasted with bribery cases of United States congress-
men where there were "direct violations of federal law by federal offi-
cials" and therefore "unquestioned federal jurisdiction."48 8 In Myers,
there were no threats by the sheik's representatives, nor a great em-
phasis on the Arab mind. "Moreover, unlike the case involving the
Philadelphia councilmen, the Congressmen here were presented with a
clear request that their official conduct be influenced in a manner that
would otherwise not occur.'
480
The large sums,
the fact that the councilmen were not asked to act improperly
but only to do what they would have done anyway, and the
threat that if they did not take the money there would be no
project, all combined in Judge Fullam's view to preclude the
mere acceptance of the money as sufficient evidence of
predisposition. 90
Furthermore, since Judge Fullam was sitting in the Third Circuit,
he was governed by Twigg, which had set aside a conviction because of
484. Id. at 1251.
485. N.Y. Times, July 26, 1981, at 24, col. 1.
486. 527 F. Supp. at 1243 (quoting United States v. Jannotti, 501 F. Supp. 1182, 1204
(E.D. Pa. 1980)).
487. 527 F. Supp. at 1243.
488. Id.
489. Id. at 1244.
490. Id.
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the government's overreaching and creative involvement in a crime.4 91
But Twigg did not govern Judge Pratt, who was sitting in the Second
Circuit. The closest the Second Circuit had come to invoking govern-
mental outrageousness in corruption or other cases was Archer, where
it had flirted with but not actually utilized the due process defense.
4 92
Judge Pratt, however, was unwilling to argue away all possible in-
consistencies between Judge Fullam's and his own approach to Ab-
scam's undercover techniques: "To the extent that Judge Fullam found
due process violations in the undercover agents offering bribe proposals
in the absence of 'suspected ongoing corrupt activities on the part of
the targeted officials' this court respectfully disagrees.14 9  "If Judge
Fullam's opinion should properly be read to be grounded on outra-
geous governmental conduct because the undercover agents initiated
bribe offers and provided extremely generous financial inducements,
then this court again disagrees .... Judge Fullam's premise that pro-
viding 'extremely generous financial inducements' offends due process,
is, respectfully, unsound.
'49 4
Judge Pratt buttressed his claim with some challenging logic:
If the courts were to establish a threshold amount beyond
which no public official could be convicted of bribery, the rich
and the powerful, those most likely to be in a position to de-
mand large bribes, would automatically have the benefit of this
defense and the crime of bribery as we know it would become
the poor public official's burden. There can be no per se
amount at which a bribe offer becomes so generous as to con-
stitute entrapment as a matter of law .... [A] per se rule with
respect to the size of monetary inducement is illogical, unwork-
able, and unfair.
49 5
But Judge Fullam had not argued for a per se rule as to a dollar
amount; rather, the fluid market price of real corruption should deter-
mine the rough range of permissible governmental inducements in
sham schemes. If the rich and powerful are in control of key segments
of public authority, then presumably they will set their price high, in
which case the government may offer correspondingly higher induce-
ments. But honest public officials possessed of common human frail-
ties, who would remain "clean" by pricing themselves out of the cor-
rupt market, must be protected from government investigations which
491. See supra note 341.
492. See supra text accompanying notes 92-94.
493. 527 F. Supp. at 1244 (quoting United States v. Jannotti, 501 F. Supp. at 1204).
494. 527 F. Supp. at 1245 (quoting United States v. Jannotti, 501 F. Supp. at 1204).
495. 527 F. Supp. at 1245.
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create an artificial market and thereby corrupt the otherwise
uncorruptible.
On August 13, Judge Pratt sentenced Representatives Murphy,
Myers and Lederer each to three years in prison. Angelo Errichetti got
six years.49
At this point, the United States Supreme Court was offered a per-
fect opportunity to address the problems of entrapment and due pro-
cess where the federal government created carefully monitored simula-
tions directed against local corruption without prior suspicion as to
particular defendants. The narrow issue which Judge Friendly had
identified as undecided in his 1981 Archer opinion-whether due pro-
cess could prohibit prosecution although the outrageous law enforce-
ment conduct was not directly inflicted upon the defendant-was
presented to the Court by the defendant Archer. But on October 5,
1981, the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari, and formally
ended the Archer legal saga, declining to utilize a decade of experience
and erase the stain.
4 s7
On December 22, 1981, Judge Pratt decided that United States
Senator Harrison Williams' conviction had not violated due process.
498
Williams had advanced mostly the same arguments as the Myers de-
fendants. His predisposition was in slightly greater doubt. In Myers,
Judge Pratt had declared the jury "virtually compelled" to find each
congressional defendant guilty. 99 In Williams, however, there was "ex-
tensive evidence at trial from which the jury could properly find pre-
disposition. While the court does not agree with the government's
characterization of that evidence'as 'overwhelming,' it does view the
evidence as sufficient to support the jury's findings beyond a reasona-
ble doubt that both defendants were predisposed.
5 0 0
Williams added another wrinkle or two to Myers. For example,
the Senator claimed that the 'pre' in 'predisposition' require[d] as a
matter of law that a defendant's inclination to commit a crime must
exist before he ha[d] any contact with government agents."50 1 As a
matter of entrapment doctrine, if accepted, this would require the jury
to
496. Id. at 1206.
497. Archer v. Commissioner of Corrections, 646 F.2d 22 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 454
U.S. 851 (1981).
498. United States v. Williams, 529 F. Supp. 1085 (E.D.N.Y. 1981), afl'd, 705 F.2d
603 (2d Cir.), cert. denied 104 S. Ct. 524 (1983). Based on an in-depth analysis of the
trial court record, Judge Pratt found evidence of Williams' predisposition sufficient for
the jury to conclude that the government's behavior was not so outrageous as to make
predisposition irrelevant. 529 F. Supp. at 1094-1102.
499. United States v. Myers, 527 F. Supp. 1206 (E.D.N.Y. 1981), aff'd in part, rev'd
in part, 692 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 2438 (1983).
500. 529 F. Supp. at 1096.
501. Id. (emphasis added).
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focus not upon the time when the crime was committed, but
upon the time when the government's investigation began. On
a conceptual level, the court rejects this argument. The rele-
vant time for determining predisposition cannot be so precisely
focused. Evidence of everything that happened before final
completion of the crime was relevant. 2
As to the infamous coaching incident, at trial Williams had
claimed that he paid little attention to Weinberg's coaching. 03 Now,
after conviction on appeal with new counsel he was claiming that
Weinberg had overwhelmed him. His own earlier unequivocal sworn
testimony to the contrary destroyed his argument.
Not only FBI agents testified for the government; Sandy Williams
also testified against his former friend. Most damaging to all the Ab-
scam defendants were the tapes. The Senator's counsel "grudgingly ac-
knowledged" that according to prevailing Supreme Court doctrine,
consensual recordings were not subject to fourth amendment restric-
tions.50' Senator Williams' new counsel argued, however, that in this
case, because so many tapes had been used, their cumulative effect be-
came unreasonable and therefore unconstitutional.50 5
Judge Pratt not only rejected this argument, "as wanting in logic
as it is unsound in principle," he scoffed at it: "A cynic might charac-
terize defendants' argument as urging that while a little 'truth' is per-
missible, large quantities of 'truth' are unconstitutional.""5 6 It did seem
a desperate last move of a definitely guilty person.
A little more than two months after the judge rejected the Sena-
tor's apparently silly claim, however, linguist Roger Shuy, in testimony
before the House subcommittee suggested that too many tapes might
very well "swamp" the truth.507 The jury becomes inundated with data.
Cases involving many tapes of many people over long periods of time
lead to a tremendous overload of information. 508 Eventually, swamping
"causes jurors and the layman in general to give up and say, 'well, it
can't be figured out, I'll just have to make my best guess.' ,,509
Shuy, who had appeared as an expert witness on language issues in
several federal courts in criminal cases, exposed the House members to
a hidden world of meaning and purpose within conversation. "Some
rather simple and obvious principles go right by the layman some-
502. Id.
503. Id. at 1098.
504. Id. at 1094.
505. Id.
506. Id.
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times, such as a person's agenda in a conversation to do a certain thing
or say a certain thing. The number of times he recycles that topic is a
clear indication of his agenda." 510 The simple assumption that "the
tapes speak for themselves" was in a sense quite dangerous.""
"In normal everyday conversation, [the listener is] expected to
give feedback to the person who is talking." Without such feedback,
speakers will soon stop talking on the topic and ask if the other person
understands or is listening. The most commonly used signals for such
feedback are what linguists call lax-tokens. The positive lax-tokens
usually take the form of un-huh, alright, yeah, or ok, but other words,
such as right, are also lax-tokens in quality. Since the function of the
lax-token is to provide feedback to the speaker, its meaning, though
positive, "cannot be taken as agreement." Yet prosecutors, courts, and
juries often mistake these as agreement.
1 2
If an indictment is made on the basis of a presumed agreement
when, in fact, the response meant "I hear you, keep talking," a false
indictment has been made. In matters involving guilt or innocence, the
FBI should be certain that the target's response is a fuli token such as
"I agree," "That's right," "I'm with you," or "You have my agree-
ment," "It's a deal," or even yes followed by another positive marker
such as "Yes, of course" or "Yes, that's right." To be completely unam-
biguous in what the target means, a true positive response must be
obtained."" Shuy insisted that the FBI had manipulated the taped
conversations to produce false appearances of corrupt agreement where
there was no real agreement.
"Securing the appearance of agreement" was only the first of
seven distinct FBI manipulative strategies that Shuy identified. The
others were coaching; camouflaging, i.e., making something important
or visible seem unimportant or invisible; criminalizing, i.e. translating
perfectly legal terms or concepts used by the target into terms or con-
cepts which are illegal or covert; blocked exculpatory statements; in-
sider-outsider by which a person's natural desire not to appear igno-
rant or belligerent to an event which the others may have agreed to,
tends to cause the targets to "go along" with something about which
they may know very little; and finally, culture language difference
strategy, where the target is forced to tolerate and treat with politeness
and dignity rather than with scorn the strange speech and actions of
foreigners. 54
Shuy went into detail, illustrating how each of these strategies had
510. Id. at 79.
511. Id.
512. Id. at 79, 81.
513. Id. at 81.
514. Id. at 81-89.
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been employed against Senator Williams. The last, the culture lan-
guage difference strategy, was perhaps the most insidious linguistic
trap. "You are more polite and more tolerant of the inarticulateness
and garbled speech of the foreigner. That is, when standard speakers
converse with nonstandard English-speakers, the latter are given ac-
commodations. ' 515 When skilled government agents posing as Arabs
used words like deal for transaction, or buy a pardon for obtain a par-
don, the temptation of the target is to excuse such usage as the best
the speaker could do, even if inappropriate.
516
Shuy summed up and concluded:
[Ilt may be true, as Paul Michel has observed in previous testi-
mony, that the honest man simply rejects the offer and de-
parts. For the man who is unlucky enough to be indicted for a
lax token agreement rather than a true agreement, Mr.
Michel's statement may not be so true.
If the offer has been camouflaged into looking like some-
thing quite different and the man is indicted, the statement
may not hold water. If the man has been coached or scripted to
say something other than he intended, and then is indicted,
the truth of the statement is in question.
If the man's honest intentions are criminalized through
contamination of the agent's language, and he is then indicted,
the statement is not true. If the man attempts to utter excul-
patory statements that are blocked by the agents, and then the
man is indicted, Mr. Michel's statement has no truth in it.
If the man is isolated from the information which others
have and succumbs to group pressure to go along with the
others and gets indicted for it, the truth of the statement is
questionable.
If the man is confused by the garbled language of a nonna-
tive speaking agent and does not catch the subtleties of the
garbled speech and is indicted as a result, the truth of Mr.
Michel's observation is nil.
517
Representative Kastenmeier, who found the testimony "fascinat-
ing," couldn't help but interrupt with some questions: "Is it your view
that the Justice Department and its agents ... consc[iously] under-
stand the strategy that you have analyzed? ' 518 Shuy replied:
No, I would not make that assumption. I think that people are
515. Id. at 88.
516. Id.
517. Id. at 89-90.
518. Id. at 90.
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able to use language without a conscious awareness of how they
do it. That's one of the more fascinating things about language,
that we all have conversational strategies, and we apply them
to all situations, but we are usually not aware of how we do it,
any more than we are aware of how we walk as we walk.
So, I would not want to say that it's a conscious strategy.
It perhaps is. I don't know. But I don't have any way of deter-
mining that. 19
Whatever else, Shuy had undercut the assumption that the "tapes
speak for themselves."
Meanwhile, Janotti's appeal had been argued before a three-judge
panel of the Third Circuit on June 10, 1981.520 Almost certainly the
vote was 2-1 to affirm Judge Fullam's dismissal of the convictions, but
Judge Sloviter must have urged the circuit to hear the case en banc.
The appeal was reargued before a larger panel on November 23, 1981,
and on February 11, 1982, the Third Circuit sitting en banc became the
first appellate court to decide an Abscam case. 21 Judge Sloviter, the
lone dissenter in the first three-judge panel, had attracted six new ad-
herents in the nine-judge panel which now voted 7-2 to reverse Judge
Fullam and reinstate Jannotti's conviction. Writing for the majority,
Judge Sloviter reviewed the facts of Abscam's Philadelphia phase,
quoting extensively from the tapes, and reversing Judge Fullam's legal
conclusions, point by point.
The federal appellate court rejected the district court's holding
that an actual potential effect on interstate commerce was a jurisdic-
tional prerequisite to federal prosecution for a conspiracy to violate the
Hobbs Act.5 22 Congress' power reached activities "affecting" interstate
commerce; and when Schwartz and Jannotti each agreed with the
sheik's representatives, their agreement was criminal although impossi-
ble to fulfill. The majority declared it "irrelevant that the ends of the
conspiracy were from the very inception of the agreement objectively
unattainable. ' ' 23 As long as defendants would have affected commerce
had they acted as they thought possible, a sufficient federal interest
existed to prosecute.
The dissenters attacked this reasoning as the "essential flaw in the
majority's opinion. '5 24 The majority was confused; it interwove its ju-
risdiction argument with the well known principle of criminal law that
519. Id.
520. United States v. Jannotti, 673 F.2d 578 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1106
(1982).
521. Id. at 591.
522. Id.
523. Id. (citations omitted).
524. Id. at 626 (Aldisert, J., dissenting).
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"factual impossibility of completing a substantive offense does not bar
a conviction of conspiracy. They confuse proof of the crime of conspir-
acy with the jurisdictional power to punish the crime.
525
The majority and dissent in Jannotti agreed that Archer was a
leading instance of artificially created federal jurisdiction. The major-
ity held, after a lengthy analysis, that Archer was different from Ab-
scam. 52 Archer rejected federal jurisdiction not because Salvatore
Barone was unreal but, quoting Judge Friendly, because the interstate
element, the phone calls, was "insufficient to transform a 'federally
provoked incident of local corruption into a crime against the United
States.' "527 In Archer, "the phone calls were purposely made in order
to create an interstate element for what would otherwise have been
merely a local crime.
528
On the other hand, as the dissent forcefully pointed out: Why
should the defendants' misperceptions have any bearing on the logi-
cally prior question of the power of the federal government to punish
their acts? The government's
argument obliquely concedes that the fantasies of federal
agents cannot alone create federal jurisdiction, but then moves
without logical support to a conclusion that belief by a listener
can somehow convert a speaker's fancy into fact. I reject the
government's theory that building castles in the air somehow
confers federal jurisdiction on the ground.52 9
The dissent agreed with the district court that the evidence did not
establish federal jurisdiction:
The Hobbs Act contemplates conspiracies that have at least a
realistic probability of affecting interstate commerce. A purely
hypothetical effect, a fairy tale conjured by the FBI's answer to
the Brothers Grimm, is not "a sufficient threat to [commerce]
so as to give rise to federal jurisdiction.". . . Cf. United States
v. Archer, 486 F.2d 670, 681-82 (2d Cir. 1973) (Friendly, J.)
530
The disagreement over entrapment and the constitutional right to
due process was deeper than that over jurisdiction, and the dissent
more fervent. The jury had found Jannotti predisposed. In deciding
525. Id.
526. Id.
527. Id. at 610 (quoting United States v. Archer, 486 F.2d 670, 683 (2d Cir. 1973)).
528. Id. at 611 (quoting United States v. Gambino, 566 F.2d 414, 419 (2d Cir. 1977),
cert. denied, 435 U.S. 952 (1978)).
529. Id. at 625 (Aldisert, J., dissenting).
530. Id. at 626 (quoting United States v. Feola, 420 U.S. 671, 695 (1975)) (citation
omitted).
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whether to overturn that verdict, the appellate majority declared that
Judge Fullam
must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the pros-
ecution, [and] .. .viewing the evidence in this light, the trial
court must uphold the jury's verdict unless no reasonable jury
could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant
was predisposed to commit the offense for which he was
convicted. 8 1
Examining the evidence, the majority found that "[e]ven if the dollar
amount offered were relevant to disprove predisposition, a question
which we do not decide," $10,000, considering Jannotti's circumstances,
was not necessarily overwhelming. The Jannotti majority endorsed
Judge Pratt's statement in Myers that "$50,000 is simply not an over-
powering sum of money. '532 Judge Fullam's "overturning the jury's
resolution of this issue was plainly an intrusion on the jury's preroga-
tive.' 83 3 Repeatedly, the majority chastised the trial judge for having
overstepped his proper bounds, "impermissibly substituting" his judg-
ment for the jury's, "usurping" their proper function to decide:
This case is unique in that through the videotape the jury
could observe the entire criminal transaction. . . . [They]
could observe the amount of pressure, overt or tacit, if any,
placed on the defendants to accept the bribes. In short, this
jury had in its hands some of the most valuable tools possible
with which to conduct its inquiry into the state of mind of each
defendant, the crucial factor in an entrapment defense.
534
Therefore, "the district court's substitution of its view of the evidence
in deciding that as a matter of law there could be no predisposition
represented an unfortunate usurpation of the jury's prerogative.
'53 5
"Passionate" was how the majority too tepidly characterized the
dissent. If the majority strongly rebuked Judge Fullam, the dissent
more strongly castigated the executive and supported the judge. First
the dissent stated "fundamental and irreconcilable differences" be-
tween it and the majority. Then Judge Aldisert, joined by Judge Weis,
came out blazing:
The majority opinion reads like a paean to the FBI for its con-
duct in this case; but as an American citizen and as a federal
judge, I find that conduct revolting.
531. 673 F.2d at 598.
532. Id. at 599.
533. Id.
534. Id. at 604.
535. Id. at 602.
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The FBI has a long and proud history. It has earned the
admiration and respect of the American people for its effi-
ciency and fairness .... But like all human institutions it is
subject to the frailties of man .... The chief deterrent
[against agents' abberational behavior has been] the resolve
shared by agents, judges, and the public that the FBI not be-
come an American version of the secret police so infamous in
many countries.53
Like all "judges [we] come to our robes bearing the stigmata of our
respective experiences." Judge Aldisert recalled his immigrant father's
abhorrence of secret police, and worst of all the "agent provocateur, a
person employed to pretend sympathy with members of a group and
incite them to illegal action, and thus to expose them to apprehension
and punishment.
5 3 7
"From my childhood I remember stories told in broken English by
gnarled refugees from Russia, the Ukraine, and Poland, recounting in
graphic detail the abuses inflicted upon them in peasant villages by the
Ochrana, the secret police of the Czar. . . ." That was followed by "the
dreaded secret police of the Stalinist era."538
The apogee of government artifice, guile, and deceit was
reached with the formation of the Gestapo in Nazi Germany.
The story of the Holocaust is an account of the agent provo-
cateur at his ruthless worst. It is an account of fraudulent rep-
resentations to determine the identity of Jews, of cajoling in-
crimination of father by son and son by father.., and of gas
chambers disguised as shower rooms. Such spectres cannot be
easily exorcised.
583 9
"The Gestapo were the consummate users of the 'honey pot'
.. . .M40 Here, too, in Abscam,
[t]he FBI employed the honey pot through a secret agent who,
by ostentatiously flashing and giving away wads of money,
would attract both the wary and the unwary, the scrupulous
and the unscrupulous. Having attracted, the honey pot would
serve also to capture those who were willing, that is, predis-
posed, to make the flight to the honey in the first place, as well
536. Id. at 612 (Aldisert, J., dissenting).
537. Id.
538. Id.
539. Id. at 612-13.
540. Id. at 613.
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as those who would have been unwilling, but who made the
flight to the pot only because of the strength of the lure.
To the Department of Justice, its operation was a taste of
honey; to me, it emanates a fetid odor whose putrescence
threatens to spoil basic concepts of fairness and justice that I
hold dear." 1
The FBI had
acted efficiently to ensnare their arbitrarily selected custom-
ers. . . . Their technique was a page torn from Aleksandr
Solzhenitsyn's vivid description of the dreaded Soviet Blue
Caps: "Just give us a person-and we'll create the case!" I am
persuaded that this case presents a classic model of the type of
entrapment that our society emphatically condemns.[5 4 2]
. . . [T]hose who receive society's commission to go forth
and capture transgressors may not themselves transgress. A
free society can exist only to the extent that those charged with
enforcing the law respect it themselves. . . . A society cannot
long remain free if we permit the law enforcer to offer more
than opportunity for transgression; a free society cannot and
will not endure if it permits law enforcers to select individuals
arbitrarily, and then to proceed by deception to persuade, ca-
jole, entice, and implant a law-breaking disposition that was
not theretofore present. 43
There is a "Judeo-Christian understanding that weakness has in-
hered in mankind since the days of Adam, [and] even the most morally
scrupulous members of society can be persuaded to breach behavioral
standards if presented with sufficiently tempting inducements.
'" 4
These were the stakes: "I refuse to proceed as if no important so-
cial issue were involved in this case. . . . I believe that we are con-
fronting an extremely sensitive intersection between morals and posi-
tive law, which demands that the judiciary assume rather than shirk
responsibility." 55
Adopting the government's best case scenario, given the induce-
ment, no reasonable fact finder could conclude beyond a reasonable
doubt that Jannotti actually was predisposed. The dissent agreed with
"Judge Fullam's determination that the government failed to present
541. Id. (emphasis added).
542. Id. at 617-18.
543. Id. at 614-15.
544. Id. at 615.
545. Id. at 616.
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sufficient evidence of predisposition to submit the entrapment issue to
the jury.
546
"The dissent's passionate grandiloquent essay on judicial responsi-
bility and courage," said the majority, "simply glosses over the salient
fact which is inescapable because of the videotape record: defendants
accepted the money readily, unprotestingly, even casually, without ever
once attempting to use their consummate political skill to say, as diplo-
matically as the circumstances required, 'Thanks, but no thanks.' "4
Unlike entrapment, due process was a constitutional question
which everyone agreed was for the judge to decide. The prosecution
conceded that Judge Fullam had rightfully identified "fundamental
fairness" as the key standard, but argued that the district court erred
in applying that standard.
The majority agreed:
We must necessarily exercise scrupulous restraint before we
denounce law enforcement conduct as constitutionally unac-
ceptable ....
We must be careful not to undermine the [Supreme]
Court's consistent rejection of the objective test of entrapment
by permitting it to reemerge cloaked as a due process defense.
While the lines between the objective test of entrapment fa-
vored by a minority of the Justices and the due process defense
accepted by a majority of the Justices are indeed hazy, the ma-
jority of the Court has manifestly reserved for the constitu-
tional defense only the most intolerable government
conduct.5'"
This was not such an instance, but
[i]n reversing the district court's judgment of acquittal on the
ground of a due process violation, we do not place our impri-
matur either of approval or disapproval on the government's
conduct. As citizens, we have differing views of the necessity or
advisability of the entire ABSCAM project. As judges, how-
ever, we rule only on whether the limits which the Constitution
546. Id. at 621.
547. 673 F.2d at 606.
548. Id. at 607-08. Abscam was not analogous to Twigg where DEA agents had "set
up, encouraged, and provided essential supplies and technical expertise" to the defen-
dant. United States v. Twigg, 588 F.2d 373, 381 (3d Cir. 1978). By contrast, in Abscam
"the FBI provided neither material nor technical assistance to the defendants; it merely
created the fiction that it sought to buy the commodity-influence-that the defendants
proclaimed they already possessed." Nor was this "a case where the government's in-
volvement in criminal activity has caused injury to third persons or extended beyond
'the very activity for which the defendant[s were] prosecuted,' factors emphasized by
Judge Friendly in dictum in United States v. Archer ... " United States v. Jannotti,
673 F.2d at 608.
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places on another branch of government have been exceeded.
We find that the government's conduct as to these two defen-
dants did not violate their due process rights, and that there-
fore the district court's judgment of acquittal on this ground
must be reversed." 9
Over a passionate dissent, the Third Circuit had reinstated Jan-
notti's legal guilt. But what of his moral and psychological culpability?
A couple of weeks after the court's opinion, Roger Shuy had testified
before the House Subcommittee that the FBI may have unconsciously
manipulated Senator Williams into apparent criminality where there
may have really been innocence. 5 0 Shuy was followed by Albert Levitt,
a consulting psychologist at Temple University, and Mary Galligher, a
PhD, linguist and attorney.55 ' Levitt, who had analyzed Jannotti's situ-
ation at the behest of defense attorneys, pointed out that, perhaps un-
intentionally, the FBI had staged the meeting with the sheik's repre-
sentatives almost exactly as Solomon Asch had staged a famous
psychological experiment-to demonstrate that through peer group
pressure, a target could be made to agree to what he knew to be
false.
552
Jannotti was in unfamiliar surroundings; he was "psychologically
outmaneuvered. Physically he was outmanned and verbally outtalked."
Jannotti, a simple unsophisticated tavern owner,
did not have presence of mind to ask for a delay or the verbal
skills to take command of the situation-many would respond
the same way-and herein lies the problem.
It is possible for the F.B.I. to create a situation and have
549. United States v. Jannotti, 673 F.2d at 610.
550. Operations Hearings, supra note 153, at 81 (testimony of Prof. Roger Shuy). For
a discussion of Professor Shuy's testimony, see supra notes 507-19 and accompanying
text.
551. Id. at 91, 96.
552. Id. at 91-93. The ASCH Experiment
revealed that a group preprogrammed to respond a particular way could influ-
ence an individual to acquiesce to the group norm even when the individual's
perceptions of concrete stimuli is [sic] different than his opinion.
A preprogrammed group is told how to respond to long and short lines
placed on a wall. The group is told to say the short lines are longer and the long
lines are shorter.
An individual is brought in and seated in such a way that he hears many
opinions before he can verbalize his own perceptions. Essentially, he sees some-
thing different than what the group is saying, and he has to decide whether to go
along with the group or go along with his own perceptions.
The experiment shows that a majority yielded to the group pressure and
went against their perceptions and judgments without other inducements or
enticements.
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less adequate, unsophisticated, verbally inept individuals sub-
mit or acquiesce to their proposals-and by doing so expose
themselves to criminal prosecution ...
[H]ow quickly and easily a person can be influenced by
group pressure. We see it in religious proselytizers.
We see ourselves talked into buying an item we don't
want, we see it in many aspects of life-but when we see a poli-
tician talked into accepting a legitimate business for the city
[we raise] a great hue and cry.
553
A few days after Jannotti was reversed and the technique vindi-
cated by the Third Circuit, Judge Pratt sentenced Senator Williams to
three years in prison. As the Senate proceeded towards the Senator's
expulsion, Senator Mathias was named to head an eight-member com-
mittee to review the FBI tactics in Abscam. The Second Circuit joined
the Third Circuit in supporting the technique by affirming the convic-
tion of INS official Alexander A. Alexandro, Jr.5 So, while secretly
monitored shams were under serious attack in Congress, they were
quickly gathering support in the courts.
On May 13, 1982, however, Senior District Judge William B. Bry-
ant dismissed the indictment of convicted Congressman Richard Kelly
because the government had violated due process. 55 In some ways
Judge Bryant's opinion paralleled Judge Fullam's. The judge was
troubled by the government's linking illegal immigration assistance
with the prospect of substantial investment in the Congressman's
district.
Also disturbing was Kelly's own uncontradicted testimony that he
had initially rejected a payoff, and if the videotaped representations of
Ciuzio, the unwitting middleman, were believed, the Congressman was
not previously involved in corrupt deals. Consider this conversation be-
tween Ciuzio and Weinberg, about Kelly:
"He's a kid and I know he's ripe for the first big ... score.
This is a Congressman, ya understand? This ain't a ... hus-
tler, cause we're hustlers. We're wiseguys .... Don't hand him
no... money, don't talk money, tell him what the problem is,
how could ya help, he'll explain it. .. ."
"I don't know," [said Weinberg,] "ya gotta speak to him.
That may be a problem. .. ."
"Listen, let me tell ya what you're buying here, ok ....
553. Id. at 93.
554. United States v. Alexandro, 675 F.2d 34 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 835
(1982).
555. United States v. Kelly, 539 F. Supp. 363, 365 (D.D.C. 1982), rev'd, 707 F.2d 1460
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 264 (1983).
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Cause maybe this is his first shot in this role, all right? He
ain't buying no... Congressman. He's buying the vehicle to
accomplish your package, ya follow. .. ."
"Let Tony hand you the money in front of him. Long as
we know he's getting money ... "
"That's ok. But don't say hey, Congressman ... you know
what I mean? Ya can't make him a ... hood, ya know."
"No but he's gotta know that he's getting paid to do it
.... [T]he guy ain't lilly [sic] white, you know. God forbid he
backs out."
"I'll vouch for the guy. ...
Although Ciuzio had repeatedly tried to impress the sheik's people
not to directly offer the Congressman money, when Agent Amoroso
met with Kelly alone he proposed a direct payment. Kelly told him he
was interested in the investment in his district but that he had "no
part" in whatever arrangements Amoroso might make about paying
money for his help with immigration. Amoroso had intimated the sheik
might go elsewhere. At this point John Jacobs, a Justice Department
attorney who was monitoring the conversation, told Amoroso over the
phone that Kelly was "being cute." Amoroso then persisted with Kelly
and soon thereafter displayed $25,000 in packets of $100 bills as an
initial payment. On videotape, much to the amusement and disgust of
a jury and the general public later viewing the tapes, Kelly stuffed the
money in his pockets.
5 17
As Judge Bryant saw it, "what the government attorney perceived
as 'being cute' may very well have been a brief victory of conscience
over temptation," if only from fear of the consequences.558 The judge
"fully appreciate[d] the need for and the value of aggressive, resource-
ful, and innovative law enforcement in our modern society which far
too often is beset with diabolical criminal conduct so sophisticated as
to be nearly impossible to detect."559 Therefore "carefully devised and
supervised covert investigations often [were] the only means of discov-
ering breaches of the fundamental mandate of one's office."560
Yet, in Judge Bryant's opinion, "as it affected Kelly," Abscam was
"outrageous." There had been "nothing to trigger" the investigation
against him. The FBI had done what Webster had disavowed as illegit-
imate-it had simply "tested] the faith of those in high echelons of
government."5" 1 The judge "readily" admitted that this test was "of-
556. Id. at 368.
557. Id. at 375.
558. Id. at 376.
559. Id. at 371.
560. Id. (quoting United States v. Alexandro, 675 F.2d 34, 43 (2d Cir. 1982)).
561. 539 F. Supp. at 373 (quoting Alexandro, 675 F.2d at 43). Judge Bryant further
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fensive to [him]. Government agents hard about the business of cor-
rupting public officials who are free of suspicion, essentially subvert
our government; and on its face this presents an unwholesome
spectacle."5 62
Judge Bryant conceded that judges were
not privileged to dismiss a case against a criminal defendant
because they do not like the case or because they have some
strong personal aversion to the government's conduct, [and
that this] standing alone is not a sufficient basis for determin-
ing that such conduct is outrageous to the point of depriving a
defendant of due process. But at the same time it is inevitable
that a strong visceral reaction provides the starting point or
triggering mechanism which ultimately leads to the assessment
that conduct is so outrageous that it transcends any standard
of fundamental fairness. Aware that what is repugnant to me
may not be repugnant to the Constitution, I have sought to
identify some discernible line between conduct which arouses
my personal resentment and that which falls short of minimal
standards of fairness.6 3
A very difficult challenge faced Judge Bryant and all other respon-
sible judges in this context: distinguishing personal feelings of distaste
from constitutional violation. Virtue testing of public officials, which
this essay advocates and Judge Bryant rejected as an illegitimate func-
tion of law enforcement, was not a basis for constitutional rejection.
Judge Bryant courageously attempted to draw a more specific line.
Assuming arguendo that virtue testing was not necessarily unconstitu-
tional, citing Heymann and Webster's testimony before the House Ju-
diciary Subcommittee, 564 the judge found that the Constitution did re-
quire that the "temptation should be one which the individual is likely
to encounter in the ordinary course." 56 5 Secondly, he declared that
"when improper proposals are rejected in these virtue-testing ventures,
distinguished Abscam from the "ordinary sting operation" in that it consisted of a
recruiting agent who was programmed to go oit and use a formula which included a
strong legitimate attraction. 539 F. Supp. at 371. Judge Bryant found it reprehensible
that Abscam didn't operate passively. It did not lure those "who become criminals under
their own power." Id. at 371.
562. Id. at 373.
563. Id. (footnote omitted).
564. Id. at 374 n.47.
565. Id. at 374. Judge Bryant went on to explain that "[t]o offer any other type of
temptation does not serve the function of preventing crime by apprehending those who,
when faced with actual opportunity, would become criminals. Instead, it creates a whole
new type of crime that would not exist but for the government's actions." Id.
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the guinea pig should be left alone," ' because "[i]n ordinary real life
situations anyone who would seek to corrupt a Congressman would cer-
tainly not continue to press in the face of a rejection for fear of being
reported and arrested."58  When the government heard Kelly himself
reject Amoroso's offer with the words "I got no part in that," the test-
ing should have ceased.
Obviously we like to think, and we hope, that our Con-
gressmen and Senators, and indeed all public servants, are
strong enough to withstand any imaginable pressure and reject
any type of temptation no matter how attractive, and walk
away. When they succumb to temptation, we are disappointed
and chagrined, as I was at the sight of Kelly stuffing $100 bills
into his pockets. But in reality, the hard fact is that our public
servants are not recruited from the seminaries and monasteries
across the land and that they are plagued by the frailties of
human nature.0
Judge Bryant's constitutional rejection of the government's con-
duct rested on the assumption that the government's "litmus test" had
been unreal-reality wasn't modelled because "it is highly unlikely
that anyone other than a government agent immune from prosecution
for violating this statute would make repeated flagrant attempts at cor-
rupting a Congressman for fear that the Congressman would notify the
FBI."" The judge reasoned from that premise to a constitutional per
se mandate that "[a] suspicion-free subject should be exempted from
further testing on the basis of winning the first battle against tempta-
tion. He should not be required to win a prolonged war of attrition
against chicanery.
5 °70
But if Judge Bryant's premise is not true, then his conclusion loses
its power. Is repeated pressure necessarily "unreal" because any offeror
would fear that the initially resisting official would turn him in? The
fact was that in Abscam, as well as in Archer and countless other situa-
tions, however honest or corrupt, however solicited, no public official
reported a bribe offer to the FBI or other law enforcement agency. On
what basis does Judge Bryant conclude that Congressman Kelly would
not face repeated solicitation in the real world?
Furthermore, while the judge did offer a bright-line constitutional
566. Id.
567. Id. In the instant case, the FBI had no such restraints.
568. Id. at 375.
569. Id. at 376.
570. Id. "Human nature is weak enough and sufficiently beset by temptations with-
out government adding to them and generating crime." Id. (quoting Sherman v. United
States, 356 U.S. 369, 384 (1958) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)).
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test of due process based on the probably false assumption that in the
real world corrupters don't push in the face of initial rejection-his per
se test-his "workable discernible line separating the merely offensive
and the constitutionally impermissible"-would create the very reality
it denies. Suppose the citizenry heeded Judge Bryant's bright-line test:
"If after an illegal offer is made, the subject rejects it in any fashion,
the government cannot press on." What would be the result of such a
per se rule?
Judge Pratt in Myers anticipated the flaw in Judge Bryant's rule:
If adopted, it would provide a corrupt politician easy insurance
against any undercover investigation, for when the suggestion
of improper conduct was raised, all the subject would have to
do would be to invoke the magic incantation, "I desire to act
within the law" and then plunge into his nefarious activities,
confident that thereafter any statements or conduct by him
would be immune from investigation. Such a per se rule would
soon frustrate virtually all undercover law enforcement.
57 1
Two weeks after Judge Bryant decided Kelly, on June 7, 1982, the
United States Supreme Court denied certiorari in Jannotti, thus al-
lowing Jannotti's convictions to stand, and the Third Circuit's opinion
to govern itself.57 2 The nation's High Court declined to clarify the
murky due process "outrageousness" with which Judge Friendly had
flirted in Archer, Judges Fullam and Bryant found in Jannotti and
Kelly, and other courts had so far rejected in corruption prosecutions.
On September 3, 1982, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
unanimously affirmed Myers, essentially adopting Judge Pratt's "de-
tailed and thoughtful opinion" but adding a few perspectives worth
noting.
57 3
The defendants had urged that their convictions be overturned on
a separation of powers argument, i.e., that absent prior suspicion, the
Executive had no business investigating the Legislature. The Myers
appeals court rejected any such double standards: "Members of Con-
gress enjoy no special constitutional role that requires prior suspicion
of criminal activity before they may be confronted with a governmen-
tally created opportunity to commit a crime."574
The three-judge court, which included Judge Friendly, also re-
jected the fundamental unfairness claim, pointing out Russell, Hamp-
ton, the three Archer cases and Twigg. Myers had been prosecuted for
571. United States v. Myers, 527 F. Supp. at 1231-32.
572. Jannotti v. United States, 457 U.S. 1106 (1982).
573. United States v. Myers, 692 F.2d 823, 860 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct.
2438 (1983).
574. Id. at 835.
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his "corrupt" receipt of money "in return for being influenced in his
performance of any official act. 5 7 5 Myers, said the Second Circuit, was
"the first public official in a reported federal decision to defend a brib-
ery charge on the ground that he intended to keep the bribe but not to
keep the promise he made to the bribe-payer. '5,7 The appeals court
held that "being influenced" need not describe the Congressman's true
intent, but only the intention he conveyed to the briber in exchange for
the bribe. Therefore even "[i]f Myers was 'playacting' and giving false
promises of assistance to people he believed were offering him money
to influence his official actions, he violated the bribery statute.
'577
The appellate court also found "interesting" the argument of Rep-
resentatives Thompson and Murphy that due process required govern-
ment undercover agents to eliminate or at least minimize all ambigui-
ties in the critical events which formed the basis of criminal liability.
"Perhaps at some point deliberate governmental efforts to render am-
biguous events over which agents can exercise considerable control
would transgress due process limits of fundamental fairness," the court
agreed, as an abstract matter of constitutional law, but "[w]herever
those limits might be, they have not been crossed in these cases. '57 8
Government was entitled to "simulate the guarded conversation that
would be expected of those proposing an unlawful venture. They need
not say, 'Congressman, I have here a cash bribe to be exchanged for
your corrupt promise to be influenced in your official action.' "17 The
government was only playing by ground rules designed by cautious but
corrupt congressmen.
Where a bribery prosecution presented a "close question as to
whether money was received as an illegal bribe or a lawful campaign
contribution," the evidence must show "'specific knowledge of a defi-
nite official act'" as a quid pro quo for the payment.5 80 In this case,
however, no congressman claimed he had received what he thought was
only a campaign contribution.
Concluding their opinion, the court emphasized that it was "not
passing judgment on the wisdom of the Abscam investigation"; it was
determining only whether the investigatory "methods employed" and
the ensuing trials rendered the convictions invalid under the Constitu-
tion.581 "The conduct of the investigation, though subject to some criti-
cism, affords no basis for rejecting the conviction," the court held,
575. 18 U.S.C. § 201(c)(1) (1982); see also 692 F.2d at 827.
576. 692 F.2d at 841.
577. Id. at 842.
578. Id. at 843.
579. Id. at 844.
580. Id. at 845.
581. Id. at 860.
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praising the "fairness, patience and thoroughness of the District
Judges," and repeatedly endorsing Judge Pratt's "comprehensive opin-
ion. ' 582 With the Supreme Court refusing to clarify its views on due
process, the federal appeals courts had to rely on their own decisions.
On April 5, 1983, the Second Circuit affirmed Judge Pratt's refusal
to void Senator Williams' convictions on the basis of entrapment and
due process.5 83 The opinion, written by Judge Newman, who had also
written Myers, noted that the major legal issues were "similar" to
those already considered in other Abscam cases.5 84 The court found
"overwhelming evidence that the Senator had sought financing of the
mining venture in exchange for his assistance in obtaining government
contracts.
5 5
Entrapment was a more serious issue. At trial, Judge Pratt had
emphasized to the jury the government's burden to prove predisposi-
tion beyond a reasonable doubt, but he also instructed the jury to de-




"As a general proposition of law," said the Second Circuit, this
"fragment" was "erroneous.11 5 7 The standard jury instruction on en-
trapment required the prosecution to prove the defendant ready and
willing to commit the crime "before anything at all occurred respecting
the alleged offense. '585 Unlike Judge Pratt, the appellate court applied
this proposition literally:
A defendant's predisposition is not to be assessed "as of that
time when he committed the crime." Normally, predisposition
refers to the state of mind of a defendant before government
agents make any suggestion that he should commit a crime. By
"state of mind" we do not mean to require any specific prior
contemplation of criminal conduct. It is sufficient if the defen-
dant is of a frame of mind such that once his attention is called
to the criminal opportunity, his decision to commit the crime is
the product of his own preference and not the product of gov-
ernment persuasion. The phrase "ready and willing" ade-
quately captures that concept .... 51
9
582. Id.
583. United States v. Williams, 705 F.2d 603, 624 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct.
524 (1983).
584. Id. at 606.'
585. Id. at 612.
586. Id. at 617-18.
587. Id. at 618.
588. Id. at 618 n.9 (quoting 1 E. DEvnrT & C. BLACKmAR, FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE &
INSTRUCTION § 1309, at 364 (3d ed. 1977)).
589. 705 F.2d at 618.
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In spite of Judge Pratt's erroneous ruling on the time frame of
predisposition, the appellate court refused to grant Senator Williams a
new trial because counsel had not objected to the judge's statement at
trial, nor asked for a clarifying instruction. 90 Furthermore, declared
the Second Circuit, the jury was "fully entitled to find, from the total-
ity of the evidence, that the defendants were 'ready and willing' to
commit the crimes charged as soon as the opportunity was first
presented .... ,,591
What entrapment time frame had the appellate court adopted? In
its view, the standard jury instruction which required a defendant
ready and willing "before anything at all occurred respecting the al-
leged offense" merely referred to the moment an inducement to com-
mit the crime was first offered. "Simply cultivating the friendship of a
target preparatory to presenting a criminal opportunity is not induce-
ment to commit a crime. 5 92 This clearly implies that while a govern-
ment agent cultivates his friendship the target need not be predis-
posed, as long as he becomes predisposed by the time the first criminal
offer is made.
Such a test is very troubling, especially concerning private acts of
private persons. The simple fact is that friendship itself might cause
predisposition. Imagine a condominium of retirees. Every day is spent
on a pool deck, walking, or sitting around swapping stories. Friend-
ships develop quickly; a government agent cultivates one retiree-target.
This person has no "specific contemplation of criminal conduct." But
many people will do for a friend what they wouldn't dream of doing for
a stranger. The target chooses his friends carefully; they are law-abid-
ing citizens. But this one "friend," initially rebuffed, has forced himself
into the target's affections by persistent kindness-picking up relatives
at the airport, buying groceries, finding a mechanic to fix a car cheaply,
celebrating a 50th anniversary, etc. One day the target's "friend," who
all along has told war stories of the garment trade and 40 years of
payoffs, asks the target to help him launder money by depositing funds
in a bank. It is an important favor, perfectly safe, and the government
will never find out, assures the target's friend. Besides, the target can
keep the interest from funds deposited under his name.
The target agrees, deposits the money, and is prosecuted by the
federal government; his "friend" was an FBI agent and he, is he a
criminal? Was he entrapped? Was he predisposed?
By the time the "criminal opportunity" was first offered, because
of friendship, the defendant, who had no prior contemplation of crimi-
nal conduct, preferred to help his friend. According to the doctrine of
590. Id.
591. Id. at 616.
592. Id. at 618 n.9 (emphasis added).
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the Second Circuit in Williams, that defendant was not entrapped. If
friendship is a necessary prerequisite for a (private) defendant's pre-
disposition, where an agent insinuates himself into the defendant's af-
fections before offering the criminal opportunity, conviction should be
barred by entrapment.
In these circumstances, entrapment should bar conviction under a
subjective view because the defendant does not deserve to be punished,
and under an objective view, because of the social harm from tactics
such as these which threaten average law-abiding citizens acting in
their private lives with loyalty and affection.
If it is held that in these circumstances there has not been entrap-
ment, has government been "fundamentally fair"? These are just more
unrefined aspects of "the as yet undefined standard of 'outrageous'
conduct that the Supreme Court has suggested might offend constitu-
tional limits."5 93 Abscam had not played upon misplaced friendship or
personal loyalty. Unquestionably, it did have its flaws. But "outra-
geousness" was the appellate court's measuring rod, and however little
the "tactics might square with our personal notions of appropriate law
enforcement conduct, '5 9 4 lacking any indication that it was "persist-
ently directed at an unwilling subject in an unconscionable effort to
erode his law abiding instinct," the appellate court found that Wil-
liams' coaching, albeit regrettable, did not violate the United States
Supreme Court's undeveloped standard. 95 Although "unquestionably
'. . far in excess of the amounts normally tendered by government
agents in an attempt to catch an 'unwary criminal,' "596 an instant mul-
timillion dollar profit was also not an outrageous inducement: "We
doubt that the size of an inducement can ever be considered unconsti-
tutional when offered to a person with the experience and sophistica-
tion of a United States Senator.
'59 7
Jurisdiction wasn't seriously contested, but the defendants desper-
ately objected that their conspiracy charge was not a federal offense
because the indictment alleged they had conspired to deprive the
United States of the "honest and faithful services of a United States
Senator," whereas a Senator, having been elected by the citizens of a
single state, owed honest and faithful service only to that state and not
the United States as a whole. The court appropriately brushed this
claim aside, emphasizing a "significant interest on the part of the na-
593. Id. at 620; see supra text accompanying notes 115-25.
594. 705 F.2d at 620.
595. Id.
596. Id. (citation omitted).
597. Id.
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tional government in the honest performance of duties by those elected
to the national legislature.
'" 5 98
One last Abscam case remaining before the federal appellate
courts would unanimously vindicate the technique. On May 10, 1983,
the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Cir-
cuit reversed Judge Bryant, reinstating Congressman Kelly's convic-
tion.599 The court was unanimous only in its conclusion that the gov-
ernment's conduct did not reach the "demonstrable level of
outrageousness" which would bar prosecution.600
Judge MacKinnon saw Abscam as just another well conducted un-
dercover operation "extraordinary only in the positions of some of the
individuals involved and in the intangible nature of the 'commodity'
purchased." 601 His two colleagues, Chief Judge Robinson, and Judge
Ginsburg, who wrote a separate opinion, saw Abscam as an extraordi-
nary operation, flawed by large inducements and a lack of
supervision. 0'
Judge MacKinnon pointed out that the court "need not determine
the exact limits on government involvement in crime imposed by the
due process clause, for clearly the government involvement in Abscam
was less than that [already] found unobjectionable by the Supreme
Court."60 In passing, Judge MacKinnon characterized Judge Bryant's
proferred due process test as "unduly speculative," reiterating that
"members of the federal judiciary have no power to veto law enforce-
ment practices merely because such practices offend their personal
tastes."60
In their concurrence, the other two judges praised Judge Bryant's
"thoughtful opinion" condemning Abscam as "an extraordinary opera-
tion," but agreed that, as applied, his "real-world test" was "specula-
tive." 60 5 The district judge had assumed that "a person who offers a
bribe would retreat upon encountering an initial rejection and would
not 'have the audacity' to press on 'for fear of being reported.'" But,
pointed out the concurring judges, realistically, "the first overture ren-
ders the party offering the bribe vulnerable to prosecution. 'In for a
calf,' such a person might press on if he perceives any chance of ulti-
598. Id. at 622.
599. United States v. Kelly, 707 F.2d 1460 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 264
(1983).
600. 707 F.2d at 1461 (quoting Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484, 495 n.7
(1976) (Powell, J., concurring)).
601. 707 F.2d at 1469 n.51.
602. Id. at 1474-76 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
603. Id. at 1470.
604. Id. at 1470 n.52, 1471.
605. Id. at 1474-75 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
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mate success. Nonetheless, were the slate clean, we might be attracted
to an approach similar to the District Court's.M
06
The slate was far from clean. In fact it was quite smudged with
lines, suggestions and commands from the United States Supreme
Court as well as the federal appellate courts. And so, although obvi-
ously disturbed about Abscam, the court felt constrained to affirm
Kelly's conviction. Perhaps to prod the Supreme Court to speak fur-
ther, or perhaps ironically, Judge Ginsburg in his separate opinion,
chalked out the narrowest due process defense:
The requisite level of outrageousness, the Supreme Court
has indicated, is not established merely upon a showing of ob-
noxious behavior or even flagrant misconduct on the part of
the police; the broad "fundamental fairness" guarantee, it ap-
pears from High Court decisions, is not transgressed absent
"coercion, violence or brutality to the person." Without further
Supreme Court elaboration we have no guide to a more dy-
namic definition of the outrageousness concept, and no war-
rant, as lower court judges, to devise such a definition in ad-
vance of any signal to do so from higher authority. 07
The signal has not yet come from the High Court. Nor is it likely
soon. The Supreme Court's decision not to decide may indicate that it
is not yet collectively prepared to say anything definitive about outra-
geous prosecutorial techniques in public corruption cases. Perhaps
waiting is a sign of wisdom. Opinions from thoughtful experts before
congressional committees, lower court judges, and a new situation may
compel the Court to give the guidance that so many await. In October
and December 1983, however, in largely unheralded moves, the United
States Supreme Court did to Abscam what it had done to Archer: It
virtually ended the judicial phase by refusing to hear Kelly °8 and Wil-
liams,0 9 thus leaving the state and federal judiciaries, executives, and
legislatures, and the Nation to their own devices.
BEYOND 1984
[In all cases where power is to be conferred, the point first to
be decided is whether such a power be necessary to the public
good; as the next will be, in case of an affirmative decision, to
guard as effectually as possible against a perversion of the
power to the public detriment.
James Madison, The 41st Federalist 10
606. Id. at 1475.
607. Id. at 1476 (quoting Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128, 132-33 (1954)).
608. Kelly v. United States, 104 S. Ct. 264 (1983).
609. Williams v. United States, 104 S. Ct. 524 (1983).
610. THE FEDERALIST, supra note 1, No. 41, at 256 (J. Madison).
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PREDICATE SUSPICION
In Kelly, the Supreme Court declined to decide whether without
any other prior suspicion of a particular defendant's corruption or a
pattern of ongoing criminal activity, federal officials, consistent with
due process, may virtue-test because "public servants. . are plagued
by frailties of human nature," because "dishonest public officials...
may cause grave harm to our society," and because official corruption
is "difficult to detect"? 
What must be known, or suspected, and with what degree of confi-
dence before the government initiates an undercover operation, or of-
fers a particular individual a particular opportunity? Some strong crit-
ics of government-created criminal simulations urge a judicially-





The Senate Select Committee declared that the government could
not meet a threshold predicate suspicion "by assertions such as 'Every-
one knows that politicians are corrupt,' or even by the arguably accu-
rate assertion that some number of individuals in every discrete group
are likely to be lawbreakers. Those assertions are not specific facts re-
lating to the particular situations under investigation.'
61
These critics condemn "fishing expeditions." They abhor random
"trolling." Their sentiments have been echoed even by Philip Hey-
mann, who told the House Subcommittee that "[n]o one felt that they
were out 'testing' the corruptibility of Congressmen or Senators. The
sense was that the Bureau was discovering what were the practices
among a handful of corrupt politicians.., that it was learning what
was going on, not creating something new.
6 14
This statement is troubling; "testing" need not be synonymous
with "creating." Yet what physicists have told us about the behavior of
the smallest particles we also discover about the behavior of particular
611. Kelly, 707 F.2d at 1467 (quoting Kelly, 539 F. Supp. at 374), 1473-74 (quoting
Kelly, 539 F. Supp. at 375; United States v. Alexandro, 675 F.2d 34, 42 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 103 S. Ct. 78 (1982)).
612. The ACLU has recommended that
undercover operations . . . be authorized only when there exists a sufficient
amount of prior evidence of a pattern of criminal activity. We also believe that
before any particular individual or group becomes a target of an infiltration or
undercover operation, a high standard of reliable evidence indicating involve-
ment or likely involvement in criminal activity must be met, and that the judg-
ment of whether such evidence is sufficient should not be made by those seeking
the authorization.
J. Berman, The Lessons of Abscam: A Public Policy Report by The American Civil Lib-
erties Union at ii (preface by I. Glasser) (Oct. 10, 1982).
613. SELEcT CoMM., supra note 153, at 383 n.29.
614. Operations Hearings, supra note 153, at 498.
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individual human beings. There is no strictly unperturbing monitoring:
We effect behavior by measuring it.6 15 We seek to investigate, not cre-
ate crime, but sometimes it will be created by monitoring. When gov-
ernment investigates government, however, the possibility of creating
crime is less troubling. When a public official's use of public power is
involved, then our collective security demands that we monitor our
public officials' faithfulness to the Constitution. Even absent particular
articulable suspicion, "testing" may be the only way to learn what is
going on.
When Representative Kastemneier asked, "[Y]ou said the guide-
lines recognize that inducements may be offered to an individual even
though there is no reasonable indication that the particular individual
has engaged or is engaging in an illegal activity .... What is the pub-
lic interest in offering such inducements under those circum-
stances?,"""6 FBI Director Webster replied, that with
consensual crimes, where you do not have clear evidence that
someone is engaging in [them] . . .[w]hat you have is a smell.
You have people who talk about it and talk around it and the
tendency in our investigations is to focus upon this kind of ac-
tivity.... No clear evidence as such but a clear kind of
smell. . . ' Now these people begin to talk about their con-
tacts. And that becomes even more remote. But if we say that
we must have a predication, a prior bite by the dog, we wipe
out the decoy in the park, we wipe out a whole range of sting
operations, a whole range of undercover things.
'617
Testifying before the Senate Select Committee, Assistant FBI Di-
615. For example, at the subatomic level, elementary particles such as electrons and
photons exhibit characteristics of both particles and waves while simultaneously being
neither. An electron in orbit around an atomic nucleus is described as a mathematical
wave, or probability function, and according to Heisenberg's Uncertainty Principle, the
electron has neither a position nor a momentum until one of these quantities is observed:
The very act of observation creates the quantity measured. As a result, the measurement
of both momentum, a vector quantity, and position, a static one, simultaneously, is not
possible without a certain degree of uncertainty in one or the other quantity. This uncer-
tainty is not a function of the accuracy of the measuring device, but is an objective
maximum of precision inherent in reality itself. Note that either quantity can be deter-
mined exactly, if the other is not determined at all, and that on any scale larger than the
subatomic, the principle does not apply. See V. GUILLEMN, THE STORY OF QUANTUM
MECHANICS, 91-103 (1968); see also W. HEISENBERG, PHYSICS AND PHILOSOPHY (1958). On
a macroscopic, and more familiar scale, the creation of behavior by the act of measuring
it is not uncommon in anthropological field studies. See, e.g., N. CHAGNON, YANOMAMO:
THE FIERCE PEOPLE (1968); N. CHAGNON, STUDYING THE YANOMAMO 89-90 (1974).
616. Operations Hearings, supra note 153, at 417 (question posed by Rep. Robert W.
Kastenmeier).
617. Id. at 418 (testimony by William H. Webster, Director, FBI).
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rector Revell spoke similarly: "[O]ur antennae picked up some vibra-
tions, and we set out to follow those vibrations, and in doing so, we
established a scenario to test that intelligence, and once we found that
it was accurate, we proceeded." '
In its final report, the Senate Committee
recognize[d] that the undercover technique may be employed
in the absence of particular suspects so long as there is a rea-
sonable suspicion that a pattern of criminal activity is under-
way in a particular area. But "vibrations"... do not consti-
tute reasonable suspicion.
.. . FBI officials do not need the power to conduct under-
cover operations without reasonable suspicion, despite their
references to "vibrations" or "smells.
'"6 19
The Committee's Final Report recommended "Legislation Estab-
lishing Threshhold Requirements for the Initiation of an Undercover
Operation" which would prohibit the Justice Department from initiat-
ing (or expanding) an undercover operation except when there is "rea-
sonable suspicion, based upon articulable facts" that the person offered
the bait "has engaged, is engaging, or is likely to engage in criminal
activity...., 620 Similarly, when the undercover operation was di-
rected at a type of criminal act without an identified individual target,
there must be "reasonable suspicion, based on articulable facts, that
the operation will detect past, ongoing, or planned criminal activity of
that specified type. ...
It may be wise resource management in most cases to articulate
the basis for undertaking an undercover investigation wherever there is
such a basis. Furthermore, there should be a judicial warrant,622 or at
618. Senate Hearings, supra note 153, at 906 (testimony of Oliver B. Revell, Ass't.
Dir., Criminal Investigative Division, FBI).
619. SELECT COMm., supra note 153, at 333-34.
620. Id. at 28, 377.
621. Id.
622. New York's Special Prosecutor for Corruption in Criminal Justice now may sub-
mit its plans for simulated crimes to prior judicial scrutiny. According to Justice Ernst
H. Rosenberger, Presiding Justice of the Extraordinary Special and Trial Terms (and
who hears corruption cases in New York City),
The Special Prosecutor writes me a letter, referring to an investigation by num-
ber only. In the letter, I am informed of the background of the investigation,
technique, and the proposal for its utilization. If I approve, I write a letter which
indicates, in substance, the following language:
"You have given me details of an active investigation, bearing number XX-
XXXXX-X-XX. You have informed me of the proposed investigative tech-
niques. These techniques do not appear to be inappropriate in the circum-
stances described."
There have also been occasions where a more formal long form order has been
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the very least prior authorization by a nonpartisan undercover opera-
tions review board, a majority of whose members are not themselves
government officials.
The FBI and Justice Department are likely to resist establishing
an outside civilian watchdog panel as an unwarranted intrusion upon
their own effectiveness. In the 15th Federalist, Hamilton noted "in the
nature of sovereign power an impatience of control that disposes those
who are invested with the exercise of it to look with an evil eye upon
all external attempts to restrain or direct its operations." '623 But such a
board would be an exercise of the great democratic principle of civilian
control over the military and popular control over the government
manifested in the jury system. This review board would be a jury of
experts.
Probable cause or reasonable suspicion of criminality, however,
should not always be necessary predicates for initiating all operations
or offering an opportunity to a particular individual. The general de-
terrent value of anti-corruption probes is greatly enhanced when it is
known that, say, five percent of the executive's undercover budget is
allocated to routine "street" patrols. Where public corruption exists in
the private sanctuaries of the powerful, these "streets" are only patrol-
lable by resourceful, dissembling, and penetrating undercover agents.
These "patrols" should be carried very far. For example, young
federal agent-attorneys might be sent into local prosecutors' offices as.
assistant D.A.'s to perform their law enforcement function simultane-
ously on two levels, both as local prosecutors and as national secret
agents investigating local corruption in those offices. State law enforce-
ment should similarly monitor itself. This recommendation is not
likely to sit well with the vast majority of prosecutors who are honest,
nor would a similar operation in which agents became judge's clerks to
discover who, on the bench, is corrupt. Nonetheless, in Chicago's Oper-
ation Greylord, the FBI has gone even further, using undercover
judges.
6 24
Perhaps the chief frustration of the Archer investigation was its
premature abortion which prevented it from reaching its ultimate tar-
get-the rotten core of the corrupt criminal justice system-judges. As
used. The letters or orders are kept in the safe in my chambers and are not
placed in the clerk's office unless later circumstances warrant.
Letter from Justice Ernst H. Rosenberger to the Author (March 22, 1984).
623. TH FEDERALIST, supra note 1, No. 15, at 111 (A. Hamilton).
624. See supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text. The flaw in a system which relies
on the investigators to monitor their own techniques is exemplified by Operation Cork-
screw. For a detailed discussion of Operation Corkscrew, in which "safeguards in practice
were little more than rhetoric," Committee Print, supra note 153, at 41, so much so that
the House subcommittee termed it a "text book example of the dangers inherent in un-
dercover operations," id. at 51, see Committee Print, supra note 153, at 40-75.
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Leuci complained, judges "set the pace" for the rest. Abscam was "a
first and substantial step by the FBI and Justice Department beyond
where law enforcement had been before," declared defense attorney
Richard Ben-Veniste,
[blut I don't think they had the guts or the foolishness to make
the same approach to the other coordinate branch, the
judiciary.
Can you imagine an Abscam investigation directed to the
judiciary? "Let's get the judges. Let's test which judges are
susceptible, given enough inducement, to being bribed." They
are not that crazy, but this was the first step.
If it is not stopped here, then we are going to have 1984
ahead of schedule in this country. It will go to the press ...
The Congress is open game already. Why not the judiciary, se-
lective troublemakers in various agencies? 2 "
Here Representative Hyde interrupted: "You don't doubt there
are judges who are on the take somewhere in this great land of ours, do
you?"
"Well, if so, I don't know about it, but I assume from past history
and cases ... ,'82l
Ben-Veniste had overstated executive tyranny in Abscam, and
surely he had understated the significance of judicial corruption. As
the chief prosecutor of Archer, he must have at one time been aware
that Frank Klein, former president of the Queens Criminal Bar Associ-
ation, named sitting judges through whom organized crime cases were
routinely funnelled to be fixed.
But if there must be suspicion of a type of corruption before initi-
ating a scam, many of the citizens in this country also believe that
some form of corruption occurs in virtually every criminal justice sys-
tem, every legislature, every zoning board, liquor and turnpike author-
ity, in every court system, in municipal, state, and the federal govern-
ment. A very small minority of public officials may be corrupt, but the
fixers are well distributed throughout the levels. If this is wrong, if this
"realism" is nothing more than cynicism and false distrust of entirely
clean public systems and authorities, then it can only be proved wrong
by vigorous trolling whose nets consistently come up empty. If nothing
else, the effect will be to increase public respect for government.
Those who disagree with the conclusions of this essay and urge a
probable cause predicate before government actively initiates any
stings in the private and public contexts assume that a probable cause
625. Operations Hearings, supra note 153, at 344 (testimony of Richard Ben-Veniste,
attorney).
626. Id. at 345.
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threshold is a real, effective check on unfettered discretion. But exactly
what this standard means, what protection it gives, is unclear. By its
very name, "probable cause" rests on a probability far short of cer-
tainty. In the search-and-seizure fourth amendment context, rules and
tests were gradually developed to specify predicate suspicion adequate
for magistrates to issue search warrants.62 7 In June, 1983, however, in
Illinois v. Gates, a plurality of the United States Supreme Court jet-
tisoned all "rigid legal rules" for determining probable cause, substi-
tuting instead a "totality of the circumstances" test.628 "Perhaps the
central teaching of our decisions bearing on the probable cause stan-
dard is that it is a 'practical, nontechnical conception,'" the Court
declared .
29
At this point, the real dispute may be whether there should be any
predicate, rather than what the predicate should be. Even this is too
simple, because it assumes that all kinds of undercover scams require
the same predicate suspicion. It presupposes one set of standards
whether the targets are private citizens or public officials. The Senate
Select Committee had introduced double standards when they pro-
posed "a higher treshhold test that must be met before undercover
techniques may be employed to infiltrate entities that were organized




The question of double standards saturates the history from
Serpico to Abscam. Serpico had refused to wear a wire to implicate
low-level cops and insisted on focusing upon police corruption at
higher levels.63' After The New York Times published Serpico's story,
Reverend Mitchell demanded an "on-going investigation not only of
corrupt police, but corrupt judges .... We have got to deal not only
with local pressure, but with wickedness in high places. 6 3 2 As a price
for his total cooperation, Bob Leuci extracted a promise from the
627. See generally 1 W. LAFAVE, SEAcH AND SEiZURE § 3.2 (1978 & Supp. 1984).
628. Illinois v. Gates, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 2328-32 (1983). Writing for the majority, Jus-
tice Rehnquist set forth the broad standard a magistrate should follow when deciding
whether to issue a search warrant:
[M]ake a practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the circumstances
set forth in the affidavit before him, including the "veracity" and "basis of
knowledge" of persons supplying hearsay information, there is a fair probability
that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.
103 S. Ct. at 2332.
629. 103 S. Ct. at 2328 (citing Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176 (1949)).
630. SELECT COMM., supra note 153, at 384.
631. See supra text accompanying notes 37-39.
632. N.Y. Times, May 6, 1970, at 35, col. 3.
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United States Attorneys that the investigation would not be directed
only at his fellow police officers, but would reach lawyers, prosecutors,
and judges. Police Commissioner Patrick V. Murphy also insisted the
investigation not be limited to the police department, but must reach
lawyers and judges; no pulling back when high ranking public officials
got involved. Later, Murphy tried to deflect mounting public scorn fo-
cused solely on the Department, declaring, "The record will show that
judges have been bought, that judges have bought their jobs. Be as-
sured that the courts aren't perfect, the prosecutors' offices aren't per-
fect and city government isn't perfect, but the police are very
visible." 33
David Durk, Serpico's associate, concluded his televised testimony
before the Knapp Commission with a passionate attack on double
standards:
The policeman is convinced that he lives and works in the mid-
dle of a corrupt society, that everybody is getting theirs and
why shouldn't he, and that if somebody cared about corrup-
tion, something would have been done about it a long time ago.
Tell us about the D.A.'s and the courts and the bar, and the
Mayor and the Governor.1
3 4
Special Prosecutor Maurice Nadjari demonstrated an evenhanded
zealousness: "When you're involved with drug sellers, you have to go
out and buy drugs. When judges are selling fixes, you have to go out
and buy the fix. This is the only way to do it."' 35 On another occasion,
Nadjari had declared: "Cops and prosecutors and judges who are in-
dicted deserved no greater dignity or better treatment than other citi-
zens arrested for committing heinous crimes.6136 Nadjari's chief deputy
had lashed out at the Appellate Court which reversed a case against
633. "Murphy Suggests Investigation of the Criminal Justice System," id., Dec. 27,
1971, at 38, col. 1.
634. Public Hearings of the Commission to Investigate Alleged Police Corruption,
New York City (Knapp Commission), Dec. 17, 1971, at 1567 (testimony of David Durk).
United States Attorney Seymour, although troubled by sending an undercover agent
into the criminal justice system to induce and simulate, adopted the strategy because not
to use the technique, which was already standard fare for detecting other victimless
crimes, would have immunized ranking public officials and violated his promises to Mur-
phy and confirmed the cynicism of Serpico, Durk, Leuci, and countless others, that
double standards prevail, that powerful lawyers inevitably protect their fellows.
Governor Rockefeller also decried double standards: "Corruption must be faced
openly. It must be faced squarely. The problem must be confronted wherever it occurs in
the criminal justice system-not just in the police department but at the prosecuting
and judicial levels." N.Y. Times, Sept. 15, 1972, at 1, col. 1.
635. "Court Condemns Nadjari Methods," N.Y. Times, Dec. 14, 1974, at 1, col. 4,
continued at 34, col. 1.
636. Id., Nov. 16, 1972, at 51, col. 4.
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the Queens D.A., declaring, "Its action fosters the belief that a dual
system of Justice exists-a corrupt one for the dishonest District At-
torney, Judge or influential politician, another more rigorous for the
ordinary criminal.1 37 Counterattacking, Justice Titone challenged the
undercover technique, declaring, "The rule of law applies to all of us in
our daily endeavors, whether we interpret laws and administer justice,
prosecute the accused, drive a bus, or dig a ditch." '38
Double standards continued to play a vital role in the Abscam de-
bate. Soon after it broke, the FBI Director declared that undercover
operations had not been and would not be aimed specifically at politi-
cians as such. But whereas the primary thrust of the attack on double
standards in the Archer phase was against pursuing low level corrupt
officials while high ranking corrupt officialdom was left alone, the dom-
inant double standards theme in Abscam has been the private citizen
versus the public official.
When Professor Heymann and FBI Director Webster made their
first appearance before the House Subcommittee, Representative Sei-
berling declared that "[W]herever you have any reasonable or probable
cause to believe that officials or anyone else are engaged in corrupt
activities, you have the obligation to go ahead and investigate those
and pursue them."6 39 Heymann observed that an unhealthy disrespect
for law was generated when there was a perception of a dual standard:
Strict enforcement for ordinary people and lackadaisical attitudes to-
ward the powerful or prominent. His prepared statement declared in
boldface: "Undercover investigations of political figures, while posing
special problems, should not be subject to different rules.""0 Webster
concurred: "The investigation of a public official is a particularly seri-
637. Id., Apr. 24, 1975, at 1, col. 1.
638. People v. Rao, 53 A.D.2d 904, 921, 386 N.Y.S.2d 441, 459 (2d Dep't 1976) (J.
Titone dissenting); see supra note 114.
639. Oversight Hearings, supra note 153, at 127 (remark by Rep. John F. Seiberling).
Congressman Hyde, in his typically blunt, no-nonsense approach, also rued the ap-
pearance of double standards:
It is unfortunate that these questions of sensitive policy and due process really
come in the context of Congressmen having been hooked as the big fish. There
have been a lot of other people in similar circumstances and our sensitivity
should have been aroused then as now, because the implication of the wagon
train getting into a circle is there .... The rights of your clients, whether Con-
gressmen or taxi drivers, are important, and I am merely commenting that it is
unfortunate that we get serious about this only when our own ox is being gored.
Operations Hearings, supra note 153, at 343-44 (statement of Rep. Henry Hyde).
Later, Congressman Hyde returned to the theme: "I would be reluctant to terminate
these hearings without trying to make clear that I do not think this subcommittee is
demanding a different standard for Congressmen or for businessmen or for anybody else
in ferreting out corruption." Id. at 542.
640. Oversight Hearings, supra note 153, at 135 (statement of Prof. Phillip B.
Heymann).
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ous undertaking [but] the same criminal standard always applied. '64 1
Responding to a question by Representative Hyde, Professor Heymann
stated, "There is no and should be no special category of undercover
operations that go to pubic integrity questions.'4
2
Some attacks on the technique strongly but implicitly condemned
double standards by assuming that public officials and private citizens
were indistinguishable as targets. Chairman Edwards observed, "Po-
lice, whether they're Federal or State or local, randomly just going
around all our cities and stopping people in the street and offering
people bribes or offering them money or trying to sell them drugs...
would produce serious damage to the fabric of our society.8 64 3 Profes-
sor Seidman also implicitly rejected double standards by using "peo-
ple" to blur all distinction between public officials and private
citizens.6
4
In an emotional exchange with Webster, Congressman Hughes
more explicitly rejected double standards:
[A]s members of Congress, as citizens ... we would all like to
make sure that our Government does not focus in on us unless
there is some reasonable basis .... We like to feel secure that
the Government will not target us . .. unless there is some
reasonable basis .... I am speaking not just for me, but for
the other innocent public officials and other citizens.8 "
With very few exceptions, then, critics and supporters of Abscam
have publicly rejected double standards. Professor Heymann summed
it up:
There should be no special rules for the investigations of Con-
gress in any form. The rules should be general with regard to
undercover operations. . . . I do not like special rules for any
class of people, executive, legislative, judicial .... In sum,
whatever one thinks should be the proper rules for undercover
investigations, these rules should apply generally to ordinary
citizens and their elected representatives alike, and to crimes
of bribery as well as any other crimes. 6
641. Id. at 138 (statement of William H. Webster, Director, FBI).
642. Id. at 153 (testimony of Prof. Phillip B. Heymann).
643. Id. at 25 (remark by Rep. Don Edwards, Subcomm. Chairman) (emphasis
added).
644. Id. (testimony of Prof. Louis Seidman). "There's no legitimate purpose served
by conducting little tests of the morality of people. It's hard enough with the tests that
people have to contend with in the real world without government making it harder still
for people to walk the straight and narrow." Id. (emphasis added).
645. Id. at 430 (remark by Rep. William J. Hughes).
646. Id. at 497 (testimony of Prof. Phillip B. Heymann).
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Heymann's former deputy, Nathan, saw Abscam's principal
strength as its rejection of double standards:
I think this is extremely important and I know was very impor-
tant to Judge Pratt, no political official was put off limits. No
allegation, regardless of the party, power, or position of the of-
ficial involved was disregarded as too hot to pursue.... I
know this subcommittee and the American people desire that
there be no different sets of law enforcement standards and
techniques which depend in any way on social status, economic
condition, or political power of the lawbreakers involved .... I
very strongly believe that it is important to make thorough in-
vestigations of allegations involving public officials. I think it is
important for our body politic to be satisfied that people in
positions of power are not exempt from the same kinds of in-
vestigations that ordinary people receive when allegations of
crime are raised .
47
Against this chorus of thoughtful critics, it takes some courage to
support double standards. Double standards have a bad ring; "equal
protection under law" seems their very antithesis. Yet most critics at-
tack double standards from a totally warranted rejection of an unfair
society where the rich and powerful live by their own private set of
rules, while the ordinary citizen is subject to the rules on the books, or
worse, to arbitrary targeting by individual law enforcement agents be-
cause of race, politics, or whim. In short, much of the attack upon
double standards is designed to deny special benefit and protection to
the powerful.
Avoiding the 1984 we abhor-the totalitarianism we always rightly
fear, requires special protection of private citizens acting in their pri-
vate capacity. That extra protection requires double standards, but
double standards which promote a vigorous attack on public corrup-
tion while providing an unyielding resistance to Orwell's horrible
vision.
Many who declared against all double standards may really be am-
bivalent about them. Congressman Hyde, for example, not only at-
tacked special exemptions for public officials, but also observed that
"whether or not they should be treated like other people inasmuch as
they are public officials with public trust is still another question. I do
not know that we will ever get answers."64 Professor Heymann, who
asserted that "there should be no special rules," nevertheless also
acknowledged
647. Operations Hearings, supra note 153, at 595, 598, 657 (statement of Irvin B.
Nathan, former Dep. Ass't. Att'y. Gen., Crim. Div., Dept. of Justice).
648. Id. at 519 (statement of Rep. Henry Hyde).
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the special importance of investigating official bribery ....
[W]here one individual has the power that any number of
others with money need if they are to accomplish their ends, he
can afford to sit back and require those others to come to him
with proposals. Thus investigating such crimes requires more
than ordinary initiative by law enforcement agents; they must
come forward with proposals. " '
Professor Heymann seemed to advance a somewhat separate set of
investigative techniques for public corruption: Corrupt public officials
may require more persistent solicitation. This troubled him; he called
it the Committee's "most difficult problem." 650 Professor Heymann
said that "Offering a public official corrupt money with no predicate
out there at all, no reason for it, no operation suggesting it to us from
the outside world, [w]as right on the line."" 1
Heymann did not, however, support a policy of random stings
against private citizens. It would seem, then, that random stings
against public officials are arguable for Professor Heymann only be-
cause he implicitly distinguishes public from private and applies
double standards.
Although oversimplistic, it is very important first to separate the
public (official) from the private (citizen). It is axiomatic in the United
States of America that private citizens acting in their private capacity
are entitled to privacy, i.e., no government snooping except for an ex-
tremely good reason.
What about drug dealers, prostitutes, bookies, bootleggers,
pornographers, homosexuals, adulterers? Consensual crimes-so called
victimless crimes-demand criminal simulation for their detection.
This alone is a good argument for adopting the Knapp Commission's
recommendation to reduce police corruption by legalizing gambling
and other victimless crimes.65 2 A whole libertarian tradition powerfully
649. Id. at 498 (statement of Prof. Phillip Heymann) (emphasis added).
650. Id. at 500.
651. Oversight Hearings, supra note 153, at 160 (statement of Prof. Phillip
Heymann).
652. Commission to Investigate Allegations of Police Corruption, CoMmissioN REPoRT
(1972) at 17-20. "Corrupt activity must be curtailed by eliminating as many situations as
possible which expose policemen to corruption." Id. at 17. The Commission also urged
that to whatever extent gambling and Sabbath closing laws remained in force, their en-
forcement should not be a function of the police department. Id. at 18. The Commission
did not, however, recommend that the police cease their regulatory and prohibitory role
in the narcotics area:
The Commission believes that the police must continue to assume responsibility
for enforcement of laws forbidding narcotics sale and possession as long as soci-
ety deems it necessary to invoke criminal sanctions in this area. However, in-
creased study and attention should be given to ways other than criminal sanc-
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represented by John Stuart Mill's classic essay On Liberty6 5 3 argues
that government should punish no act between two consenting adults.
Nonetheless, it seems clear that a majority of the citizenry through
their representatives will continue to outlaw some private consensual
activities. Government must have reasonable suspicion if not probable
cause to believe a particular private citizen acting in a private capacity
is engaging in a prohibited private act which offends public sensibili-
ties, before probing private life and testing virtue. At the opposite ex-
treme of private citizens engaging in private acts are public officials
engaging in public acts: e.g., Norman Archer presenting Barone's case
to a grand jury, or representatives sponsoring legislation.
The Senate Select Committee recommended legislation distin-
guishing private life from government in just the wrong way: Whereas
ordinarily the federal government could initiate stings only when there
was "reasonable suspicion based upon articulable facts," those same
undercover operations could "infiltrate any political, or governmental
.. .organization or entity" only upon a stricter "finding that there is
probable cause to believe that the operation is necessary to detect or to
prevent specific acts of criminality."' Religious and news media as
private institutions were appropriately singled out for special protec-
tion, but the Committee's double standards, which especially protect
public office from effective scrutiny, are objectionable.
The better view is that, without any prior suspicion of their cor-
ruption, public officials acting with public power should be subject to
secret monitoring. Random virtue testing of public officials is thera-
peutic to our society, helping us more nearly approach our goal of a
true republic. "Public officials" are those who, as a condition of em-
ployment, swear an oath of allegiance to the United States Constitu-
tions for dealing with the addict.
The laws against marijuana are particularly controversial because of their
growing unenforceability and the conviction of many that they are undesirable.
However, the Commission has not found evidence that the marijuana laws are a
distinct factor in police corruption.
Id. at 19 (emphasis added).
653. Mill argued that consensual conduct not injurious to others was outside the
proper scope of societal control. However,
[a]s soon as any part of a person's conduct affects prejudicially the interests of
others, society has jurisdiction over it, and the question whether the general wel-
fare will or will not be promoted by interfering with it becomes open to discus-
sion. But there is no room for entertaining any such question when a person's
conduct affects the interests of no persons besides himself, or needs not affect
them unless they like (all persons concerned being of full age and the ordinary
amount of understanding). In all such cases, there should be perfect freedom,
legal and social, to do the action and stand the consequences.
J.S. MILL, ON LmERTY 92 (Bobbs-Merrill ed. 1956) (1st ed. London 1859).
654. SELEcT Comm., supra note 153, at 28.
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tion. To help ensure their oaths are true, their pledges of faith some-
thing real, let every public official assume always that some agent of
the principal observes all their use of public power. Let them assume
that each passing lure may contain a hook. For in the end, as Thomas
Jefferson said, "when a man asssumes a public trust, he should con-
sider himself as public property." 55 It is good preventive medicine for
every public official to assume that all use of public power is being
constantly monitored.
Government, pervasively testing and monitoring private citizens in
their private lives would be a totalitarian destruction of our free soci-
ety, but government testing and monitoring itself is good republican
government. "Suspicion is a virtue, as long as its object is the preserva-
tion of the public good, and as long as it stays within proper bounds,"
declared Patrick Henry. "Should it fall on me, I am contented: Con-
scious rectitude is a powerful consolation."6s 6
There are prominent points on the continuum between the ex-
tremes of a private citizen acting privately and a public official acting
with public power. Private citizens often act in a public or quasi-public
capacity. For example, corrupt lawyers like Klein or Rosner often cor-
rupt the public process in their private but licensed representation of
clients. So too do business people, especially where there are govern-
ment contracts. Throughout our country, small business routinely
bribes elevator, building, liquor and other public inspectors.
If we adopt this double standards approach and accept in princi-
ple that public officials may be monitored and tested while acting with
public power, it follows that all private citizens interacting with public
officials in their use of public power are similarly subject. Here, the
active/passive distinction takes on critical importance. Let every pri-
vate corrupter wonder whether the public official with whom he strikes
a corrupt deal is really an honest government agent.
Although sham opportunities should be made available to private
business by undercover agents posing as corrupt officials, government
agents should not initiate the bribe offers and a fortiori agents should
not "shake down" private citizens by demanding bribes and then pros-
ecuting their payment. A private citizen who initiates a bribe to a pub-
lic official for overlooking a violation should be prosecuted.
Even this is too simplistic. Many building codes, for example, can
655. Remark of Thomas Jefferson to Baron von Humboldt, 1807, quoted in BART-
LITT'S FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 375 (13th ed. 1955). The sentiment is valid, but the authen-
ticity of this statement is subject to some doubt. It does not appear in what purports to
be the complete correspondence between von Humboldt and Jefferson, H. de Terra, The
Humboldt-Jefferson Correspondence, 103 PROCEEDINGS OF THE AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL
SocmrEY 787 (1959), and does not appear in the 15th edition of Bartlett's.
656. 5 THE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 2, at 213 (Patrick Henry, statement to Vir-
ginia ratifying convention, June 1788).
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never be enforced in detail without shutting down legitimate small
construction companies. It is not uncommon to find honest builders
who pay cops not to force them to sweep all the sand and fill all the
holes every night, not to enforce unrealistic rules about distance from a
road that materials may rest overnight, regulations enacted long ago
for large construction sites, but inappropriate for single family
remodelling jobs. This is wrong, but it would be troubling if the gov-
ernment sent undercover agents dressed as cops to "hang around" a
site, making their presence known in a way that did not actively solicit
but did suggest an approach to a savvy builder. Of course paying a
public official to overlook a truly unsafe condition is very serious and
should be prosecuted. By accepting money up front, Jannotti might
have placed himself in a position to be pressured into overlooking hotel
safety code violations. When private citizens in their business capacity
interact with public officials in their official capacity, there are fine
lines to be drawn in the use of undercover techniques.
Business bribery may involve no public official. For centuries, sup-
pliers worldwide have paid kickbacks to purchasing agents. Often these
acts are crimes, and the faithless agents' private employers are the un-
willing victims. It requires undercover monitoring and simulation to ef-
fectively prosecute all bribery, including this private type. The most
carefully corrupt and the most unwary innocent resemble each other in
the private no less than the public sphere. Here, warnings of the
Archer/Abscam critics assume significance. With one major excep-
tion-organized crime-absent judicially warranted approval, based at
least on reasonable suspicion if not probable cause that a particular
individual was committing these crimes, government should not intro-
duce criminal simulations into the private business context.
6 57
Another segment in the continuum between public officials acting
in their public capacity and private citizens acting in their private ca-
pacity includes public officials acting in their private capacity. Al-
though this essay has urged that, as a condition of employment, every
public official, having sworn an oath of allegience to abide by the Con-
stitution, and entrusted with some portion of the public power, also
agrees to be monitored and tested when using the public power, public
officials are also citizens and human beings with private lives. Their
dual capacity led many critics and supporters of Abscam to deny the
657. Oversight Hearings, supra note 153, at 25 (testimony of Prof. Geoffrey Stone).
Private employers may still hire private agents to gather evidence for whatever reason to
present to a District Attorney-leaving themselves open for possible civil suits for any
unwarranted intrusions.
Undercover scams privately initiated against private citizens may be very intrusive
but, as Professor Stone warned, it would be a "mistake too easily to equate the dangers
posed by intrusions into privacy by government and superficially similar intrusions by
other elements of society." Id.
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public/private distinction and urge "one set of rules" to protect all citi-
zens. A distinction can be made, however, between public officials act-
ing in their public capacity and public officials in their private
capacity.
When Professor Heymann appeared before the House Subcommit-
tee a month after Abscam first broke, Congressman Hyde, testing Hey-
mann's flat rejection of double standards, confronted him with his own
written assertion that the Justice Department would "not shirk our re-
sponsibility to continue the investigation and to prosecute, if war-
ranted, regardless of how prominent or powerful the official may be."63 8
"Now you told us about the investigation of electrical inspectors in
Chicago," said the Illinois congressman to President Carter's Criminal
Division Chief, "tell me again why you didn't investigate and prosecute
Dr. Peter Bourne in the White House." 5 9
Heymann hesitated. "I'm wondering for a minute, Mr. Hyde,
whether it's appropriate for me to say anything about that or not."60
Congressman Rodino, Chairman of the Judiciary Committee, and
Subcommittee Chairman Edwards signaled Congressman Hyde not to
press. "I don't want to embarrass anybody, so I will withdraw the
question."61
Professor Heymann, on a moment's reflection, decided the ques-
tion deserved its "simple answer":
To the best of my knowledge no one is prosecuted for similar
behavior, and that ought to apply to political figures, too. It's
easy for someone in my position to say let's go ahead and pros-
ecute a political figure. Administrative, executive, or legislative,
State or Federal.
It's hard to say let's not prosecute a political figure who
may or may not have technically violated the law in a situation
where no one else would be prosecuted.6 62
"Well, if that's so, that's fine," said Congressman Hyde, "if that
wasn't a violation. .. ."
"It's not a matter of saying it's not a violation," corrected the Pro-
fessor. "Whether it was or not, it's a matter of saying there are situa-
tions where no one else would be prosecuted, and I believe in those
situations, even if a political figure has violated the law, he or she
658. F.B.I. Oversight: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional
Rights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 159 (1980) (statement
of Rep. Hyde quoting Prof. Phillip Heymann) [hereinafter cited as FBI Hearings].
659. Id. (statement of Rep. Henry Hyde).
660. Id. (statement of Prof. Philip Heymann).
661. Id. (statement of Rep. Henry Hyde).
662. Id. (statement of Prof. Phillip Heymann).
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should not be prosecuted where no one else would be, simply because
they are public figures."6 '
Although Bourne was a public official who had violated the law
and we do not want public officials breaking the law with impunity, the
fate of the physician sits well with us, as it did with the committee,
only if we imagine his violation as having occurred in his private capac-
ity. He was only incidentally a public official.
Similarly, after the Town of North Muskegon Police Department
dismissed a police officer for violating the adultery statute by cohab-
iting with a married woman not his wife, a federal district court in
western Michigan rejected the city's argument that the cop's off duty
conduct at least potentially affected his job performance, and rejected
the town's claim that as a condition of their employment law enforce-
ment officers can be required to be totally law abiding citizens. The
court reinstated this public official, upholding his constitutional right
of sexual privacy2
Of course, it is usually illegitimate for government agents posing as
willing sexual partners, fellow sports bettors, or the like, to test public
officials in their private capacity to see if they will commit crimes unre-
lated to their use and abuse of the public trust. But here, too, there are
troubling cases.
For example, a public official who because of sexual misconduct is
subject to blackmail may be a threat to the republic. So, too, a compul-
sive gambler, alcoholic, etc. A simple rule here would be that public
officials acting in their private capacity should not be offered a simu-
lated criminal opportunity unless there is reasonable suspicion to be-
lieve their private disability interferes with their public trust. Before
assuming their public office and swearing oaths to abide by the United
States Constitution, perhaps in a confidential background check, pub-
lic officials should reveal under oath, their particular vulnerabilities.
The questionnaire might read: "Have you committed any crimes for
which you have not been convicted or arrested? Have you engaged in
any activity which you would be embarrassed to have made public? If
the answer is 'yes,' specify. The failure to include anything here consti-
tutes a waiver of your right to privacy concerning it."
Such revelations would not eliminate but would diminish a public
official's vulnerability to blackmail, because he could report the at-
tempt to authorities without also having to reveal anything newly em-
barrassing. Thus, the inclination to temporize with a blackmailer
would be diminished.
Critics might claim that such a system would be impractical and in
663. Id.
664. Briggs v. North Muskegon Police Department, 563 F. Supp. 585, 592 (W.D.
Mich. 1983).
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any event would scare away potential public servants. It might be
workable; some -assistants at the New York special prosecutor's office,
confronted with similar questions before swearing their oaths, admit-
ted they had smoked marihuana 65
It is difficult but possible to separate to some degree the public life
from the private life of a public official. Professor Heymann had testi-
fied that the Justice Department generally imposed on itself a rule that
it would not pressure the target's immediate family. "It's legal, but we
don't do it. But friends, yes; girlfriends, boyfriends, best friends,
yes.,
6 66
This constitutes a rough outline of the double standards this essay
urges. The main distinctions are four: public officials in their public
capacity, public citizens in their private capacity, private citizens in
their public capacity, and private citizens in their private capacity.
Specific checks and fine lines have yet to be worked out. However sub-
tle the graduations become, the extremes are clearly separate: Officials
acting with the public power should be subject to much greater scru-
tiny, simulated criminal opportunity, and monitored temptation re-
lated to their public trust than private citizens acting in their private
capacity.
At bottom, double standards as a component of fundamental fair-
ness rests upon the basic belief that government should be held to the
strictest standards. This cuts many ways. It applies to government as
investigators, as legislators, as judges, as prosecutors, and finally, yes,
as targets.
This double standard double cut was well expressed by former
United States Attorney Whitney North Seymour in defending the
technique under cross examination in the Archer due process .hearing:
"You felt[,] did you not[,] that the end justified the means[,] is
that right?"
"No," said Seymour, "I felt there was a plain obligation to pursue
what appeared to be solid information of unlawful conduct in the ad-
ministration of justice in Queens County and that we were the only
agency in a position to do anything about it at the time."
"Did you think that the government officials should be subjected
to the same rules of conduct that are commanded of a citizen?"
665. Personal knowledge of Author.
666. FBI Hearings, supra note 672, at 147. When I was a special prosecutor, I saw an
associate display no sensitivity to this distinction, coercively blending private and public.
A businessman who refused to cooperate with our investigation into police shakedowns
was given an added incentive when his wife and his girlfriend were each subpoenaed to
appear before the grand jury at the same time. At most, they had unimportant informa-
tion to provide. He cooperated to avoid that confrontation. In my view, this tactic was
unfair, and would have remained outrageous even had he been a targeted public official.
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"I believe that they should be subjected to a higher standard. I
think that higher standard was met in this case.
'66 7
In sum, when government officials are investigating government
officials, when "government" is agent and target, then double stan-
dards are deeply embedded, even, ironically, in Justice Brandeis' clas-
sic, stirring call for their abolition:
Decency, security, and liberty alike demand that govern-
ment officials shall be subjected to the same rules of conduct
that are commands to the citizen. In a government of laws, ex-
istence of the government will be imperiled if it fails to observe
the law scrupulously. Our Government is the potent, the omni-
present teacher. For good or for i, it teaches the whole people
by its example. Crime is contagious. If the government be-
comes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law; it invites every
man to become a law unto himself; it invites anarchy. To de-
clare that in the administration of the criminal law the end
justifies the means-to declare that the government may com-
mit crimes in order to secure the conviction of a private crimi-
nal-would bring terrible retribution. Against that pernicious
doctrine this Court should resolutely set its face.6
ENTRAPMENT
Traditionally an entrapment defense was supposed to check gov-
ernment overreach. The Senate Select Committee would accomplish
this by Congressional legislation establishing an objective entrapment
defense making it entrapment per se whenever "federal agents pro-
vided goods or services that were necessary to the commission of the
crime [which] defendant could not have obtained without government
participation."6
The Senate Select Committee's final report vigorously attacks the
"prevailing" subjective entrapment doctrine as
unjustifiable in theory and often perverse in practice. ...
[A]lthough the [Supreme] Court had failed to articulate it[,]
police should refrain from offering inducements that are signif-
icantly larger than those actually proferred under similar cir-
cumstances in the real world or that are attractive enough to
persuade virtually anyone in similar circumstances to commit a
crime.... The entrapment inquiry now focuses on the defen-
dant's predisposition, rather than on the police conduct. As a
667. Respondent's Appendix at RA 212, New York v. Archer, 486 F.2d 670 (2d Cir.
1973).
668. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
(emphasis added).
669. SELECT CohiM., supra note 153, at 27.
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result, the conviction of a predisposed defendant will stand
even if he was lured into criminality through the offer of a
wildly unrealistic inducement to which most people would have
succumbed. Conversely, a defendant snared through the use of
reasonable and otherwise proper police methods must be ac-
quitted if he is found not predisposed.1
70
Actually, the Senate attack here does not go far enough. Again,
there is that flawed doctrinal connection between government induce-
ment and defendant's predisposition: an enormous inducement makes
the target all the more willing, all the more plainly predisposed, and
therefore all the less entrapped.
There are at least two responses to this "flaw": (1) Define predis-
position as "otherwise ready, willing, and able to commit crimes of this
type," thus leaving public officials alone with their otherwise unrealiz-
able corrupt fantasies; and (2) Alternatively, under a subjective ap-
proach, admit that a larger inducement is less subjectively entrapping,
but rely on due process-fundamental fairness-to pick up the slack.
By this reasoning, when the government offers an enormous induce-
ment, it ensures predisposition and no entrapment, but only at a
greater risk of due process violation. Due process, then, checks
entrapment.
Whether or not acknowledged doctrinally, this check will operate
any way. "It may be likely," the Senate Committee observed, "that a
jury would find that a defendant had been entrapped if a huge induce-
ment had been offered to commit some trivial offense (e.g., $5,000,000
to double park), but such a jury surely would be motivated not by the
articulated predisposition principle, but by outrage at the police
conduct.
671
A second attack upon subjective entrapment is that it is internally
incoherent. If an entrapment defense excuses only non-predisposed de-
fendants because they are less blameworthy and less personally deserv-
ing of punishment, why not excuse all non-predisposed defendants,
even where private persons induce their targets for private motives and
thereby overbear their innocent wills? Since subjectivists restrict en-
trapment to inducement by government agents or informants, that
standard is not consistently concerned with defendants' personal guilt
or innocence. As the Senate Committee summed up this attack, "the
defendant's moral blameworthiness cannot be affected by the
tempter's hidden identity as a federal agent. '6 72
One of the few commentators who agrees with the majority of the
670. Id. at 365.
671. Id. at 366.
672. Id. at 364.
[Vol. 28
BEYOND 1984: UNDERCOVER IN AMERICA
United States Supreme Court in preferring a subjective entrapment
defense, Professor Roger Park, countered that although entrapment is
concerned with defendants' personal culpability, that defense has other
objectives which sometimes require persons of equal moral culpability
to be treated differently under the law.6 7 3 In his excellent and widely
cited The Entrapment Controversy, Park offered an analogy in de-
fense of subjective entrapment. If two defendants each rely upon a
lawyer's expert advice that a particular act is legal, he who relies upon
a public official later has a defense of "mistake of law," whereas the
other person who in good faith relied upon private counsel is neverthe-
less guilty.
674
Private inducement is not entrapment under either a subjective or
objective view. "Designing an entrapment defense, then, requires a
candid recognition that the entrapment doctrine has very little to do
with culpability and very much to do with directing law enforcement
efforts into effective and socially desirable channels," the Senate Com-
mittee's final report declared."7 "[I]f society actually believes that
those tempted into criminality are not culpable (a notion that the Se-
lect Committee rejects)6 7 6 the substantive criminal law should be mod-
ified to reflect that fact and to acquit persons tempted into crime,
whether by governmental or by non-governmental actors.
6 7 7
The catalogue of objections to subjective entrapment is lengthy,
including an apparent circularity and post hoc method of proving pre-
disposition noted by the Senate Committee: "[I]n modern practice
'predisposition' permits a finding that any defendant who commits any
crime in response to any inducement is predisposed, because such de-
fendant has, by accepting the inducement, demonstrated his willing-
ness to engage in illegal conduct.
'6 7 8
Perhaps the greatest problem with subjective entrapment is the
nature of predisposition. What is it? Can the question, "Was the de-
fendant predisposed?" be answered truly with a "yes" or "no"?
Take Harry Jannotti. Given the Arab mind, with apparently limit-
673. Park, The Entrapment Controversy, 60 MiNN. L. REv. 163, 241 (1976).
674. Id. Note Park's double reliance upon a private/public distinction. In entrap-
ment, that distinction is critical as to the source of the inducement-a public official or
cooperating citizen acting in a public capacity is necessary for entrapment, whereas a
private person inducing in a private capacity cannot entrap. Troubling cases include a
public official acting privately; e.g., a corrupt cop inducing a merchant to bribe, or a
private person acting apparently publicly-a phony "cop" inducing the bribe. Strictly,
the merchant does not have an entrapment defense to attempted bribery, nor a defense
of duress absent fear of physical force.
675. SF.LEcT Comm., supra note 153, at 372.
676. Id. at 368.
677. Id. at 369.
678. Id. at 366.
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less wealth, the skills of representatives who also pushed the right but-
tons, and the enormous municipal benefit from this apparently legiti-
mate project, can it be said with any certainty that Jannotti either was
or was not predisposed?
In the end, predisposition may not only be unknown, it may in
fact be unknowable. Predisposed/non-predisposed is not a useful di-
chotomy as much as a continuum. We are all more or less prone or
resistant to certain opportunities. Almost anyone will yield to induce-
ment, coercion, and emergency at some level of love, sympathy, or
need. A subjective entrapment defense makes predisposition an all-or-
nothing question: Was the defendant predisposed? Even if the answer
could be known, it might well turn out to be a matter of degree, accu-
rately expressed as a likelihood, a probability that all other things
equal, in situations of this type, given this inducement, the defendant
would act criminally. How is a jury to decide?
When we are unsure of whether the defendant has been en-
trapped, who should have to prove what? Under the objective view, the
defendant has the burden to prove the government's failing, whereas
generally with subjective entrapment, the government has the burden
to establish predisposition.179 Each must prove the other's flaw.
679. Thus, for example, the MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.13 (Proposed Official Draft 1962)
incorporates an objective test for entrapment. Under such a statute, the inquiry focuses
on the likelihood that police conduct would induce a hypothetical law-abiding person to
commit a crime of the type alleged against the defendant. The predisposed defendant,
the one ready and perhaps eager to commit the crime, may still be acquitted if it can be
shown by a preponderance of evidence that police conduct created a substantial risk of
inducing non-predisposed persons to commit such a crime.
The classic formulation of the burden of proof under the subjective theory is that of
Judge Hand, who stated that entrapment cases raise two questions of fact:
(1) did the agent induce the accused to commit the offense charged in the indict-
ment; (2) if so, was the accused ready and willing without persuasion and was he
awaiting any propitious opportunity to commit the offense. On the first question
the accused has the burden; on the second the prosecution has it.
United States v. Sherman, 200 F.2d 880, 882-83 (2d Cir. 1952) (reversing the conviction
of defendant, who was again convicted on retrial, a judgment which was affirmed by the
court of appeals, United States v. Sherman, 240 F.2d 949 (2d Cir. 1957), and reversed by
the Supreme Court, Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369 (1958)). Under most recent
decisions, the defendant's burden is met merely by the introduction of some evidence of
government inducement; the defendant's burden is only the burden of production, not
the burden of persuasion. See Park, supra note 673, at 262-67. In the Abscam cases,
where the existence of the sting operations was not contested, the defendants all easily
met their burden as to inducement.
In most cases when an entrapment defense is raised, the second issue, the defen-
dant's predisposition, is actively contested. Id. at 263. Once the defense of entrapment
has been properly raised, the government must prove the defendant's predisposition be-
yond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 264. This focus on the predisposition of the defendant
was explained by the Court in Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369 (1958): "To deter-
mine whether entrapment has been established, a line must be drawn between the trap
[Vol. 28
BEYOND 1984: UNDERCOVER IN AMERICA
If a federal jury took it seriously, the government's burden of per-
suasion as to defendant's predisposition might well make the difference
between guilt or innocence. Can it be said beyond a reasonable doubt
that Harry Jannotti was predisposed to criminality? Judge Fullam and
the two Appellate dissenters concluded that clearly, as a matter of law,
the evidence did not permit a fair-minded jury to conclude beyond a
reasonable doubt that Jannotti was predisposed. On the other hand, in
some states like New York, where a defendant must persuade the jury
by a preponderance of the evidence that predisposition was absent,6s0 a
state court might reasonably affirm Jannotti's conviction, on the
ground that, as required, the defendant had failed to persuade the jury
by a preponderance of the evidence that he was not predisposed.
In all federal courts, once the government's inducement is shown,
a jury is instructed to acquit unless they are convinced "beyond a rea-
sonable doubt that the defendant was ready and willing to commit the
crime at any favorable opportunity."681 The word "any" here is ambig-
uous. Does it mean "every"? If the jury doubts the defendant would
have committed the (type of) crime had the inducement been smaller
and more reasonable, should it acquit? Or does "any" mean "at least
one," so that a defendant who would have seized a different opportu-
nity was not entrapped? To be sensible, "the crime" must be elastic in
the proper way. How much of "the crime" includes the actual circum-
stances, including the inducement that surrounded its commission?
What is the precise (type of) crime that Jannotti either was or was not
willing to commit at "any" favorable opportunity?
Suppose Jannotti was not predisposed to cheat the People, but
only to serve them. Suppose he was not predisposed to allow anything
unsafe or adverse in his district. Suppose he accepted money from a
for the unwary innocent and the trap for the unwary criminal." Id. at 372. In most cases,
subjective entrapment is a question for the jury. United States v. Jannotti, 673 F.2d 578,
597 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1106 (1982).
680. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 40.05 (McKinney 1975).
New York's affirmative defense of entrapment by definition requires the defendant
to bear the burden of persuasion by a preponderance of the evidence. New York's en-
trapment defense reads as if it were both subjective and objective. See id. On the other
hand, the official practice commentary reads: "The formulation of this offense is based
upon the federal standards as enunciated in Sorrells v. United States, and Sherman v.
United States." (citations omitted). Id., Practice Commentary.
Roger Park has pointed out that New York and New Hampshire's high courts, with
identical statutes, have interpreted them oppositely-New York held to have a "subjec-
tive" and New Hampshire an "objective" standard. See Park, supra note 673, at 168-69
n.16 and cases cited therein.
681. Park, supra note 673, at 176 n.39 and cases cited therein. This instruction was
approved as a standard jury instruction in Russell, 411 U.S. at 427 n.4, and is taken from
E. DEvrrr & C. BLACKMAR, FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS § 13.09, at 364 (3d
ed. 1977).
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sheik to whom it meant nothing but proof of his willingness to aid a
legitimate project. In that case, was Jannotti predisposed to accept a
bribe under "afiy favorable opportunity"?
Finally, suppose predisposition can be adequately defined and de-
cided by a jury-should it make the difference between guilt or inno-
cence? Two defendants are offered the same criminal opportunity;
both accept it, both are aware it is criminal and consciously exchange
official acts for money. Yet one is not entrapped because he is predis-
posed. Subjective entrapment seems to violate a basic prohibition
against punishing status and thought crime. 2 A person is to be pun-
ished not for what he thinks, or for who he is, but only for how he has
intentionally, knowingly, recklessly, or negligently acted. We should
punish the intentional act, not the predisposition, the argument goes;
status crimes, thought crimes, head us toward Orwell's bleak vision in
1984.
The Senate Select Committee, which had nothing but scorn for
the Supreme Court's subjective entrapment defense, recommended in
its final report that Congress consider legislation establishing a federal
affirmative defense of entrapment, providing for a defendant's acquit-
tal when a federal agent (or cooperating private person) "is shown by a
preponderance of the evidence to have induced the defendant to com-
mit an offense, using methods that more likely than not would have
682. Thus, if the defendant has a record of offenses similar to the one charged, it will
be almost impossible to prevent a finding of predisposition by the jury. The mere at-
tempt to raise the entrapment defense by such a defendant will often result in the jury's
deciding on a guilty verdict because the defendant is a "bad person," irrespective of the
showing as to the particular offense charged:
It is a strange doctrine that makes guilt or innocence depend on whether a de-
fendant has committed other similar offenses. However bad a person may be,
however guilty of crime, it is nevertheless a principle of our system of criminal
law administration that conviction and punishment must be for some specific act
or crime proved against an accused by competent evidence compelling an infer-
ence of guilt as to the specific act, and not for a general criminal depravity or
wickedness. The admission of this kind of evidence invariably prejudices the
jury against the accused and diverts their attention from an impartial considera-
tion of the evidence of the particular crime charged.
Donnelly, Judicial Control of Informants, Spies, Stool Pigeons, and Agents Provocat-
eurs, 60 YALE L.J. 683, 1108 (1951).
Because the defendant with a shady past will have a nearly impossible time avoiding
a finding of predisposition, entrapment may be foreclosed as a practical option for de-
fense. See 1 U.S. NATIONAL COMMISSION ON REFORM OF FEDERAL LAWS, WORKING PAPERS
306 (1970). This inability to mount a successful entrapment defense, say critics of subjec-
tive entrapment, encourages police to adopt abusive tactics against such defendants:
"One of the most serious shortcomings of the present entrapment law is that the predis-
position element tends to encourage or tempt law enforcement into a 'devil-may-care' or
'anything goes' attitude toward persons of a known criminal reputation." Id. at 306-07.
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caused a normally law-abiding citizen to commit a similar offense." 6 3
This objective standard, too, has its obvious flaws. Who is a "nor-
mally law-abiding citizen"? Is he wealthy, powerful, easily befriended,
loyal? Not only is the standard unclear, it is inefficacious. Take the
very wealthy, cautiously corrupt public official, thoroughly predisposed
to corruption, but only under the most favorable conditions. Insulated
by intermediaries, this most thoroughly corrupt target may refuse
$10,000 bribes as not worth considering. If government agents cannot
become intimate with the most cautious, they must compensate by of-
fering an inducement so substantial it would cause a normally law-
abiding citizen to violate the law, yet is necessary because it represents
a typical corrupt price for this wealthy, cautiously crooked official.
Under the proposed objective entrapment doctrine, these inducements
would result in acquittals, in spite of the fact that they are tailored to
the particular target and represent the minimum bribe sufficient to re-
veal serious corruption.
A complementary danger inheres in the objective standard: con-
sider a particularly weak, susceptible target who is not predisposed and
has not previously engaged in criminality, but is caught in the govern-
ment net, unable to resist temptations that a hypothetical average per-
son should be able to resist. Park urges that such a weak-willed defen-
dant should be acquitted, and only a subjective entrapment defense
permits it: "[A]n inducement. . . fair in the abstract may be unfair in
a particular case, for reasons that are unknown to the agent and there-
fore do not affect the propriety of his conduct."6" 4
A strength of subjective entrapment is that it focuses upon each
particular defendant's behavior and mental state. Did he brag of an
ability to fix, did he readily acquiesce, did he show expert knowledge?
As Park points out, even under an objective entrapment defense, the
particular defendant's predisposition might be relevant to the decency
of the police conduct. In Sherman, for example, the agent's knowledge
of the target's weakness-his former addiction, his predisposition to
use narcotics although presently abstaining-was a factor in assessing
the agent's conduct. The particular context, the particular defendant's
subjective mental state, must play some role even in an objective de-
fense. "A hypothetical person cannot be wholly hypothetical. He must
be endowed with some of the actual qualities of the defendant."68 The
question, difficult to answer, becomes-Which?
Perhaps a public/private distinction is necessary here. Otherwise
an objective standard would place the most wealthy corrupt officials
out of reach, while convicting the weak-willed private citizen. "Nor-
683. SELECT COMM., supra note 153, at 373.
684. Park, supra note 673, at 220.
685. Id. at 204.
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mally law-abiding citizen" is too broad a category. The normal citizen
does not swear an oath of allegiance to the United States Constitution
as a condition precedent of employment. The normal citizen is not en-
trusted with public power. If an objective standard is to be employed,
perhaps the measuring rod should be a "normally law-abiding public
official in the defendant's particular office." Still a problem remains
with the very wealthy, canny corrupt, who will only take small risks for
great sums.
With the weak-willed, the public/private distinction is also attrac-
tive, but problematic. On the one hand, a non-predisposed, weak-willed
public official, particularly susceptible to temptations that the average
official would resist, is dangerous, and ought not to occupy a position of
public trust. That the objective entrapment defense is unavailable to
such a person is good, but on the other hand, that it is unavailable to
the non-predisposed private citizen inadvertently tangled in the gov-
ernment net is disturbing. Obviously, double standards have their lim-
its, here reached. Even for violations of their public trust, as criminal
defendants, public officials are entitled to the same guarantees, and the
same burden of persuasion requirements, as all other citizens. 86
Obviously, another flaw with any objective entrapment standard
outlawing methods more likely than not to cause a normally law-abid-
ing citizen to commit a similar offense, is its vagueness. Vagueness was
also the key problem with a due process protection "whose nature and




"One way to forestall the most serious potential abuse of the gov-
ernment's 'inducement power' is to codify the due process principles,"
said the Committee. They concluded, however, that due process legis-
lation was not yet needed, and that a "general outrageousness standard
would provide law enforcement officials and the judiciary with little
useful guidance. Unacceptably intrusive undercover tactics cannot all
be identified through the use of a simple formula." '68 8
Yet the Committee was willing to identify common ground:
Most people would agree, for example, that law enforcement
agents should not use threats of harm ... that police should
not manipulate a target's personal or vocational situation-for
example, by destroying his property so as to increase his need
for money-[in order] to increase the likelihood of his engaging
in criminal conduct; ... that undercover agents should not
686. In dismissal or impeachment hearings, however, where the public official is judg-
ed and disciplined in a public capacity, a different standard may govern to protect the
public.
687. SELECT COMM., supra note 153, at 368.
688. Id. at 370.
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cultivate intimate relationships with targets, the better to lure
them into criminality; and that law enforcement agents should
not engage in serious and harmful criminal activity or inten-
tionally injure innocent third parties in an attempt to deter
crime. (See generally United States v. Archer) .619
The Senate Committee codified these formulae into three situa-
tions that constituted per se entrapment: When it was shown by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence that the defendant committed the crime
1. Because of a threat of harm, to the person or property of
any individual... ;
2. Because federal law enforcement agents manipulated the
defendant's personal, economic, or vocational situation to
increase the likelihood of his committing that crime; or
3. Because .. .agents provided goods or services that were
necessary to the commission of the crime and that the de-
fendant could not have obtained without government
participation.6 90
This classification is incomplete without a recognition of a public/pri-
vate distinction. In small towns, influential corrupters typically manip-
ulate local public officials' vocational, economic, and/or personal situa-
tions in order to convince them to cooperate and join the corrupt fold.
It is not inconceivable that a foreign power would so manipulate a na-
tional official's situation. Unfortunately, duplicating this pressure may
be necessary to determine whether the public official's character is ade-
quate to the public trust. The government must never do this to pri-
vate citizens, and should avoid such manipulations of public officials in
their private capacity, although the boundary may be difficult to
determine.
Objective entrapment typically is an issue for the judge and not
the jury. 91 The Senate Committee observed, "the 'normally law-abid-
ing individual' standard does not require the resolution of any factual
issues, and it does not, of course, purport to hinge on the innocence of
the accused, two areas that typically are the province of the jury."6 92
The exact nature of an "average law-abiding citizen," however, does
seem to be a factual issue.
Highly critical of Abscam, United States Attorney Weir asked,
[H]ow many hoops does a man have to jump through, how
many times does he have to say no before he crumbles, because
689. Id.
690. Id. at 362.
691. Id. at 375.
692. Id.
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we are dealing with something which exists in everyone to a
degree, and that is greed.
How many times should a man say no to several million
dollars before he agrees to perpetrate a fraud on a fictitious
sheik?
693
"What is your answer?" inquired Congressman Hyde.
"I would look at the amount of pressure put on him and let the
jury decide.
'694
Traditionally, in a free society, the jury, as representative of the
community's sense of fairness, is a primary restraint on government
encroachment of citizens' liberty. Aristotle identified the jury as the
most essential guarantor of personal rights in a democracy, 9 5 and the
Maryland Farmer saw the jury, "the democratic branch of the judiciary
power-more necessary than representatives in the legislature: for
these [judges'] usurpations which silently undermine the spirit of lib-
erty, under the sanction of law, are more dangerous than direct and
open legislative attacks."6 96 Contemporaneously, in the 83rd Federal-
ist, Hamilton, himself no populist, nevertheless extolled the value of
the jury as "essential in a representative republic" and a check upon
"arbitrary methods of prosecuting pretended offenses."697 Ultimately,
for Hamilton, the "strongest argument" for a jury was its "security
against corruption .... [T]here is always more time and better oppor-
tunity to tamper with a standing body of magistrates than with a jury
summoned for the occasion ... ."69 In short, giving joint control of
the outcome of trial to a judge and jury afforded a "double security;
693. Operations Hearings, supra note 153, at 483 (testimony of U.S. Att'y Robert
Weir).
694. Id. at 484.
695. ARISTOTLE'S CONSTITUTION OF ATHENS AND RELATED TEXTS 77 (K. von Fritz & E.
Kapp trans. 1950).
[Tihirdly (and according to the prevailing opinion, this more than anything else
has increased the political power of the common people), the right of appeal to a
jury court. For when the people have a right to vote in the courts, they become
the masters of the state. Moreover, since the laws are not written down in clear
and simple terms... disputes over interpretation will inevitably arise, and the
court has the decision in all affairs, both public and private. Some people believe
that Solon deliberately made the laws obscure so that the people would be mas-
ters of the decision. But this is not likely. The reason is rather that he was not
able to formulate the best principle in general terms.
Id. "For the people have made themselves masters of everything and administer every-
thing through decrees of the assembly and decision of the law courts, in which they hold
the power." Id. at 114.
696. 5 THE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 2, at 38 (Maryland Farmer) (pseudonym of
John Francis Mercer, a non-signing member of the Constitutional Convention, id. at 5).
697. THE FEDERALIST, supra note 1, No. 83, at 499 (Hamilton).
698. Id. at 500.
[Vol. 28
BEYOND 1984: UNDERCOVER IN AMERICA
and it will readily be perceived that this complicated agency tends to
preserve the purity of both institutions."6 "
In the end, an insurmountable problem with objective entrapment
is that it diverts attention from the defendant's guilt or innocence. In
determining whether the defendant was entrapped, why should a judge
decide what some hypothetical person would have done in some range
of average circumstances not actually present? The subjectivists are
concerned with a defendant's mind-set on a specific occasion, with that
defendant's responsibility. Unfortunately, both standards of entrap-
ment are seriously flawed. The Select Committee considered, but re-
jected for now, abolishing the entrapment defense. As the Committee
observed in a subjectivist moment,
an entrapment defense serves a powerful and necessary-even
if largely symbolic-function. It reflects the deeply rooted and
often unarticulated feeling that "[h]uman nature is weak
enough and sufficiently beset by temptations without govern-
ment adding to them and generating crime. . . ." An entrap-
ment defense also gives force to the general perception that it
is inappropriate for the government to "play on the weaknesses
of an innocent party and beguile him into commiting crimes
which he otherwise would not have attempted.
70 0
A majority of the Justices of the Supreme Court agree that a due
process defense exists separately from either subjective or objective en-
trapment.70 1 That defense does not stem from the Court's supervisory
authority over the federal judicial system; nor is it implied in congres-
sional statutory intent. Rather, due process outlaws only outrageous
behavior, which is not merely distasteful but so fundamentally unfair
as to be unconstitutional.70 2 In retrospect, the key question in Archer
and Abscam is fairness.'
699. Id. at 501.
700. SELECT CoMM., supra note 153, at 369.
701. See supra text accompanying notes 74-77 & 115-25.
702. Justice Rehnquist suggested in dictum in United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423,
431-32 (1973), that a due process defense might be available in a case involving outra-
geous police conduct. He cited Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952), as an example
of such a case. 411 U.S. at 432. In Rochin, in which a conviction based on evidence
obtained by forcibly pumping the defendant's stomach was reversed as violative of due
process, Justice Frankfurter explained that such conduct does "more than offend some
fastidious squeamishness or private sentimentalism about combatting crime too energeti-
cally. This is conduct that shocks the conscience." 342 U.S. at 172.
Citing Rochin, Justice Powell argued in Hampton that a due process defense based
on outrageous police conduct should be available even to a predisposed defendant: "Due
process in essence means fundamental fairness." Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S.
484, 494 n.6 (Powell, J., concurring). To violate due process and bar conviction, "[p]olice
overinvolvement in crime would have to reach a demonstrable level of outrageousness."
Id. at 495 n.7 (Powell, J., concurring).
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Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has not yet found a fit occasion
to articulate its views. It missed a perfect opportunity by denying cer-
tiorari in Archer. That investigation was not only fair, it was the model
investigation, situationally targeted with probable cause of corruption
in the Queens County criminal justice system; it was carefully moni-
tored; the corrupt opportunity was unambiguous; the unwitting mid-
dleman, Wasserberger, without hesitation led undercover agents to a
defense attorney who actively structured the corrupt strategy. The de-
fense attorney set the price, and reasonable realities were duplicated.
Furthermore, the chief operative in the New York probe, Bob
Leuci, was a government agent-informant who was strongly committed
to documenting corruption without ensnaring innocent people, and he
had been replaced as soon as possible by undercover agent Sante
Bario. In the Archer investigation, the corrupt middleman De Stefano
had made one single introduction and immediately dropped from the
case, leaving it under the tight supervision and control of the federal
agencies.
In contrast, however valid on balance, Abscam was seriously
flawed. Mel Weinberg, whom Ben-Veniste called "so unbelievably cun-
ning and Machiavellian that the FBI agents can be eaten for breakfast,
lunch, and dinner by a guy like that, '70 3 had a club over his head and
had made a deal to delay or escape prison. Out for himself and largely
on his own, the "walking cesspool" as Congressman Hughes called him,
had "dragged the whole investigation down. '70 4 Principal detractors
and admirers all agree that Abscam's fundamental mistake was too lit-
tle supervision of its chief operative, informant Mel Weinberg.
"Abscam," concluded the Senate Select Committee, "demon-
strate[s] the importance of replacing informants with undercover spe-
cial agents at the earliest practicable moment in an undercover opera-
tion; if pressure is to be applied, it should be applied by an undercover
agent fully familiar with the boundaries established by the entrapment
doctrine and by the due process clause.
'70 5
But what are the boundaries established by the due process
clause? What was fundamentally fair or unfair about Abscam?
An "aberration, something totally different than any other experi-
ence," United States Attorney Plaza called it, "a perversion of the
truth. 7 0 6 Plaza told the House Subcommittee: "I feel that the jury
703. Operations Hearings, supra note 153, at 356 (testimony of Richard Ben-
Veniste).
704. Id. at 765 (remark by Rep. William J. Hughes).
705. SELECT COMM., supra note 153, at 225-26.
706. Operations Hearings, supra note 153, at 456 (testimony of U.S. Att'y Edward
Plaza).
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should have been entitled to the complete picture. . . . The feeling [in
Washington] was that the video tapes spoke for themselves. [But]
there were illusions within illusions.
'7 0 7
Ben-Veniste had already explained to the House Committee how
Abscam was a "scam within a scam." The FBI had assured Weinberg
that no targeted political figure would ever be called upon to perform
any action whatsoever, and the Bureau allowed Weinberg to tell the
targets he was double-dealing the sheik. Taken together, Weinberg
could orchestrate a performance that no one took seriously. "[T]he De-
partment of Justice has suggested that the Abscam premise approxi-
mated a real-world situation ... the bizarre scenario of an eccentric
billionaire sheik with his overtly unfaithful financial adviser who would
give away substantial amounts of money for mere words without action
hardly mirrors reality." '08
Not only have judges and juries unanimously rejected Ben-
Veniste's and Plaza's scam-within-a-scam scenario, but also the Senate
Select Committee's own "Comprehensive Review of the Record
Amassed" "compelled" it to "reject the contention that Abscam per-
verted the truth and convicted individuals for playacting."70 9 Review-
ing virtually every bit of evidence and analyzing all relevant conversa-
tions in detail, the Select Committee "unequivocally" rejected as "pure
prevarication" the Myers defendants' claims that they believed there
was no real quid pro quo for the bribes.7 10 This was especially strong
language from a Committee that often couched its factual conclusions
in probabilistic terms.
Nor is a "scam within a scam" per se outrageous: In the Archer
investigation, he was Salvatore Barone, Las Vegas junket coordinator,
to the Queens grand jury before whom he was relating his story; while
to his attorney and bail bondsman waiting outside, whom he had paid
to fix his case, Sam Barone, mob killer, was telling the grand jury a
phony story; while United States Attorneys Scoppetta and Shaw knew
their undercover agent Sante Bario was simultaneously playing two
other roles to prove the system's corruption. This scam within a scam,
illusion within an illusion, was necessary, proper, and fair.
Nevertheless, if Abscam were truly as Ben-Veniste and Plaza char-
acterized it, it would have been improper and fundamentally unfair.
Targets should be public officials who are willing to sacrifice the public
good for private gain. The essence of public corruption is the public
sacrifice, not the private gain. The Philadelphia phase was too rushed,
the investigation was closing down; the feds had to make it happen too
707. Id. at 474.
708. Id. at 822 (testimony of Richard Ben-Veniste).
709. SELECT COMM., supra note 153, at 173.
710. Id. at 201.
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fast. They did, and left a nagging doubt about whether Jannotti is in-
nocent or guilty.
Abscam had its weaknesses, particularly Jannotti, but these are far
from enough to reject its basic technique. That stands fully vindicated
in essence as necessary and proper.
Abscam must be kept in perspective; it was far from brutal
totalitarianism.
[T]here was no pressure brought on the public official. There
was no badgering, no threats, no harassment, no appeals to
friendship or duty and no attempt to play on the weaknesses of
any party....
There were no wiretaps sought or used in which all parties
to the conversation were unaware that they were being taped
...no search warrants used to invade.., anyone's home or
office. There was no effort to turn relatives or other close confi-
dants of public officials into informants against them. Virtually
all of the evidence came from statements and promises volun-
teered by public officials to third parties whom they barely
knew and whom they trusted to maintain their silence.
711
United States Attorney Robert Del Tufo bitterly complained to
the House Subcommittee that "some of those prosecutors with over-
sight responsibilities forgot or perhaps some never knew the obliga-
tions of prosecutors in this society, which is to strike hard blows, but
fair blows." He also
urge[d], finally, that the subcommittee guard against the incli-
nation to overreact against Abscam. The lapses in prosecutorial
responsiblity should not overshadow the dedicated efforts of
thousands of other prosecutors who have acted properly and
effectively. Only in recent years has law enforcement demon-
strated the resolve and the ability to deal effectively with or-
ganized crime, political corruption and white collar crime.
The effort must continue and covert operations are indis-
pensible to it. Law enforcement has largely demonstrated an
ability to apply undercover techniques in a responsible and
controlled way, the approach should not be lost or impaired.
7 12
This is no doubt common ground among all truly responsible crit-
ics. When Representative Washington asked critics Del Tufo and Rob-
ertson, "Aren't you really saying that this Abscam technique, unrefined
as it is, is inherently too dangerous for the Government to go tinkering
711. Operations Hearings, supra note 153, at 615, 621 (testimony of Irvin Nathan).
712. Id. at 714-15 (testimony of U.S. Att'y Robert Del Tufo).
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with. . . ? I get the feeling you are saying that this process is so inher-
ently dangerous that perhaps we shouldn't be utilizing it at all,
' '7 1 3
Robertson made absolutely clear the limits of his criticism: "Mr. Wash-
ington, I have to respond to that. I am not saying that. I do not believe
that the technique, the undercover technique, the use of individuals of
the ilk of Mel Weinberg is too dangerous. I don't believe that even the
creation of perhaps some fictitious illegal activity is too danger-
ous.. .. As long as these things are monitored and managed... they
can be kept within bounds and individual liberties can be
protected."
71 4
That, of course, brings us back to the question of bounds. Where
are the boundaries, how do we settle them, and how do we police
them?
Of the many dimensions of fairness this essay has attempted to
survey (see particularly those suggested by Professor Gary Marx, and
by the New York Court of Appeals in Isaacson)7 1 5 the active/passive
continuum stands out as especially significant. Unarguably fair is the
passive agent posing as a helpless, elderly person on a park bench to
capture a mugger.
At the other extreme, a benchmark of outrageous government
pressure would be a purported conversation between federal informant
Hoffman and his target, automaker John DeLorean, eventually acquit-
ted of trafficking in cocaine:
DeLorean: "All I ever wanted was an investment to save the company.
I was willing to pay your $1,800,000 commission, and if you
wanted to put that in a dope deal, that's your business. Just
count me out."
Hoffman: "You honor your part of the deal. That way you obviously
live longer."
DeLorean: "I don't have money or any collateral. I just want out. [I]
won't talk."
Hoffman: "How is your little daughter? Wanna get her head
smashed?
7 1 6
Johnny Oleszewski ("Johnny 0") was one of a small group of IRS
criminal intelligence supervisors who in the 1950's and 1960's pio-
neered the scam by successfully penetrating organized crime:
We knew who was gambling in Detroit. We had heard that if
you started a bookmaking operation and you did not use the
713. Id. at 760 (question posed by Rep. Harold Washington).
714. Id. (statement of William Robertson, former U.S. Att'y for the District of New
Jersey).
715. See supra notes 135, 138, 142, 407-50 and accompanying text.
716. N.Y. Times, Nov. 1, 1983, at B5, col. 5-6 (subheading omitted).
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Syndicate for their services, they would put you out of busi-
ness. So our agency set up a bookmaking operation and let it
be known in circles that it was operating and let the syndicate
people come there and say, "Look, you're in my turf; you're
either going to pay off or you're going to be killed." So you set
up what appears to be a gambling operation, so that these peo-
ple will have the opportunity if they so choose, to come in and
threaten and extort.
7 17
Soon after Abscam broke, I asked Johnny 0 how it compared to
his earlier simulations.
There is a difference; we did not go out to notify any-
body-"We're in the business; we want your business"--and
induce them to come to us. If it happened, fine-but if it
didn't happen, we would not entrap them, overtly entice them
to take action.
That's the difference. But when you let someone know
you're going to pay them $100,000-even if the guy is honest,
he's going to be curious-you don't know what this guy is going
to come through with, that becomes a little bit hairy, and I'm
not sure...
Was it the activity of the Abscam agents or the sweetness of the
deal that distinguished earlier IRS anti-mob operations from Abscam-
type stings? It was both factors blended:
They had to come and put the arm on us. The active is consid-
erably different. If I advertise that I can get a contract for the
purchase of oil out of Libya and I've got the type of contacts,
and I indicate to outsiders that I've got a real hot deal going
and given the right type of juice, I can make a deal that will
make everybody a million dollars, at that particular point, I've
already got the sugar on the apple, and these birds are hum-
ming around to try to peck at it. Not because they thought
they should do something, but because I brought them into it.
I set the deal up where they think they can make a million
bucks. And they're a little bit greedy, but they have no idea
that they're going to have to do anything illegal. So I'm setting
them up, whereas in our phony bookie operation, we had peo-
ple that were engaged in an activity that is competitive. If the
other people believed that was a threat and if they wanted to
take over, they must move in. I'm not telling them anything.
I've made no contact with them. They have to take the initia-
717. The entire "Johnny 0" passage is based on personal communication with the
Author.
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tive to do something. In the case of the oil deal, I've already
taken the initiative. I've thrown something out that's false and
enticing, and it's the honey on the trap.
Johnny O's passivity would not uncover corruption in the criminal
justice system. Passive stings won't uncover judges and D.A.'s fixing
cases. Rarely will those public officials make the first approach. If you
are committed to cleaning up a corrupt criminal justice system, you
cannot be passive.
"You're absolutely right," agreed Johnny 0. "Given that circum-
stance of a corrupt judicial system, if I had that responsibility to make
that kind of case, that's probably the course I'd take."
Returning to Abscam, if congressmen were selling their votes,
would a passive approach work? Would representatives approach gov-
ernment agents-"You want my vote? It's going to cost you."
Johnny 0 was unwilling to make the same concession:
I think to make that kind of case stick, you're going to have to
take a passive approach. You might say, "Look, I've got a prob-
lem; I'm looking for some help." And after that they've got to
come to you and say, "I can give you the help but it will cost."
But to go to them and say, "Look, I've got $100,000," or, "It
can be worth your while because they are the people I'm repre-
senting" . . . It's a fine line, but to me you've crossed it.
While I might be a swinger in certain areas, I'd have to
evaluate that very carefully before I would make a move, be-
cause the amount of sugar involved would induce that fly to
land. It's too close. I don't know enough of the Abscam circum-
stances to really give an opinion, but I'd say you're treading on
very, very thin ice. There was nobody more anxious to make a
good case than I was, but at the same time you have to be very
careful that you're not going beyond the bounds of fairness.
Did Johnny 0 recommend drawing guidelines in advance, or did
we have to trust undercover agents' instincts? "No, you can't do that.
You have to draw the guidelines, however difficult they are.
7 18
Perhaps we can identify some points along an active/passive con-
tinuum. The most passive sting occurs where the government poses as
a passive victim of physical violence-e.g., the park bench victim.
Next, perhaps, where it poses as legitimate business awaiting coercion,
protection money demands, or payoff requests by municipal inspectors.
More active is an illegitimate business scam awaiting those approaches.
More active still is establishing that business as a neutral prop in a
larger criminal setting-a fencing operation, a safe repository for stolen
718. Id.
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goods. The government is even more active where its undercover oper-
ation supplies ingredients or expertise not absolutely unavailable but
otherwise difficult to obtain. Finally, it is most active where the under-
cover operation is a fully fashioned world, now no longer a prop, but
more a complete set. In this world, people unwittingly play their parts,
relationships are formed, and targets are initially contacted, and ac-
tively enticed with inducements.
No point in thi' continuum should be out of bounds per se, but
guidelines in advance are important, and the Attorney General's
Guidelines have it about right. The nature of the corrupt opportunity
should be made clear, the inducement should duplicate reasonable re-
ality, and should be within the scope of activities sought to be de-
terred. A very sophisticated corrupt politician can take advantage of
these guidelines by insisting all offers and payments are made through
a bagman, who only meets prospective corrupters at sites he selects at
the last minute and who checks for a wire. The bagman instructs the
payor never to mention any quid pro quo directly to the official, but
merely to propose legislation or other official action justified as good
policy.
If this agreement is violated, the public official acts outraged and
immediately accuses the offeror of attempted bribery, or at least imme-
diately ends the meeting and cancels any further contact. In this way,
protected by the guidelines, a wary corrupt public official knows that
any deal or fix that is not constructed as manifestly illegal is not being
offered by a federal agent.
Almost all per se rules of fairness may be manipulated to the ad-
vantage of the corrupt. In November, 1983, for example, a New York
Times article that reported how the use of government surveillance
was successful in attacking organized crime in Las Vegas also noted
that savvy criminals were conspiring in their bedrooms or lawyers' of-
fices, aware that government refrained as a matter of course from bug-
ging those protected sanctuaries.71 9
The second FBI Guideline, that the inducement must reasonably
duplicate reality, is one of the few per se rules that cannot easily be
manipulated. A clever public official who sets a rate above market price
only needs one taker, and that higher price immediately becomes mar-
ket. The corrupt official must either grow geometrically and will soon
be priced out of any corrupt market, or he will be dealing market
prices. There is no test the corrupt can design to separate the duck
from the decoys.
A few additional guidelines have been suggested that should also
be adopted, not as hard and fast rules, but as presumptive fairness
719. N.Y. Times, Nov. 8, 1983, at A18, col. 1.
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boundaries that need a good excuse to be violated. Wherever possible,
a target should be given time to reflect upon a proposed corrupt deal.
Furthermore, lax tokens like "yes," "uh huh" ordinarily should not be
taken as proof of agreement.
Finally, as to fairness, we should adopt double standards and dis-
tinguish active inducements legitimately targeted at public officials
acting in their public capacity from government scams targeted at pri-
vate citizens operating in their private capacity.
In sum, we are best served by a subjective entrapment defense
coupled with a meaningful due process defense. With this combina-
tion, a jury of the defendant's peers assesses the particular defendant's
personal culpability, giving the defendant the benefit of all reasonable
doubts, adopting, perhaps, something akin to a "root of the evil" test.
Was the defendant, on the balance, sufficiently the author of a corrupt
act so as to justify prosecution? Like the insanity defense, entrapment
is in this view ultimately a subjective question of a particular defen-
dant's moral culpability, best decided by the standards of the
community.
At the same time, it is vitally important to a free, republican gov-
ernment that the Executive be kept in check by the Judiciary, which
determines whether its methods of investigation are fundamentally fair
or outrageous. A due process standard must be fleshed out. Countless
suggestions have come from courts, commentators, and public officials
in the other branches. Hopefully, soon the Supreme Court will take an
overview of the decade and a half from Archer to Abscam and give
some sense of the constitutional boundaries they first explicitly noticed
in Russell and barely reaffirmed in Hampton.720 Otherwise, we are left
with the Third Circuit's Kelly holding, that the due process clause's
"broad 'fundamental fairness' guarantee . . . is not transgressed 'ab-
sent coercion, violence or brutality to the person.' "721 If due process is
720. For a discussion of the due process defense as developed in United States v.
Russell, 411 U.S. 423 (1973), and Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484 (1976), see
supra note 702 and accompanying text.
721. United States v. Kelly, 707 F.2d 1460, 1476 (3d Cir.) (quoting Irvine v. Califor-
nia, 347 U.S. 128, 132-33 (1954)), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 264 (1983). Cases in which law
enforcement activity would support a Rochin-type due process defense, opined the Third
Circuit, would form a "slim category." Id. at 1476 n.13. Just how slim can be gleaned
from the list of cases, cited with approval by the court, id., in which a due process de-
fense was not sustained: Yanez v. Romero, 619 F.2d 851 (10th Cir.) (threat to use cathe-
ter to take urine sample), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 876 (1980); United States v.
VanMaanen, 547 F.2d 50 (8th Cir. 1976) (police prepared false reports, advised witness
to leave town, failed to disclose existence of informant before trial); United States v.
Gengler, 510 F.2d 62 (2d Cir.) (kidnapping of defendant from Bolivia), cert. denied, 421
U.S. 1001 (1975); United States v. Harrison, 432 F.2d 1328 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (grabbing
suspect's throat to prevent swallowing of heroin); Rivas v. United States, 368 F.2d 703
(9th Cir. 1966) (body cavity border search), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 945 (1967); Blefare v.
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meaningfully to complement subjective entrapment, it surely means
more than this. In the absence of a Supreme Court declaration, Con-
gress must seriously consider issuing temporary but federally binding
guidelines declarative of their understanding of the constitutional lim-
its on undercover in a free society, leaving it to the several states to
articulate their views under their respective state constitutions.
GARDEN PARTms TAPED
A retake opens with Adam and Eve, contentedly basking in the
sunshine, Adam staring at the partly cloudy sky, Eve picking flowers.




"No thank you; they're everywhere. I pick what I like."
"Oh? I notice you don't touch the apples from the tree in the
middle."
"Right. From this one tree our Sovereign Lord has told us we may
not eat."
"God was only testing you to see if you would pass up good fruit
for no reason. Don't be so gullible. God really wants you to eat it and
prove you're a man."
"No, God specifically said. .
"Don't quote scripture to me. Trust me."
"Ask Eve."
"Hey, Eve, this fellow you live with ain't so bright, but you strike
me as a pretty sharp lady. Let's be honest. You would like to try the
fruit from the tree in the center."
"What are you suggesting? Absolutely not. It's against the Lord."
United States, 362 F.2d 870 (9th Cir. 1966) (in connection with border search, rectal
examination, administration of an emetic, pumping of stomach, largely without objection
at the time by defendant). The Third Circuit, following United States v. Payner, 447
U.S. 727 (1980), discussed supra note 146, also limited the due process defense to cases
where the outrageous, fundamentally unfair conduct of the government was inflicted di-
rectly on the defendant. 707 F.2d at 1476. While the Third Circuit was compelled to
follow the holding in Payner, it is more difficult to understand why the court thought its
role in defining the limits of the due process defense under Rochin had to be so very
limited: "Without further Supreme Court elaboration, we have no guide to a more dy-
namic definition of the outrageousness concept, and no warrant, as lower court judges, to
devise such a definition in advance of any signal to do so from higher authority." Id.
(footnote omitted). To be meaningful, a due process defense must encompass more than
the most egregious physical invasions of the defendant's person. Nothing in the concepts
of "outrageousness" or "fundamental fairness" suggests they should be limited to in-
fringements on a person's physical integrity. The Third Circuit in Kelly took too literally
Justice Frankfurter's reference in Rochin to "the rack and the screw."
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"Admit it; you want to."
"It never occurred to me."
"OK, but think about it; you do desire to taste it."
"Now that you mention it, I am rather curious; it does look good."
"Come on, taste it."
"No, God told us not to eat it. We can't."
"Can't or won't?"
"God says we die if we eat it; it must be poisonous."
"Die? Ha. I eat it all the time. It's delicious."
"No, God says we die. God wouldn't lie."
"Don't be naive. God doesn't want you to eat it because God
doesn't want you to be able to think for yourself and resemble God.
Once you eat it, you will be free."
"I could do it, but it would be wrong."
"Come on, taste it; have an open mind. Just take one bite; if you
don't like it, don't finish it. I'll finish it. I'm only doing this for you
because you're my friend."
"I don't know."
"Oh, but you will. Come on, try it."
And with that, the snake plucked the fruit from .the tree and
handed it to Eve: "You can honestly say you never ate the fruit from
the tree."
The rest is the human condition. Entrapment? Fundamental
unfairness?
JURISDICTION: A RIGHT TO DETERMINE
An issue resolved prior to a defendant's guilt or innocence, juris-
diction may be the most important question of the Archer/Abscam leg-
acy. Jurisdiction is not merely a "technical" legal question, but a com-
prehensive problem which links almost all others. It is indisputable
that bribery may be a serious crime, and if properly proved should be
punished and, where possible, prevented. At the same time, the meta-
question of jurisdiction is whether and when a particular branch of
government, or a particular government, or government itself has the
right to determine a target's guilt or innocence.
Phrased this way, then, the jurisdictional question is at least three
separate questions:
1. Does the Executive have jurisdiction to sting the Legislature
and/or Judiciary without undermining the separation of powers which
Americans take as absolutely necessary for a well-working constitu-
tional republic?
2. Does the federal Executive have jurisdiction to sting branches
of state government without seriously undermining essential founda-
tions of our federal constitutional republic?
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3. Finally, under what conditions does Government-whether
federal or state-have jurisdiction to demonstrate corruption through
the use of carefully monitored undercover stings without destroying
that humane free society which our constitutional republic was primar-
ily designed to promote?
At the dawn of Western civilization, the first scientists and philos-
ophers conceived a well-working universe as stemming from encroach-
ing opposites successively checking each other's transgressions. Hera-
clitus pointed out that stability masked an underlying strife between
contending opposites. 22 Basic English constitutional liberties were es-
tablished only by centuries of wars fought by Parliamentarians to ac-
quire Legislative independence from a perpetually encroaching Execu-
tive overreach. Through the efforts of great judges like Sir Edward
Coke, the Judiciary asserted its independence from both the Legisla-
tive and Executive.723 In his Spirit of the Laws, Montesquieu laid
722. In the sixth century B.C., the Greek philosopher Anaximander speculated that
the universe worked because of a continual mutual encroachment of such opposites as
hot and cold, moist and dry "according to necessity; for they pay penalty and retribution
to each other for their injustice... ." Anaximander, Fragment 1, trans. in G. KIRK & J.
RAVEN, THE PREsocRATic PHILOSOPHERS 117 (1957). See generally W. GUTHRIE, A His-
TORY OF GaEEK PHmosoPHY (1962). "It is necessary to know ... that all things happen
by strife. . . ." Heraclitus, Fragment 80, trans. in G. KIRK & J. RAVEN, supra, at 195.
Heraclitus analogized the stability of the universe to that of a tightly strung bow or lyre.
Heraclitus, Fragment 51, trans. in id. at 193.
723. Foremost among the guarantees against arbitrary executive power extracted
from King John at Runnymede was that "No free man shall be taken, imprisoned, dis-
seised, outlawed, banished, or in any way destroyed, nor will We proceed against or pros-
ecute him, except by the lawful judgment of his peers and by the law of the land."
Magna Carta, ch. 39, trans. in A. HOWARD, MAGNA CARTA, TEXT AND COMEmNTARY 43
(1964). The contest between King and Parliament culminated in the triumph of parlia-
mentary supremacy over royal prerogative in the Glorious Revolution of 1688. See gener-
ally J. TANNER, ENGLISH CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICTS OF THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY
(1928).
In parallel with the struggle between King and Parliament, the Judiciary grew more
independent. By the time of Edward I, judicial power was being exercised, not by the
monarch in person, but by a professional cadre of lawyers and judges who, though they
served at the king's pleasure, did not always decide as the king pleased, but according to
law and precedent. See F. THOMPSON, THE FIRST CENTURY OF MAGNA CARTA: WHY IT
PERSISTED AS A DOCUMENT 57-58 (1925). In a famous confrontation between royal power
and judicial independence, the common law judges, led by the indomitable Chief Justice
Coke, told James I that they, not the king, had the ultimate authority to determine their
own jurisdiction:
The judges informed the King that no King after the Conquest assumed to him-
self to give any judgment in any cause whatsoever, which concerned the adminis-
tration of justice within this realm, but these were solely determined in the
courts of justice .... Then the King said he thought the law was founded upon
reason and that he and others had reason as well as the judges. To which it was
answered by me [Coke] that ... his Majesty was not learned in the laws of his
realm of England, and causes... are not to be decided by natural reason but by
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down a principle that became axiomatic for the American founders: A
well-working constitutional republic required a separation of powers.
724
The Executive, Legislative, and Judiciary must each have their own
sphere of authority, and any two should prevent the third from de-
stroying the delicate constitutional balance necessary for liberty. Al-
though the Judiciary is traditionally considered the weakest, least dan-
gerous branch of government, possessing neither purse nor sword and
depending upon the other branches for the enforcement of its decrees,
the fate of Maurice Nadjari, New York's anticorruption special prose-
cutor, shows that a Judiciary resisting what it sees as Executive over-
reach in the use of undercover techniques can undermine public confi-
dence in special prosecutors and bring about their downfall.
725
The post-Abscam period has demonstrated the separation of pow-
ers working well at the national level. Congress has conducted a most
searching inquiry into the proper limits of undercover operations.
Through legislation and budget cuts, Congress could greatly limit and
even abolish the use of such tactics by the FBI. The Judiciary, through
an entrapment and due process defense, can block the Executive from
successfully prosecuting and punishing individuals unfairly.
Although it criticized many aspects of the Executive's behavior in
Abscam, the Senate Select Committee's Final Report found the sting
not to threaten our constitutional balance
28
But, beyond Abscam and Archer, is there a serious separation of
powers problem in widespread federal or state executive stings against
the other two branches? Philip Heymann thought not:
I don't think that undercover operations should be treated sep-
arately for Congress on the ground that there is a special
the artificial reason and judgment of law... which requires long study and
experience before ... a man can attain to the cognizance of it ....
E. CORWIN, THE "HIGHER LAW" BACKGROUND OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 38-39
(1955) (quoting Coke's account of the incident). The king responded that such law would
be treasonous, but Coke countered with a maxim of Bracton's that the king was "under
God and Law." Id.
724. Thus, in THE FEDERALIST, supra note 1, No. 47, Madison characterized the sepa-
ration of the executive, judicial, and legislative powers as "the sacred maxim of free gov-
ernment" and acknowledged the contribution of Montesquieu: "The oracle who is always
consulted on this subject is the celebrated Montesquieu." Id. at 308, 301. See generally
P. SPURLIN, MONTESQUIEU IN AMERICA 1760-1801 (1940).
725. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
726. SELECT Comi., supra note 153, at 32.
The Abscam undercover operation initially raised questions about the possibility
that the executive branch could use its law enforcement powers to encroach
upon the independence of the other branches of government and thereby to en-
danger the constitutionally mandated separation of powers. The Select Commit-
tee's investigation shows that no such encroachment occurred in Abscam.
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threat to the separation of powers inherent in this type of in-
vestigation. I think undercover operations are a rather clumsy
way for a malicious executive to try to dominate or intimidate
Congress.
72 7
Executive domination here depended upon a "fund of corruptibil-
ity in Congress," which Professor Heymann believed absent. Also, a
sting against a group relies on no one blowing the whistle, making it
public. Furthermore, after the fact, probing congressional committees
would reveal any improper political targeting, thus discrediting the Ex-
ecutive. In short, "[tihere are other ways, far more to be feared, for an
unscrupulous Executive... to get at Congress. "728
Heymann seemed not to greatly fear party politics with an execu-
tive of one party-a president, a governor, a locally elected district at-
torney-attacking legislative members of another party by utilizing un-
dercover investigations. The succession of office is a check against that
possibility, for when the people learn of this executive abuse, they will
vote that executive out of office. Another check is the realization by
legislative members of the executive's own party that subsequent ad-
ministrations may turn the techniques against them.
But executive stings may be abused to undercut the separation of
powers. In 1984, this nation is fortunate to have as FBI Director Wil-
liam Webster, who is scrupulously sensitive to constitutional issues of
fairness, privacy, and the separation of powers. It has not always been
so; nor can it always be expected. We should not allow our respect for
the person who presently possesses the power to lull our fear of its
abuse. Two hundred years ago, in a moment of extreme caution, the
Maryland Farmer warned:
The chief magistrate is now clothed with full authority to do
good-If he does so, he confirms a solid tyranny for his degen-
erate successors-For if power does not corrupt him it cer-
tainly will those that follow: In this view, the best ... magis-
trates have only entailed misery on mankind.72 9
As Director of the FBI, J. Edgar Hoover shied away from using the
sting, but he was quite willing to keep dossiers on politicians and ex-
ploit them. It is entirely possible, and a danger worth guarding against,
that an ambitious FBI Director armed with an uncontrolled discretion
to utilize criminal simulations, might document politicians' private
weaknesses, exploiting them to the serious detriment of the constitu-
727. Operations Hearings, supra note 153, at 491 (statement of Prof. Phillip B.
Heymann).
728. Id.
729. 5 Tm ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 2, at 56-57 (Maryland Farmer).
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tional plan. The Judiciary would not exercise control as there would be
no trials stemming from the technique. Rather, the tapes would be uti-
lized only on rare occasions as a secret means to force a vulnerable
Congress to increase the FBI's budget, decrease congressional over-
sight, and so on.
A ruthless executive, misusing stings, accumulating dirt for black-
mail, might destroy the balance "constitutionally, and by one of those
silent operations which frequently takes place without being noticed,
but which often produces such changes as entirely to alter a govern-
ment, subvert a free constitution, and rivet the chains on a free people
before they perceive they are forged. 7 3 0 Slowly and silently the FBI
might gain control of government and we would discover our tyranny,
if at all, long after we could prevent it. The odds are long, but the
stakes are high.
Some would trust that no such persons will be in positions of
power with an inclination to usurp it. But, as Charles Turner observed
at our founding, "[Plower long continued. . . makes men giddy, turns
the head, and heart too, many times."'73' An Old Whig warned,
[T]he only safe way of reasoning on political subjects is, to con-
sider men, abstractly as men, with like passions and infirmities
throughout the world, in every age, and every country; and to
believe that the same guards and checks against arbitrary
power, which were necessary two thousand years ago, are
equally necessary at present, and will be so two thousand years
hence.
7 32
If there is a real threat to the separation of powers, why not sim-
ply outlaw the technique at least against Congress? Because, while it is
dangerous, the technique is absolutely necessary to combat official
corruption.
In their attempt to insure legislative independence from the Exec-
utive, the founders placed in the Constitution a guarantee that "for
any Speech or Debate in either House, they [Senators and Representa-
tives] shall not be questioned in any other Place.1 73 3 In 1979, in cir-
cumstances like Abscam, the United States Supreme Court ruled in
United States v. Helstoski7 4 that this "speech and debate" clause pre-
cludes the prosecution in a bribery trial from making any reference to
730. 2 id. at 386-87 (Brutus).
731. 4 id. at 237 (A Friend to the Rights of the People) (pseudonym of Thomas Cogs-
well, Chief Justice of the New Hampshire Court of Common Pleas, id. at 204, 234).
732. 3 id. at 48 (An Old Whig) (author's identity unknown).
733. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 6, cl. 1.
734. 442 U.S. 477 (1979).
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any legislative act performed by the defendant Representative. 76 "The
usual way we would prove an allegation of bribery outside a Congres-
sional context," said Professor Heymann, "is to show that money was
transferred more or less contemporaneously with the performance of
an official act for which the money was promised."7 30 But now, "al-
though we can prove that money passed (the quid), Helstoski prevents
introducing evidence of the official act (the quo). 7 3 7 Without under-
cover scams, often congressional bribery is simply unprovable.
The best demonstration of this, perhaps, is "Koreagate" where, as
a House Committee report on Standards of Official Conduct concluded,
Korean officials had made illegal cash payments to a number of con-
gressmen in order to obtain influence in Congress.7 38 Although report-
edly as many as 115 congressmen had taken bribes from South Korean
agents, since neither the Koreans nor congressmen involved would ad-
mit paying or receiving money, not a single representative was even
censured.739 Again, when all is said and done, without undercover
scams congressional bribery is extremely difficult if not impossible to
prove.
Not only is the executive scam necessary to prove corruption in
government, it is particularly effective in preventing it. If, as the Fed-
eral Farmer declared, "It is the probable chance of escaping punish-
ment that induces men to transgress, 7 0 then it must also be true that
the prospect of punishment prevents the transgression. The likelihood
of punishment fails to deter many classes of criminals, but politicians,
trained to think contingently, and act cautiously, with reputations, po-
sitions, power, and fortunes to protect, are most likely to think before
they take bribes, and be deterred even by a tiny but real prospect of
detection.
We must have undercover stings against members in the coordi-
nate branches of government: We must risk executive domination and
our constitutional plan to maintain our republic. The use of this power,
however, must be surrounded with restraints-external checks. Just as
the jury system is a democratic check upon judicial abuse, and fre-
quent elections are democratic checks upon some forms of executive
735. 442 U.S. at 488.
736. Oversight Hearings, supra note 153, at 135 (statement of Prof. Phillip B.
Heymann).
737. Id.
738. House Comm. on Standards of Official Conduct, Korean Influence Investiga-
tion, H.R. Doc. No. 252, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978).
739. Nathan and Heymann emphasized this point during their testimony. Oversight
Hearings, supra note 153, at 491-92 (testimony of Prof. Philip B. Heymann); at 598
(testimony of Irvin B. Nathan, former Dep. Ass't Atty. Gen., Crim. Div., Dept. of
Justice).
740. 2 THE ANm-FEDERLIST, supra note 2, at 305 (Federal Farmer).
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and legislative abuse, so an undercover operations review board, com-
posed in large part of private citizens with access to FBI files in all
undercover operations, might provide a helpful early check upon the
otherwise unrestrained executive power.
Congressionally enacted FBI guidelines, which give FBI subordi-
nates grounds for resisting clear overreach by their superiors, provide
another check. Agents who realize that the agency is definitely violat-
ing congressional and judicial mandate could oppose their agency from
within and, if unsuccessful, could warn Congress, the judiciary, and the
press.
In the end, although there exists a serious risk to the separation of
powers from the abuse of the technique, there is also jurisdiction for
the Executive to sting the Legislative and the Judiciary.
No less important to our constitutional plan than separating the
branches of government is the task of dividing sovereignty between
central and local government. This is, of course, a perpetual problem of
government in all ages: How to combine local autonomy with central
control? The United States jettisoned its Articles of Confederation in
favor of our present Constitution primarily to insure adequate central
power to maintain ourselves as one nation.741 On the other hand, we
are a pluralist nation of states, committed to local government over
local concerns. The essence of state sovereignty has always included
defining, detecting, prosecuting, and punishing crime.
41
Yet the central government has a legitimate interest in defining,
741. The framers of the Constitution, meeting at Philadelphia, abandoned the idea of
amending the Articles of Confederation at an early stage of their deliberations. See gen-
erally M. FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION (1911). The obstacles to
effective national government inherent in the loose confederacy established under the
Articles of Confederation are extensively detailed in THE FEDERALIST, Nos. 15-22. Argu-
ing for total replacement of the Articles, Alexander Hamilton characterized the defects
of the old system as beyond remedy: "It must be by this time evident to all men of
reflection, . . .that it is a system so radically vicious and unsound as to admit not of
amendment but by an entire change in its leading features and characters." THE FEDER-
AmST, supra note 1, No. 22, at 151.
742. Thus, in Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187 (1959), the Court acknowledged
the primacy of the states' role: "[T]he States under our federal system have the principal
responsibility for defining and prosecuting crimes." Id. at 195. Similarly, in Rochin v.
California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952), the Court delineated a limited federal role:
In our federal system the administration of criminal justice is predominantly
committed to the care of the States. The power to define crimes belongs to Con-
gress only as an appropriate means of carrying into execution its limited grant of
legislative powers. U.S. Const., Art. I, § 8, cl. 18. Broadly speaking, crimes in the
United States are what the laws of the individual States make them, subject to
the limitations of Art. I, § 10, cl. 1 in the original Constitution, prohibiting bills
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detecting, prosecuting and punishing certain national crimes, such as
counterfeiting and treason. Those who initially opposed the Constitu-
tion did so primarily because of two essential fears. Without a Bill of
Rights, they believed the federal government would slowly but surely
encroach upon individual liberties and local sovereignty. 43 Second,
they believed the central government would eventually abolish the in-
dependence and autonomy of the states, the federal judiciary actively
cooperating in this federal encroachment of state rights.744 They were
not altogether wrong.
Congress has stretched its delegated power to "make all laws nec-
essary and proper" 45 to "regulate commerce among the several
states" 48 and produced federal criminal statutes like the Travel Act,
41
under which Archer was prosecuted, and the Hobbs Act,748 under
which Jannotti was prosecuted by the federal government for commit-
ting what were essentially only state crimes "affecting commerce."
Reading the discussions and debates of our founders who proposed and
the people who ratified the Constitution, it seems clear that Congress,
with the cooperation of the federal courts, has extended its power be-
yond originally agreed limits.
United States history, from its founding to its Civil War, estab-
lishes beyond dispute that under the constitutional plan, a state may
not annul federal legislation it believes usurps its essential rights.749
743. The absence of a bill of rights was the foremost objection to ratification ad-
vanced by the Anti-Federalist opponents of the Constitution. See generally THE ANTI-
FEDERALIST, supra note 2. George Mason, who had been among the Virginia delegates to
the constitutional convention refused to sign the Constitution and became a prominent
Anti-Federalist. He listed the lack of a bill of rights as the first among his objections,
expressing fear that the national government would use its power to annul citizen rights
guaranteed by state law: "There is no Declaration of Rights; and the Laws of the general
Government being paramount to the Laws of the several States, the Declaration of
Rights in the separate States are no Security." G. Mason, Objections to the Constitution
of Government formed by the Convention (1787), reprinted in 2 id. at 11.
744. The pseudonymous Brutus, see supra note 11, a leading Anti-Federalist
polemicist, warned that "the judicial power of the United States ... will lean strongly in
favour of the general government, and will give such an explanation to the constitution,
as will favor an extension of its jurisdiction... ." 2 THE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 2,
at 417, 420 (Brutus). Brutus predicted that this judicially fostered encroachment of state
power would render the states trivial and irrelevant: "[I]n proportion as the general gov-
ernment acquires power and jurisdiction, by the liberal construction which the judges
may give the constitution, will those of the states lose its rights, until they become so
trifling and unimportant, as not to be worth having." Id. at 426-27.
745. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
746. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
747. See 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (1982); supra note 65 and accompanying text.
748. See 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (1982); supra text accompanying note 304.
749. Thus, for example, President Andrew Jackson's response to South Carolina's at-
tempt at nullification of federal tariff legislation, see supra note 29, was his strongly
worded Proclamation to the People of South Carolina (Dec. 10, 1832), reprinted in 3
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Ultimately, the national government polices the subtle, ever-changing
boundaries between national and local sovereignty. When national leg-
islation conflicts with contrary state legislation, the former prevails.
There is no more essential principle of federalism than national
supremacy under the Constitution, as explicitly declared by the
supremacy clause: "This Constitution and the Laws of the United
States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof. . . shall be the su-
preme Law of the Land ... any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of
any State to the Contrary notwithstanding." 750
Those who originally expounded states' rights-including state
control over essentially local crime-were wrong to assume the federal
judiciary would always cooperate in this slow but steady congressional
power grab. Concerned not to upset the optimal constitutional balance
between national supremacy and local autonomy, leading federal ju-
rists like Henry Friendly have sought to check federal usurpations of
state sovereignty over local crimes.751
This essay has criticized Judge Friendly for his Archer opinion,
but his sensitivity to proper federal-state relations, his resistance to
manufacturing phony federal jurisdiction over essentially local crime, is
salutary. Federal judges like Friendly help us remember that ordinarily
it is not the job of the federal government to detect and prosecute local
crime, and that it is bad public policy, if not unconstitutional, to
ground federal prosecutions upon a stretched definition of interstate
commerce. In our federal plan, national supremacy complements but
does not supplant states' rights. The tenth amendment and the closing
passage of the Bill of Rights state: "The powers not delegated to the
United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States,
are reserved to the States respectively or to the people.
7 52
Congressional hearings in the wake of Abscam have probed deeply
into almost every significant aspect of the FBI's undercover tech-
niques. Perhaps the most notable exception, the area left least ex-
plored, is the basic problem of federal jurisdiction over local corrup-
tion. In passing, Chairman Edwards had asked Professor Seidman
MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 1789-1897 1203 (1897), in which he made it
clear that nullification was an intolerable threat to the Union:
I consider, then, the power to annul a law of the United States, assumed by
one State, incompatible with the existence of the Union, contradicted expressly
by the letter of the Constitution, unauthorized by its spirit, inconsistent with
every principle on which it was founded, and destructive of the great object for
which it was formed.
Id. at 1206.
750. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
751. H. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A GENERAL VIEw (1973), discussed supra
notes 63-73 and accompanying text.
752. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
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whether an FBI agent could be prosecuted for violating state law when
engaging in authorized undercover behavior.7 53 Not having studied this
problem, the Georgetown Law Professor declined to offer an opinion,
but did observe that "there would be complex supremacy clause
problems. 17  In any event, he found it "indefensible" for the federal
government to authorize violations of state criminal statutes: "I don't
think that the Federal Government ought to be in the business of au-
thorizing its agents to go around violating State laws against things
like armed robbery and murder. I just don't see the justification. 1' 55
No one disagreed with this, but the problem was more difficult:
what about non-violent state "crimes" like lying to a grand jury, or
filing false affidavits? In the Archer investigation, the United States
attorneys had rejected using a real defendant to attempt to buy his
way out of the criminal justice system, partly because they feared he
might be prosecuted for bribery by the local authorities if the case
busted. They assumed that a federal agent would be immune. Police
Commissioner Murphy had hesitated before supplying the cop to ar-
rest Bario in the scam because he, too, feared local prosecution, unsure
whether the federal attorneys could immunize the cop from state
prosecution.
After Professor Seidman declined to address it, Chairman Ed-
wards, himself an ex-FBI agent, continued to muse aloud on this "in-
teresting question." If "the informant was authorized to institute a
burglary and was arrested by the local police, what would happen" at a
local trial?756 "I'm sure it would be offered as a defense. But whether
or not it would stand up is something else. We really don't know, do
we? '7 57 It was "an interesting constitutional question," Seidman
agreed. The conversation shifted, and never returned to federal-state
relations.
A little over a year later, in June 1982, the Eleventh Circuit was
forced to consider this very question.7 58 The FBI had been investigat-
ing a Stone Mountain, Georgia district attorney whom it suspected was
selling protection to local gamblers. The district attorney turned the
tables by arresting the corrupt middleman, a state legislator who of-
fered him a bribe. A specially appointed district attorney then tried to
prosecute the FBI agent under Georgia law for attempted bribery. "We
do not face so extreme a case as Archer," said the federal appeals
753. Oversight Hearings, supra note 153, at 20 (question by Rep. Don Edwards, Sub-
comm. Chairman).
754. Id. (testimony of Prof. Louis Seidman).
755. Id.
756. Id. at 20 (remark by Rep. Don Edwards, Subcomm. Chairman).
757. Id.
758. Baucom v. Martin, 677 F.2d 1346 (11th Cir. 1982).
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court, "but disruption of the state judicial process by federal officers,
even without an improper motive, can be serious. ' '7 9 The Court issued
a stern warning:
Investigators and prosecutors must be as aware as are the
courts of the "delicate interface between state and federal law
enforcement." Deliberate violations of state law for federal
purposes must be the rare exception, and be clearly seen to be
reasonable, necessary, and proper. Otherwise, federal officers
will have to be abandoned by federal courts as the Supremacy
Clause will not save them.
760
Once again, the Archer experience-that thoroughly vindicated
federal investigation of New York's corrupt criminal justice sys-
tem-had been distorted, its lessons lost to the Eleventh Circuit, prob-
ably because the Second Circuit had not seen fit to correct its own
misstatements and fully inform other federal circuit courts.
The federal appeals court did recognize that the FBI must employ
agents to detect and prosecute crimes against the United States. "The
purchase as well as sale of narcotics may constitute a state violation,
but seldom gives rise to state objection." 17 6 ' This "analogy between nar-
cotics and official corruption cases [was] not a strained one, both are
often very difficult to make. 7 6 2 Furthermore, "[a] dishonest public of-
ficial who profanes his official trust may do more harm to our society
than common criminals, and be much more difficult to investigate and
convict."7 6 Nor was there any better method to investigate the allega-
tions, and finally, perhaps critically, "[t]his bribery episode was after
all not a pure federal intrusion into a state matter. The state itself was
a partner of the federal government in the investigation in pursuit of
common interests of public concern.
' '7
6
The federal court refused to throw the federal agent to the angry
local District Attorney, concluding, "the Supremacy Clause
controls.
'7 5
Apparently unaware that Archer, which it found more "extreme,"
also involved extensive federal-state cooperation, the federal appeals
court did not squarely face the question: What is a federal agent's lia-
bility in strictly federal investigations for federally authorized acts
which otherwise violate state criminal law? Absent bad faith, there
759. Id. at 1350.
760. Id. at 1351 (quoting District Judge Ward's unreported opinion) (emphasis
added).
761. Id. at 1350 (footnote omitted).
762. Id.
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clearly seems to be immunity under the supremacy clause, but if, ac-
cording to the court's analysis, the "Supremacy Clause controls" only
where the investigative technique was reasonably employed, and if that
technique was reasonable only where there was a federal basis to inves-
tigate, we are thrown back to the question of jurisdiction.
Judge Friendly ignored it in Archer; the House Subcommittee had
ignored it too. By its own declaration, the Senate Select Committee
had studied "constitutional provisions, statutes, regulations, guidelines
and judicial decisions governing important aspects of undercover oper-
ations," all the hearings of the House Subcommittee, as well as "nearly
40,000 pages of trial transcripts and due process hearing transcripts,"
and more than 20,000 Abscam documents.76 6 Yet, although it pointed
out the "most relevant constitutional provisions" as the fourth amend-
ment, fifth amendment, speech and debate clause, and the first amend-
ment, its minutely comprehensive report also ignored sixteen words in
the United States Constitution which this essay seeks to demonstrate
give the federal government its real jurisdiction to investigate local cor-
ruption by simulating crimes: "The United States shall guarantee to
every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government. "
s
In a republic, the citizens exercise their supreme power through
representatives elected by them and responsible to them. Whatever
their differences on the appropriate balance between state and federal
power, those who designed and debated the United States Constitution
"t[oo]k for granted, that all agree in this, that whatever government we
adopt, it ought to be a free one; that it should be so framed as to se-
cure the liberty of the citizens of America, and such ... as to admit of
a full, fair and equal representation of the people."76 When state legis-
lators secretly sell their votes to special interests in derogation of the
common good, then the people are not fully, fairly and equally repre-
sented. Where district attorneys and judges take bribes to fix cases of
mob killers caught with unlicensed guns, then the will of the people, as
expressed in their legislatively adopted penal law, is not translated into
actual fact, and there is no true republic. "The soul of republicanism,"
observed the Impartial Examiner, is "that reciprocity of common inter-
est between the legislature and the bulk of the nation. 7 69 Official cor-
ruption is an antithesis of real republican government.
At its founding two hundred years ago, some pessimists like the
Maryland Farmer felt that our republic, like all "government by repre-
766. SELEcT Comm., supra note 153, at 7-9.
767. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
768. 2 THE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 2, at 368 (Brutus).
769. 5 id. at 193 (Impartial Examiner) (author's identity unknown).
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sentation, seems only to have been established to disgrace itself and be
abolished it perishes by speedy corruption.
7 0
The Constitution only guarantees the people in their states a re-
publican "form" of government. If elections and other outward forms
are maintained, hasn't the constitutional guarantee been met? Clearly
not, and this, too, was common ground among the founders. "I believe
the people of the United States are full in the opinion, that a free and
mild government can be preserved .. . only under the substantial
forms of a federal republic," declared the Federal Farmer.77 1 Defending
the guarantee clause in the 43rd Federalist, Madison emphasized:
The more intimate the nature of such a union may be, the
greater interest have the members in the political institutions
of each other; and the greater right to insist that the forms of
government under which the compact was entered into should
be substantially maintained. But a right implies a remedy; and
where else could the remedy be deposited than where it is de-
posited by the Constitution?7
That depository is the federal government. Madison went on to cite
Montesquieu: "Should abuses creep into one part, they are reformed
by all those that remain sound.
'7 7 3
In the 71st Federalist, Hamilton said: "The republican principle
demands that the deliberate sense of the community should govern the
conduct of those to whom they intrust the management of their af-
fairs. 7 7 4 Under a republican government, then, two conditions must be
met: First, Legislatures-the people's representatives-must enact
rules which they believe reflect the people's will to promote the public
good, with the Executive and Judiciary evenhandedly translating these
legal rules into social fact. Second, citizens must be able to assess
whether and when those to whom they delegate public power are faith-
less with the public trust, so as to remove them from office. As
Madison said, "the right of electing the members of the government
constitutes more particularly the essence of a free and responsible gov-
ernment. The value and efficacy of this right depends on the
knowledge of the comparative merits and demerits of the candidates
for public trust.
'7 75
If the essence of representative government is free elections, which
are occasions for the people to make meaningful choices, undetected
770. Id. at 42 (Maryland Farmer).
771. 2 id. at 53 (Federal Farmer).
772. THE FEDERALIST, supra note 1, No. 43, at 274-75 (J. Madison).
773. Id. at 277-78.
774. Id. No. 71, at 432 (A. Hamilton).
775. J. Madison, Report on the Virginia Resolutions, reprinted in 4 DEBATES IN THE
SEVERAL STATE CoNvENTIoNs ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONsTrruIUON *546, 575
(J. Elliot, ed., 2d ed. 1836).
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corruption seriously undercuts the ability to assess those candidates
and it therefore seriously undercuts real representation. Undetected
official corruption denies us truly representative government.
Ironically, this linkage was most explicitly recognized by Judge
Pratt in Myers, a case where federal jurisdiction was not even
questioned:
When public officials are as readily corrupted as were the
defendants in these cases, the republic is in grave danger. Far
more threatening to our national survival than any foreign en-
emy is corruption and rot at the center of our government. If
legislative actions by members of congress can be purchased
with funds supplied by unseen foreigners, in jeopardy is the
very core of our democratic government, faithful representa-
tion of citizens by their elected representatives.77
Only through carefully monitored undercover simulations are the
people assured that their government is truly republican. Where cor-
rupt local government will not reveal itself except through federal
stings, the guarantee clause gives the federal government jurisdiction
to demonstrate local corruption in office. The clause demands no less.
In its Study Draft of a new Federal Criminal Code, the National Com-
mission on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws expressed views virtually
identical to those stated here.7 77 They proposed that Congress use its
"largely untested constitutional power" and make bribing local officials
a federal offense.
778
776. Myers, 527 F. Supp. at 1236.
777. 1 WORKING PAPERS OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMI-
NAL LAWS, STUDY DRAFT OF A NEW FEDERAL CRIMINAL CODE 720-21 (1970).
778. Id. at 721. In his consultant's report, Norman Abrams, a professor at U.C.L.A.
Law School, explained:
Federal investigation and prosecution of what is essentially a local offense may
also be appropriate where the case involves corruption of local government or,
for some other reason, a breakdown of local law enforcement .... And Federal
investigation and prosecution may be desirable because local law enforcement
may find it difficult or awkward to proceed since local officials are involved. Fed-
eral intervention in such cases is justified by the same type of reasoning that
might lead a State governor to send a special prosecutor to a local county to
prosecute a case of local corruption.
Id. at 54.
The report justified federal detection of local corruption in other ways: Although
defendants may not themselves be local officials,
there may be concern that the offenders will be able to corrupt local officials and
thus block local prosecution. This is a more speculative basis for Federal prose-
cution, since it may depend on mere suspicion rather than the nature of the
charge, the position of the accused or other such factors. But it is difficult to
reject it as an adequate justification, particularly where such suspicions are
strong.
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The analysis of consultants Bancroft and Dean included the pre-
cise justification for the federal investigation of the New York criminal
justice system, spearheaded by Detective Leuci, culminating in the
Archer case: "The Federal interest in securing protection for the hon-
est local public servant who may not be able, because of local corrup-
tion, to secure vindication from his own sovereign is a direct and sub-
stantial function of the Federal interest in the prosecution of local
corruption itself."
' 779
We who appreciate state rights might protest that to adopt this
essay's recommendations-rejecting unwarranted federal criminal ju-
risdiction over activities which merely "affect commerce" while resting
it on the guarantee clause-only amounts to exchanging one intrusion
upon state sovereignty for another. After all, if the states are primarily
responsible for defining, detecting, prosecuting, and punishing local
crime, and bribery remains essentially local crime, why shouldn't the
states prosecute it?
They should. Investigating and prosecuting local corruption is and
should continue to be a state function. The states are primarily respon-
sible for keeping their own systems clean and initiating their own
stings. Throughout the United States, however, there are pockets of
official corruption which have remained unperturbed for decades.
Without federal investigation, these local nests of corruption will re-
main and the outward forms of republican government will be a sol-
emn mockery.
This is only part of the solution. As the Consultant's Report on
Jurisdiction declared, "Federal investigation need not of course inevi-
tably lead to Federal prosecution. Federal agents might 'make' the
case, then turn over their files to State officials, and be available to
testify when necessary in the State prosecution.
' '
178
State autonomy can be maintained by distinguishing between fed-
eral jurisdiction to investigate local official corruption under the guar-
antee clause, and federal jurisdiction to prosecute. Judge Friendly sug-
gested in his lectures, Federal Jurisdiction: A General View,71 1 that
federal law enforcement agencies must turn over local bribery cases to
Id.
In their working papers, consultants Bancroft and Dean observed: "Federal concern
with local corruption appears to be a function of two interrelated considerations: (1) The
Federal interest in preserving an essentially republican form of government for the
Union and for each of the States. (2) The Federal interest in defeating the national as-
pects of organized crime." Id. at 709.
779. Id. at 712. For a detailed analysis of the guarantee clause, finding it "to be a
proper, albeit largely unrecognized basis for Federal jurisdiction over local corruption
and intimidation," see id. at 721.
780. Id. at 52.
781. H. FRIENDLY, supra note 63.
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the states whenever in their judgment those cases can be prosecuted
effectively by nonfederal agencies.7
8 2
Specifically, unless rebutted by a contrary written finding by the
United States Attorney or Attorney General, a presumption of state
competence to prosecute would mandate state prosecution.
When the federal government has some reasonable suspicion, the
guarantee clause gives the federal government a right to sting the
states. The intentions of the founders and the spirit of the tenth
amendment would require that federal prosecution be declined in favor
of state prosecution whenever practical, but the supremacy clause gives
the federal government unquestionable jurisdiction to decide whether
and when local prosecution is appropriate. Not only the federal execu-
tive but also Congress have a vital role to play by making local corrup-
tion a federal crime, and specifically giving federal investigative agen-
cies jurisdiction under the guarantee clause.
GOVERNMENT'S JURISDICTION OVER PRIVATE LIVEs:
1984 AND BEYOND
Under our federal republic, Archer-type investigations should be
cloned, and instituted throughout the United States by federal and lo-
cal government. There are many cities and towns where judges, prose-
cutors, legislators, police, and other officials are on the take. The
United States Constitution, the supreme law of the land, justifies un-
dercover scams because it guarantees all citizens that government at all
levels will be a straight game.
The same Constitution equally guarantees our basic freedoms,
fundamental fairness, and our essential rights. The third and final ju-
risdictional question concerns not the executive versus the other
branches, nor federal versus state government, but government versus
the people: Does government, whether state or federal, have the juris-
diction to sting private persons acting in their private capacities?
Much of life, like much of law, is a balancing act. At one extreme
in the continuum is a Hobbesian state of nature, an anarchy where not
rules but power arrangements of the moment govern in a war of all
against all, with life, "poore, nasty, brutish, and short."783 Everyone
grabs what they can. Perhaps this brutal anarchy is disguised by the
outer forms of government under a rule of law.
Laws are cobwebs, catching only the flies and letting the wasps
escape. The great and powerful can easily bring to justice the
poor and humble offender; but who is to lead to punishment
the great? These lords of the earth, who have extensive and
782. Id. at 60.
783. T. HOBBES, LEVIATHAN *62 (1651).
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powerful connexions, who aim at no trifling larcenies; but who
plunder a people of their liberties and put public revenues into
their private purses, under the sanction of laws made by them-
selves:-These are the men who deprive their fellow mortals of
their fondest hopes.
84
The people release government agents to sting the wasps, only to
confront a greater horror at the other extreme. Twenty-four hundred
years ago, Aristotle listed "tyranny's three aims in relation to its sub-
jects, namely that they shall a) have no minds of their own, b) have no
trust in each other, and c) have no means of carrying out anything."
8 5
George Orwell has updated Aristotle's nightmare.
In 1984, two-way telescreens and planted microphones helped gov-
ernment to pervade private lives. Big Brother was everywhere--"asleep
or awake, working or resting, in [the] bath or in bed"-no escape.
88
Winston Smith, the tragic hero of 1984, could try to duck out of the
telescreen's sight, and avoid the planted microphones that dotted the
landscape, but he could not avoid the Thought Police, those elite gov-
ernment investigators who "for seven years. ... had watched him like
a beetle under a magnifying glass. There was no physical act, no word
spoken aloud, that they had not noticed, no train of thought that they
had not been able to infer .... ,,787 "Nothing [was] efficient in
Oceania except the Thought Police. 78 8 Everywhere in 1984 govern-
ment agents were testing morality, testing thought itself, testing the
predisposition for crime. Agents of the Thought Police record every
gesture for indications of "thought crime," "the essential crime that
contained all others.
'789
In 1984, every aspect of a person's life was subject to inspection,
every relationship suspect. It was a world of sameness and solitude, but
no privacy. From outside the Party impressed its uniformity, and you
fled, terrified and isolated, safe for the moment only in the furthest
recesses of your own skull. Privacy and trust-neither total together-
ness nor complete isolation-were obliterated. Personal loyalty, an ex-
perience denying uniform rules, was anathema to Total Government.
Winston Smith's last defiance, even after he had been tortured to an
aged skeleton, was to cling to the thought of his private love for Julia,
but the Thought Police forced him to betray even this. Their agents
had offered him opportunities: an antique shop owner with quaint at-
tachments to the old days, who lent Winston a bedroom for his private
784. 5 THE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 2, at 56 (Maryland Farmer).
785. ARISTOTLE, POLITICS, supra note 5, Bk. V, ch. xi, at 277.
786. G. ORWELL, supra note 6, at 173.
787. Id. at 228.
788. Id. at 163.
789. Id. at 19.
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love, secretly monitored. O'Brien, an Inner Party member and appar-
ently rebellious fellow spirit who welcomed Winston into the Resis-
tance in order to betray him and supervise Winston's torture cure.
Against this total control, corruption was the only hope. "Anything
that hinted at corruption always filled him with a wild hope. Who
knew? Perhaps the Party was rotten under the surface .... ,,70o The
Party could be destroyed by corruption: its purity turned to ash. Cor-
ruption rots, weakens, loosens order and control. However horrible
when played for keeps, an anarchistically corrupt free-for-all is infi-
nitely better than totalitarian freedom-for-none. "Despotism is a set-
tled gloom that totally extinguishes happiness," said Centinel.
"[C]ontinual civil war, which is the most destructive and horrible scene
of human discord, is preferable to the uniformity of wretchedness and
misery attendant upon despotism;-of all possible evils, . . . this is
the worst and most to be dreaded.
'7 9 1
Why portray these extremes? Passing beyond 1984, the United
States of America is neither an anarchistic jungle nor a totalitarian
laboratory. We are suspended not between Totalitarianism and Anar-
chy, but more moderately between community and autonomy. While as
Justice Harlan pointed out in 1970, we now possess "devices that make
technologically feasible the Orwellian Big Brother," a supermarket's
television camera also monitors the parking lot for our safety from
muggers.7 12 We note with approval the headline in the newspaper next
to pictures of eagle, elk, big horn sheep, and grizzly bears: "Wildlife
Agents Shift Tactics to Trap Poachers."79 3 The article recounts that
agents are now going undercover, posing as out-of-town commercial
hunters willing to pay local poachers for endangered trophies. "We're
the FBI of the wildlife world," says Terry Grosz, head of the Fish and
Wildlife Service's Law Enforcement Division in Denver. "The uni-
formed game warden is almost a thing of the past. 7 9 4 The agency has a
covert operations branch, with headquarters in Washington, whose
agents were recruited from the FBI, Drug Enforcement, and the CIA.
They use fake storefronts, hidden tape recorders, cameras and false
identities, posing as pet dealers, placing advertisements in magazines.
The scam is the only technique that works when the victims, whose
extinction is truly a crime against nature, cannot complain. Yet to save
our precious wildlife we may gradually sacrifice our own precious pri-
vate life.
"There is no public abuse that does not spring from the necessary
790. Id. at 104.
791. 2 THE Am-FEDRALIST, supra note 2, at 186-87 (Centinel) (footnote omitted).
792. United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 770 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
793. N.Y. Times, Oct. 28, 1983, at A18, col. 4.
794. Id.
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use of power," observed the Maryland Farmer at the founding of our
republic. 195 "[I]t is that insensible progress from the use to the abuse,
that has led mankind through scenes of calamity and woe, that makes
us now shrink back with horror, from the history of our species."98
The technique threatens us in 1984 and beyond, less totally but
more subtly than in 1984. Orwell's vision was horrible, but blatant and
overwhelmingly total. Big Brother and telescreens were obvious signs
which put Winston on notice that the Government sought to be every-
where and the Thought Police would, if they could, monitor his every
thought and deed. We are mostly free in the United States. However
guarded we may be at the office, outside it we feel at liberty to talk
openly, act openly, express ourselves and expose ourselves. Winston
Smith sought a safe harbor; he sought to conceal himself from Big
Brother-at least he was aware of the opposition, he knew the game,
but we trust that persons are who they seem. In private, we quickly
open up to new friends whose acquaintance we "chance" to make.
The United States tends to be smug about its free society. On July
4, 1983, the last celebration before 1984 of our Declaration to the world
that a people may revolt to effectuate their inalienable rights to life,
liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, there appeared in our newspa-
pers an article headlined "Soviets Seek Citizen Spies":
Soviet authorities in some cities are distributing postcards urg-
ing citizens to report suspicious behavior by their neigh-
bors-anonymously if they like-in line with Soviet leader
Yuri Andropov's drive for law and order.
Postcards from the city of Krasnodar were made available to
Western correspondents yesterday. They gave citizens a choice
of 12 accusations that could be brought against neighbors.
The cards, apparently issued as an experiment in an initial run
of 10,000, asked accusers to underline, for example, if the ac-
cused does odd jobs, has unearned income, refuses to pay ali-
mony, is not working, has been previously imprisoned, does not
raise his children responsibly, drinks or uses drugs.
197
We look at Soviet society with repulsion, and think again of its resem-
blance to 1984:
The children ... were systematically turned against their par-
ents and taught to spy on them and report their deviations.
The family had become in effect an extension of the Thought
Police. It was a device by means of which everyone could be
795. 5 THE AnrI-FEDERALIST, supra note 2, at 27 (Maryland Farmer).
796. Id.
797. Newsday, July 4, 1983, at 9, col. 1.
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